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Foreword 
The costs and benefits of large-scale mining to local communities and the evolution of the 
relationship between mining companies and communities is a subject that has become 
important in countries spanning the globe. To date, however, it is also a subject on which 
there has been a dearth of comprehensive research. In a context in which this relationship is 
changing rapidly —albeit unevenly and unsystematically —the need to develop tools that will 
allow the assessment of the impact of different approaches to this relationship has become 
paramount. 
To address this need, a project on large mines and the community was launched in three 
traditional Latin American mining countries —Bolivia, Chile, and Peru —where mining has 
been an important part of the economy for centuries. Given the relatively long and extensive 
mining history of the three countries, it is believed that these studies will provide important 
lessons to other countries in the region and around the globe. It was also decided to include 
studies from Canada and Spain so as to compare the experiences of developed and 
developing countries and to share lessons learned. The experience of Canada, with its well-
established mining industry and involvement of aboriginal peoples that live in many of 
Canada's mining regions, has important parallels with the Latin American situation. The 
study of the Almadén mercury mine in Spain, the oldest active mine in the world, looks into a 
community profoundly affected for over 2 000 years by a mine that is now facing closure. 
The project was developed by in-country research teams and staff members of the Industry 
and Mining Division of the World Bank (now part of the Mining Department) and the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. It was officially launched in 
Lima in June 1998 with financial support from IDRC, the World Bank, the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Government of Spain. The country 
studies were undertaken by teams from the Universidad Católica (Bolivia), the Universidad 
de Chile (Chile), the Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (Peru), Carleton University 
(Canada), and International Institutional Consulting (Spain), as well as by Graham Parsons, 
an independent consultant in Saskatchewan, Canada. 
This book is the final result of these efforts. It contains an independent analysis of the various 
effects of large-scale mining on local communities, with three medium-scale mines included 
for contrast. The authors have explored the reasons for varying performances and lessons 
learned for future operations. The general message of the book is a hopeful one: the 
relationship between mining operations and local communities is undergoing a largely 
positive evolution, and there are very practical programs and policies that can be followed to 
increase the probability of such experiences. A more specific message of the book is that 
these are more likely to take place if the three major stakeholders —the local community 
(including such groups as civil society, local government, labour unions, and women's 
groups), the mining company, and the central (or state/provincial) government —work 
together in a trilateral framework toward ensuring long-term, sustainable benefits to the 
community, benefits that will not disappear when the mine eventually closes. It is our hope 
and belief that the studies contained in this book will play a key role in the development of 
best practices with respect to mining and the community, which can be used to guide the 
policy and actions of all stakeholders. 
We would like to thank CIDA and the Government of Spain for their support for this project, 
Real Lavergne for his assistance in the development and monitoring of this project, Jean-
Claude Lauzier for his contributions to the development of the project, and numerous 
participants in project workshops in Lima and Santiago. 
Caroline Pestieau 
Vice-President, Program and Partnership 
International Development Research Centre 
James Bond 
Director, Mining Department 
World Bank
CHAPTER 1.  
Key Observations and Recommendations: A Synthesis 
of Case Studies 
Gary McMahon and Felix Remy 
Introduction 
This book presents six studies that investigate the impacts of medium-and large-scale mines 
on local communities. Each examines the economic, social (including health and education), 
cultural, and environmental effects of the mining operations on the communities. The studies' 
primary goal is to analyze the mining operations costs and benefits upon the surrounding 
vicinity from a multi-dimensional perspective. Strong emphasis is placed on the sustainability 
of any benefits received by the communities. Second, the authors explain the legal and 
consultative processes that often led to quite different results. Third, the authors identify the 
best or good practices from the perspectives of all stakeholders in the management of the 
development, extraction, and closure phases of a mining operation, paying particular attention 
to sustainable socioeconomic development. 
Two factors have affected increased globalization of trade markets in recent years: The 
decline of the communist trading block and the increased environmental control in developed 
countries. One of the most notable results of this has been the marked increase in exploration 
and mineral development activities by local and multinational companies in developing and 
transition countries. Many countries that have recently begun the transition to a market 
economy (or moved away from a reliance on state intervention in the economy) see the 
development of the mining sector as vital for the reactivation of their economy. In particular, 
revenues from this sector are often the most important (and easiest to manage) source both of 
foreign exchange and fiscal revenues. 
The capital-intensive nature of mining requires very large amounts of investment capital and, 
in most cases, considerable technological upgrading.1 
Consequently, many governments of countries with significant mining potential have 
changed their investment and mining codes to attract foreign investors.2 The results of these 
actions have been impressive. Between 1990 and 1997, while global exploration investment 
went up 90 percent, it increased fourfold in Latin America. From another perspective, the 
share of exploration investment in other developing countries rose from 1990 to 1997, but by 
the year 2000 it returned to the 1990 level. However, Latin America increased its share by 
123 percent (from 13 percent to 29 percent) from 1990 to 1997, and then maintained that 
share from 1997 to 2000, when exploration investment was sharply reduced worldwide.3 
At the same time, with the recently diminished role of the state in the mining industry and a 
more active international community, expectations regarding the responsibility of mining  
1 In this document, the mining sector does not include oil and gas. Although much of the 
discussion also pertains to that sector, it is excluded from this project due to its distinctive 
characteristics. 
2 Most of this reform has taken place in Latin America although the momentum is 
beginning to spread to developing countries in other regions of the world. 
3 Exploration investment generally leads to project investment of a much greater amount, 
although there is no clear relationship and the amounts are spread over a number of years. 
companies in the protection of the environment and their relationship with local communities 
have changed. It is now generally accepted that the potential detrimental effects that mining 
can have on fragile ecosystems and local communities should be prioritized. While it is 
generally true that large international mining companies are better environmental citizens 
than smaller, domestically owned mines, a number of negative incidents has drawn 
widespread interest in and criticism of their practices. On the one hand, local and 
international environmental groups have become increasingly involved in mining disputes. 
On the other hand, local communities have become increasingly concerned that they shoulder 
all of the negative impacts of mining but receive few of the benefits, especially as capital-
intensive, large mining operations only generate a fraction of the jobs that they did a 
generation or two ago. 
The emphasis this analysis places on the development of the local community is relatively 
new in terms of economic research on mining. Traditionally, most research has focused on 
the macroeconomic effects, determining the benefit (or lack thereof) to the mining sector's 
impact on the national economy. Often the discussion has been centered on the natural 
resource curse or the related Dutch disease. On the contrary, there is little analytical research 
on the microeconomic or regional effects that focus on socio-cultural and, especially, 
environmental effects. In contrast, the studies in this book are primarily concerned with 
whether or not large mining operations can produce net sustainable benefits to local 
communities, and, if so, whether there are policies or processes that can increase positive and 
reduce negative impacts. In order to determine the net benefits, it was necessary to analyze all 
relevant impacts—economic, social, cultural, health, and environmental. The key issues 
addressed in each of these areas are discussed in this introductory chapter. 
Three of the six studies cover mines located in developing countries. They cover a total of 
seven mines in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru and each study follows similar methodologies, 
addressing the issues described above. The other three studies are on mines located in 
developed countries, each of which was selected to provide further illumination to the results 
of the Latin American studies and provide additional lessons for all developing and transition 
countries involved in large-scale natural resource extraction. Chapter 5 examines community 
and regional development in the area of the Almadén mercury mine in Spain, the oldest 
continuously operating mine in the world with at least 2000 years of operation. Chapter 6 
examines the history of mine-community relations in Canada, using a number of mini-case 
studies. Finally, chapter 7 looks at the community effects of the uranium industry in northern 
Saskatchewan, a part of Canada mostly populated by aboriginal peoples.4 
This chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the studies, culminating in a synopsis of 
lessons learned, conclusions, and recommendations. 
Key issues 
It was noted in the introduction that the researchers investigated the economic, social, 
cultural, environmental, and health impacts of medium-and large-scale mining operations on 
local communities. The key issues that they addressed in each area are outlined here. 
 
 
4 Native peoples in Canada are customarily referred to as aboriginal peoples while in Latin 
America they are called indigenous. We use both terminologies in this book depending on 
the context. 
Economic issues 
The opening of a large mine has economic consequences at the national, state or provincial, 
and local levels. Large mines create employment directly in both the construction and 
operating phases, indirectly through input demand, and even more indirectly through the so-
called multiplier effects of the demands for goods and services by their employees. Large 
mines also provide foreign exchange earnings and tax revenues. Although the level of the tax 
burden, including indirect taxes, remains an important issue, many countries have reduced 
taxation levels and eased repatriation requirements in order to attract foreign investment. But 
in some countries obsolete fiscal regulations have been applied, depriving the host country of 
a fair share of any benefits. At the same time, many countries have been decentralizing tax 
and expenditure systems. 
These observations have many implications. 
1. Spin-off economic benefits. Who is it that benefits from the direct, indirect, and 
multiplier effects of the opening of a large mine? Are there provisions for local and 
indigenous communities? Are there any commitments "to buy locally"? Will there be 
any attempt to train local residents for skilled or semi-skilled positions? Will informal 
or small-scale mines be displaced by the proposed new operation? 
2. Income benefits. What will be the general effect on wages and incomes in the local 
area? Is it likely that the prices of some basic goods will increase dramatically, causing 
hardship to those community members not receiving benefits from the new economic 
conditions? In sum, the income distribution effects of the opening of a new mine are 
likely to be substantial and have potentially serious effects. 
3. Taxation. The division of taxes and royalties among different levels of governments is 
an important factor in determining the geographic and end-use distribution of the 
benefits and costs of the mine. The influx of new migrants puts great strains on the 
existing social and economic infrastructure. It is essential that some mechanism exists 
to ensure an orderly expansion of activities and provision of services. 
Environmental issues 
There does not seem to be any hard evidence that large international mining companies seek 
pollution havens in which to conduct their operations. With some exceptions, they use the 
same technology in developing countries that they do in their home countries, and they often 
supersede the local environmental standards. However, there have been a number of large 
incidents in recent years which mining critics eagerly point out. In this study, primarily 
through discussions with the various stakeholders, the researchers made an assessment of the 
general environmental performance of the mining operations and their general compliance to 
national and international processes and standards. 
Social and cultural issues 
It is not just economic implications that pose a concern. There are equally grave social and 
cultural repercussions to opening a new mine, particularly when indigenous populations are 
affected. For instance, an influx of new workers may lead to social problems due to a lack of 
adequate housing and infrastructure, growth of bars and prostitution, easier access to the area 
due to road development, and deficient educational and medical facilities. Moreover, workers 
from other regions of the country or abroad usually bring different lifestyles and patterns of 
behaviour and arouse local resentments. Usually, the average "imported" worker will be 
wealthier than the local population: this may magnify their importance in the eyes of some 
local residents, especially the young. 
The uneven distribution of benefits and costs from the mine may also upset existing social 
hierarchies and have dramatic cultural consequences. On the other hand, if managed properly, 
the increased employment, wealth and commerce caused by the mine opening can lead to a 
cultural revival, especially in a depressed area. Of particular concern is the case where the 
cultural adaptation of indigenous and non-indigenous local communities may be quite 
different. While the latter may not find their cultural base threatened by the large mine and 
welcome its employment opportunities, the indigenous peoples may believe that they and 
their culture will be overwhelmed by the arrival of large number of workers and their 
families. 
Similar to economic benefits and costs, the distribution of social benefits and costs is likely to 
be unequal, particularly if there are indigenous populations. In the past, companies often 
acted as a surrogate government, providing infrastructure, schools and medical care. While in 
recent years this may continue to be true for the company's employees, it is less and less true 
for the community at large. Therefore, local governments need to be empowered and 
financed to provide such services. An important part of the analysis in this project was to 
analyze the implicit distributional effects of the provision of government and company 
services. The related impact on poverty reduction was also a focus of the project. 
Health issues 
The health impacts of the opening of a large mine are an important factor from the 
environmental, social, and cultural perspectives. The pure economics of a large mine opening 
can also have significant health impacts if it leads to higher incomes and tax dollars spent 
locally on health-care provision, including better medical facilities. Nevertheless, the 
potential negative health impacts associated with mining generally receive most of the 
attention. 
The most direct health concerns are occupational health and safety issues. Large mining 
companies have become quite conscientious in this area, although care must be taken that 
special local circumstances are given adequate due. 
There are also important types of health impacts via the environmental nexus. First, there are 
the effects due to flow contamination. Such pollutants can lead to increased morbidity via 
direct consumption or via effects on the quality or quantity of crops contaminated by polluted 
irrigation water or air. Second, environmental disasters can have similar effects and, if 
involving toxic substances such as cyanide, could result in death. Third, the long-term effects 
of pollution stocks can have serious morbidity and mortality impacts, especially if they 
include the slow leak of toxic substances and heavy metals into the environment. 
Even if the production processes of a new mine are completely clean, there is still likely to be 
a significant health impact due to social effects. On the positive side, the company may act as 
a surrogate government and provide health facilities that previously did not exist. On the 
other hand, in-migration may bring in new diseases or, just as importantly, result in the 
spread of diseases related with prostitution, such as venereal diseases and AIDS. In general, 
the more isolated or "virgin" is the territory into which the mining operation is entering, the 
greater is the socially related health impact. 
Legal and consultative issues 
Just as important as what took place is why it took place. Of particular importance are the 
regulatory framework in effect at the time of project development, coupled with the 
consultative processes followed in the negotiations leading to the opening of the mine, as 
well as mediation methods for any conflicts which later develop. Final outcomes significantly 
depend on the clarity and specificity of fiscal and environmental regulations and standards, as 
well as who is involved in the negotiations and the "rules of the game." Moreover, the mining 
companies themselves may have codes of conduct for dealing with environmental issues and 
local populations. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can also play an important role in 
the negotiations, especially with regards to environmental and indigenous issues, where they 
may be better informed than public authorities. 
The outcomes of negotiations will also be greatly influenced by the existing legal framework. 
Of particular importance are these five factors. 
1. The rights of local and indigenous communities with respect to natural resources, land 
claims and general land invasion; 
2. The legal position with respect to mining in national parks and the effects on 
biodiversity; 
3. The general state of judicial systems and law enforcement, particularly with respect to 
the ability of local and indigenous groups to demand effective representation; 
4. General environmental legislation, especially with regards to individual or class action 
litigation and the existence of "ecological" crimes; and 
5. The legal responsibilities of mining companies with respect to local and indigenous 
communities and environmental protection in general. 
The mining operations 
The six studies analyzed in this book cover thirteen mines or mining regions, including Inti 
Raymi and Puquio Norte in Bolivia; Escondida, Candelaria, and Fachinal in Chile; 
Yanacocha and Antamina in Peru; Almadén in Spain; Cameco in northern Saskatchewan; and 
Voisey Bay, Diavik, Sussex, and Sudbury Basin in Canada. 
Inti Raymi, Bolivia: This large-scale gold mine is only 42 km from Oruro, a medium-sized 
city located at an important crossroads in the altiplano of Bolivia. The region has a long 
history of mining. The immediate area of the mine is characterized by very low productivity 
agriculture and high levels of out-migration. The mine began production in the 1980s, and 
there was a major increase in capacity in the early 1990s. During the 1990s, Inti Raymi was 
by far the most important mine in Bolivia and a major contributor to exports and regional 
GDP, but its reserves are now quite low.5 
Puquio Norte, Bolivia: This medium-scale gold mine is located in the Bolivian lowlands 
about 180 km east of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. The mine is very close to San Ramon, a town of 
about 6 000 people located at an important crossroads. The economy of the area is based on 
agriculture and commercial activities; mining is not traditional. Population growth is very 
high in the region. Puquio Norte was commissioned in 1997 with reserves for about seven 
years. While significant locally, it is not an important mine from the national or regional 
point of view. 
Escondida, Chile: This very large copper mine is 300 km from the medium-sized city of 
Antofogasta. The region is a dry desert with a long mining history with other important 
operating mines. Escondida started production in December 1990. It has reserves for over 50 
years and is a major contributor to Chilean exports, fiscal revenues, and regional GDP. 
5 Until recently the mine was expected to close within three years but recent discoveries 
may extend its life to ten years or more. However, this new lease on life is quite dependent 
on the development of a bioxidization process that would make exploitation of the new 
reserves economically feasible. 
Candelaria, Chile: This large copper mine is located 20 km south of Copiapó, a medium-
sized town, in the coast of the Chilean 3rd region. As in the case of Escondida, the mine is 
located in a dry desert and the region has a long mining history. It has reserves for 34 years. 
Candelaria is an operation with significant impact in the regional economy. 
Fachinal, Chile: This medium-scale gold mine is in a semi-wilderness area, about 25 km 
from the small town of Chile Chico. Tourism is the most important local activity and job 
opportunities are scarce; mining is not a traditional activity in the area. Fachinal was 
commissioned in 1996 and presently has reserves for about eight years. While significant 
locally, it is not important from a national point of view. 
Yanacocha, Peru: This very large gold mine is located 45 km from Cajamarca, a medium-
sized city. The economy of the area is based on agriculture and domestic tourism; mining is 
not a traditional activity. The region is one with high levels of poverty and lack of basic 
needs. Yanacocha first began production in 1993 and has expanded several times since. It is a 
very low-cost producer with reserves for at least 15 years, and is an important contributor to 
exports, fiscal revenues, and regional GDP. 
Antamina, Peru: This very large-scale copper mine is under construction and should be in 
production by late 2001. It is located in a very poor highland area of Peru dominated by small 
towns and low productivity farming. Antamina has reserves for at least 40 years. It is 
projected to be a very important contributor to Peruvian exports, fiscal revenues, and regional 
GDP. 
Almadén, Spain: The state-owned mercury mine at Almadén has been in operation for over 2 
000 years and perhaps much longer. Historically, the region has been very dependent on the 
mine as a source of employment and income. Other activities in the lightly populated region 
are farming and rustic tourism. Due to the decline in the demand for mercury caused by 
environmental concerns, the mine is currently operating at low levels of production. During 
its history the Almadén mine has been an extremely important source of export and fiscal 
revenues for Spain although this is no longer the case. 
Cameco, Northern Saskatchewan, Canada: Cameco, the world's largest uranium mining 
company, has four uranium mines in operation in northern Saskatchewan. It was formed 
when provincial and federal state-owned companies were merged and privatized in 1988. The 
mines are all located in remote, cold climate sites, in a region heavily dominated by 
aboriginal peoples living in poor conditions. Cameco is a very important employer in 
northern Saskatchewan as well as a significant generator of fiscal revenue for the entire 
province. In the 1990s between 40 to 50 percent of its employees were aboriginal peoples. 
Voisey Bay, Labrador, Canada: This very large-scale nickel deposit is located in a remote 
area of northern Canada mostly inhabited by aboriginal peoples. Construction is currently 
delayed due to stalled negotiations between the owner, International Nickel Company, and 
the Government of Newfoundland. When in operation the mine is expected to employ about 
1 400 people on a fly-in, fly-out basis. About 25 percent of the jobs are to go to local Innu 
and Inuit peoples. The mine is expected to generate $296 million in annual income in 
Labrador and $1 billion annually for the entire province of Newfoundland. 
Diavik Mine, Northwest Territories, Canada: This large-scale diamond mine in a very remote 
area of northern Canada is scheduled to open in 2003. The inhabitants of the region are 
mostly aboriginal. It is expected to provide 411 jobs, with employment of northerners to 
eventually be 100 percent. Agreements with the company also provide for significant 
purchases from northern businesses. 
Sussex, New Brunswick, Canada: This medium-scale potash mine was built in the 1980s in a 
well-established area that is economically dependent on farming plus pulp and paper. Most of 
the 334 employees are from surrounding communities. About 50 percent of all expenditures 
by the company go directly to the local region. 
Sudbury, Ontario, Canada: The Sudbury Basin contains very large nickel and copper mines. 
It is located at an important crossroads between both southern and northern as well as eastern 
and western Ontario. During the last century, Sudbury has evolved into a major mining and 
regional service center. Companies selling mine-related goods and services have access to 90 
mines within a 500 kilometre radius. Moreover, many Government services have relocated to 
Sudbury. While at one time the Sudbury Basin was considered one of the world's major 
mining environmental disasters, it now is a global technological leader in high productivity 
and environmentally friendly technologies. 
Latin America: costs and benefits of the mining operations 
In this and the following section the results of the studies in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are 
summarized. The analysis begins with the economic costs and benefits of mining to the local 
communities, progresses social and cultural impacts, and finally presents environmental 
effects. The processes that helped determine the results are examined in the section entitled 
"Lessons learned and recommendations." Gold and copper are the primary products of four 
and three of the mines, respectively. All the copper mines represent large-scale operations, 
though two of the gold mines are medium-scale operations. 
Economic costs and benefits 
As noted earlier, most previous research on the mining sector has focused on its 
macroeconomic effects. To put the operations in context, the contributions to fiscal and 
exports revenues are discussed here, but no analysis is made of the direct or indirect 
implications of these amounts. Here, the focus is on a number of key microeconomic 
variables concerning local communities. These include land acquisition, employment and 
salary levels, business creation and development, multiplier effects, infrastructure creation, 
contribution to local taxes, training and education for mine employment as well as effects on 
local prices, particularly basic commodities and housing. 
Table 1 contains the available data on investment, production, export revenues, and fiscal 
revenues for the mines in this study. For the large-scale mines, the amounts of investment and 
production are generally very large. The Table shows that the large-scale mines in Latin 
America have generated substantial export revenues and, except for Inti Raymi, healthy fiscal 
revenues too. The medium-scale mines are not significant from a macroeconomic 
perspective. 
In a number of cases, land acquisition was a very crucial economic and social issue. Although 
it can be seen in Table 2 that prices paid were generally far above pre-mine market values, 
the negotiations often were very difficult. Moreover, local people usually had a different 
conception of what a land acquisition contract is than the mining firm, and tried to reopen the 
contracts (often successfully) when new information came to light or circumstances changed. 
Contracts were never reopened on the grounds the company had originally been too generous. 
Whenever disputes arose, the two most important points of contention were a lack of 
consistency in pricing coupled with lack of alternative sources of employment and income for 
the sellers of the land. Even though the landowners received a sum far beyond the present 
value of their holdings, it was often consumed or poorly invested, and later on the former 
peasant farmer had no source of income. 
Table 1. Investments, production, export revenues, fiscal revenues. 
Large-scale 
mines 
Investment Production Export 
revenues(% of 
Fiscal revenues(% 
of total 
total 
exportrevenues)
fiscalrevenues) 
Inti Raymi, 
Bolivia 
$200 million 
(1990-1994) 
10 435 kg of 
gold (1998) 11% (1998) $4.2 million in 1998 
Yanacocha, 
Peru 
$492 million 
(1993-1998) 
41 300 kg of 
gold (1998) $250 million in 1998(4.6%) 
$164.4 million 
intotal from 1993-
1997(1.6%) 
Antamina, 
Peru 
(projected 
annual) 
$2.296 
billion 
(1998-2002) 
250 000 mt 
ofcopper; 150 
000 mtof zinc 
$950 million 
(10%-15%) 
$83 million per 
year(2.5%-3%) 
Escondida, 
Chile 
$2.3 billion 
(1990-1998) 
851 000 mt of 
copper in 1998 $1.96 billion in 1998(8.9%) 
$253 million in 
1996(1.92%) 
Candelaria, 
Chile 
$902 million 
(1988-1997) 
215 000 mt of 
copper in 1998 $656 million in 1998(3%) 
$30 million (total 
from 1993-1996) 
Diavik, 
Canada 
(projection) 
$850 million N/A N/A $4 million per year 
Northern 
Saskatchewan, 
Canada 
1986 US 
$2.5 billion 
(1953-1998) 
10 924 
milliontonnes 
uranium(1998) 
$379 million 
(3.1%) (1998) 
$72 million 
(2.4%provincial 
ownsource 
revenues(1998)) 
Almadén, 
Spain 
- - - - 
Medium-scale mines 
Puquio Norte, 
Bolivia 
$25 million 
(1993-1997) 
861 kg of gold 
(1998) 0.8% (1998) $0.32 million in 1998 
Fachinal, 
Chile 
$85 million 
(1994-1996) 
1400 kg of 
goldand 78 000 
kg ofsilver in 
1998 
$30 million in 
1998 (<<1%) 
- 
Sussex, 
Canada 
- 770 000 tonnes 
ofpotash and 
700 000 tonnes 
of rock salt per 
year 
- - 
In order to overcome difficulties associated with pricing, it is important to be transparent in 
negotiations either with landowners, or with communities in the case of the ownership of 
common land. If different vendors perceive that others have received a better deal, not only 
will they try to reopen their contracts but ill feelings will be generated. Pricing becomes a 
particularly difficult challenge when land is bought over time. Yanacocha in Peru paid much 
larger amounts for land bought in the late 1990s versus the early 1990s, amounts that largely 
reflected changing market conditions caused by the renewed dynamism in the area due to the 
mining operation itself as well as the defeat of Sendero Luminoso. This led to a great deal of 
bitterness on the part of early sellers and brought social forces such as the Catholic Church on 
their side. In the end the early contracts were renegotiated and several side payments were 
renegotiated which included jobs and social programs. Antamina, perhaps learning from the 
difficulties that Yanacocha had faced, bought almost all the land that it thought it might need 
at one time, paying the same amount for land of similar quality. 
Side payments, such as preferred employment, are one method to avoid or, if necessary, of 
overcoming the difficulties that arise when former landowners have spent the money they 
received for their land and have no other income sources. Another method that can be used in 
the case of the sale of community owned lands is to keep the funds in some sort of trust. In 
the case of Inti Raymi in Bolivia, one community (La Joya) included a representative from 
the mining company as part of a three-member board of trustees to help prevent both wasteful 
investments and corruption. 
Table 2. Land acquisition. 
Large-
scale 
mines 
Price 
range(per 
ha)/average 
price(per 
ha)/number of 
hectares 
Previousm
arketprice 
(perha) 
Side payments Savings and 
investment 
General 
comments 
Inti 
Raymi, 
Bolivia 
$300-
$1000/$368/5 
746a 
$30 Preferred 
employment for 
locals, including 
training; 
Constructed 135 
houses at $11 
000/house for 
dislocated 
villagers 
High 
percentage 
invested 
Prices paid 
depended on 
quality of land 
and 
availability of 
alternative 
sites; artisanal 
miners given 
areas 
Yanacoc
ha, Peru 
$37-
$600/$152/4 
069 
$44 (1992) Rotating 
employment for 
land vendors 
50% invested 
payment 
(other lands, 
houses, taxi) 
Great 
variation in 
prices of 
similar quality 
land over time
Antamin
a, Peru 
$100-
$1000/$480/7 
141 
$30 $33 000 to 52 
renters on mine 
site 
Communities 
100%; 
renters 
80%;landow
ners (not 
known) 
Negotiated 
common price 
all at once 
with prices 
only 
depending on 
quality of land
Escondi
da, Chile 
Negligible(unoc
cupieddesert) 
Negligible - - - 
Candelar
ia, Chile 
Negligible(unoc
cupieddesert) 
Negligible - - - 
Diavik, 
Canada 
Negligible Very low Royalties to 
aboriginal 
groups, Local 
hiring policy 
with first 
priority to 
affected groups 
- Must 
negotiate 
impact and 
benefit 
agreements 
with 
aboriginal 
groups who 
own land 
Northern 
Saskatch
ew an, 
Canada 
Negligible Very low Employment 
performance 
monitoring 
Preferential 
local training 
and hiring 
policies 
Procurement 
contracts to 
local business 
New company 
development for 
Indian and 
community 
based business 
- Must 
negotiate 
impact and 
benefit 
agreements 
with local 
residents prior 
to 
development 
Almadén
, Spain 
- - Preferred 
employment for 
locals 
- Miners have 
right to 
agriculture 
activities on 
mine property 
Medium-scale mines 
Puquio 
Norte, 
Bolivia 
N/A/7 200 Very low None Not relevant All land 
bought from a 
foreigner; 
COMSUR 
allowed 
artisanal 
miners to stay 
with 
conditions 
Fachinal
, Chile 
- - - - - 
Sussex, 
Canada 
- - - - - 
a Inti Raymi also paid $22 222 per hectare for land adjacent to the local town site. 
With the possible exception of some environmental externalities (discussed below), there 
were substantial benefits and few economic costs to the communities near the mining 
operations. Given the great technological advances in mining in the last 30 years (including 
the prevalence of labour-saving open-pit mining), direct employment in the Latin American 
mines has usually been small but not insignificant, except during the construction phase 
where it was substantial. Moreover, it has often been an important source of work for 
relocated peoples (usually peasant farmers). 
As can be seen in Table 3, the indirect employment effects are often extremely important. 
Employment in sub-contracted firms or suppliers of mine-related goods and services is often 
equal to or much higher than mine employment—fourteen times as high in the case of 
Yanacocha. In turn, estimated non-mine related employment generated through multiplier 
effects is often much higher than direct or indirect mine employment —about 2.5 times as 
high as the others combined in the case of Inti Raymi. In summary, for all of the large-scale 
mines, the total effects of the operations on local and regional employment can be substantial. 
Table 3. Employment. 
Large-scale 
mines 
Direct 
employment 
Indirect 
local mining 
employment 
(mine 
contractors 
and 
suppliers) 
% of 
direct 
and 
indirect 
mining 
posts 
filled by 
local 
residents
Localnon-
mine 
employment 
generated 
by minea 
Total mine 
related 
employment 
as share of 
total 
employment 
Inti Raymi 716 246 65% 2 500 25% (60) * 
Yanacocha 269 3 885 90% 6000 14.4% of 
county 
(provincial) 
Antamina 
(projected) 
1 250 (4 000 
during 
construction) 
3 750 80% 4 000 2.8% of 
department 
Escondida 2 000 6 200 >80% 5 200 9% of 
Region II 
Candelaria 860 450 86% 1012 7% of 
Region III 
Diavik 
(projected) 
411 - >70% - - 
Northern 
Saskatchewan 
(1998) 
1254 937 49% 1620 27% 
Almadén 
(average over 
last 50 years) 
1351 50 90% - - 
Medium-scale mines 
Puquio Norte 118 Very small 30% 
(approx) 
- 10% (25% 
of manual 
labour) 
Fachinal 265 250 <30% 900 - 
Sussex 345 615 >90% - - 
*—The first figure includes Oruro; the bracketed figure is the 2 communities closest 
to the mine site (La Joya and Chuquiña) 
a This is the number of jobs generated due to the expenditure of contractors and 
suppliers on local inputs and the employees of the mining company, mine contractors, 
and mine suppliers in local markets (i.e. the "multiplier effect"). 
Outsourcing is critical for both the size and sustainability of the mining operations' economic 
impact. This point cannot be over-emphasized: it is perhaps the strongest result proven by 
these studies. In most cases, outsourcing increased over time and was the key source of 
entrepreneurial development. Moreover, the multiplier effects of the operation were much 
greater if there was substantial local outsourcing because of the bigger monetary injection 
and because employees of contractors usually spend more of their own money in the local 
economy. While all of the larger mines worked actively to develop local contractors and 
suppliers, Escondida's program designed to assist local companies in quality control is the 
most noteworthy. This company's program has been so successful that many of its local 
contractors not only supply other firms in the region but are supplying mining companies in 
other regions of Chile. 
While business creation to sell basic commodities or recreation to miners usually happened 
on its own, business creation for outsourcing began more readily and on a larger scale when 
the mining company played a proactive role. Yet, there is room here for governments to be 
more proactive and not just rely on company initiative. An interesting example of how not to 
proceed occurred in the case of the Fachinal gold mine in Chile. Many new shops opened to 
provide basic goods and recreation to the miners but the company made an agreement with a 
subsidized government supplier that was able to undercut most of these local operations. 
Moreover, the company opened a large canteen to provide recreation for the miners. Both of 
these developments have had significant negative effects on the local community and led to 
much bitterness towards the mine. 
As shown in Table 4, with the exception of Puquio Norte in Bolivia, salaries for miners and 
contractors are much higher than general local levels in the cases where data exists. As noted 
in the discussion on employment, the local monetary injection is much larger than the salaries 
to the mine employees, and this amount is increased through the multiplier effects. The last 
column of Table 4 contains the estimated multipliers for the various mines. These vary 
widely and largely depend on the ability of the local community and region to take advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the mining operation. The multiplier associated with 
Escondida is extremely high given the development of an increasingly sophisticated network 
of mining contractors and suppliers in the Antofogasta area. 
 
Table 4. Salaries and wages. 
Large-scale 
mines 
Average 
monthly salary 
(non-
management) 
Mine 
salaries 
relative to 
local 
salaries 
Average 
monthly 
salary for 
employees 
of mine 
contractor
s
Mine 
contractor 
salaries 
relative to 
local 
salaries 
Annual 
monetary 
injection to 
local economy 
(mine 
employees and 
contractors) 
Estimated 
multiplier 
lnt¡Raymi(19
97) 
$678 450% 
higher 
$350. 250% 
higher 
$9.3 million 2.79 
Yanacocha 
(1997) 
$1 155 300% $700 180% $21.7 million 2.53 
Antamina 
(projection) 
$1 000 200% - - $29.8 million 1.42 
Escondida $1 800 254% - - $279.6 
million 
5.7 
Candelaria $1 300 233% - - $39 million 1.76 
Diavik 
(projection) 
$3 750 Much 
lower 
- - $40 million - 
Northern 
Saskatchewan
, Canada 
(1998) 
$3 700 440% for 
north; 
674% 
northern 
Indian; 
$2 700 330% for 
north; 
490% for 
northern 
Indian; 
$64.7 million 
(wages and 
salaries only) 
2.4 
240% 
provincia
l average 
175% 
provincia
l average 
Almadén, 
Spain 
$500 125% $500 125% $8.4 million - 
    (average over last 50 years in 
constant 1998$) 
    
Medium-scale mines 
Puquio Norte 
(1998) 
$290 Same - - - N/A 
(probabl
y very 
low) 
Fachinal $764 157% - - $7.6 million 1.76 
Sussex - - - - $34 million - 
In theory, infrastructure creation can be one of the most important benefits of a mining 
operation as it encourages development of other economic opportunities. However, as can be 
seen in Table 5, in the Latin American studies this was generally not the case as most of the 
mines are not far from existing roads. The exceptions are Escondida—which is in the middle 
of a desert, so opening up the route did not provide many other opportunities —and 
Antamina. In the case of Antamina, a mine still under development, it is expected that the 
building of a paved road to the coast will have a very strong positive impact on local 
development, especially in agriculture and tourism. In most cases, the most important 
expenditures on infrastructure were for construction of or upgrading local roads, schools, and 
hospitals. An interesting exception occurred in the case of Puquio Norte in Bolivia, where the 
company and local community combined funds to build a gas pipeline to the mine that was 
larger than necessary to meet the company's needs. The extra capacity was used to provide 
electricity to the local rural population. 
If properly channeled to the region, local taxes can be an extremely important benefit of the 
mine, as was the case with Inti Raymi in recent years. In Peru substantial taxes from a mining 
operation also should go to the local and regional levels but it is unclear if they actually have, 
as the case of Yanacocha illustrates. In general, the fiscal systems in the three countries are 
quite centralized, suggesting that this is an important area for some type of reform in order to 
bring more sustained benefits to the local community. However, funding by foundations 
established by the mining companies substitute for local taxation to some degree. 
Table 5. Infrastructure and local taxes. 
Large-scale 
mines 
Roads and ports Power Hospitals, 
schools, and 
other
Local taxes 
Inti Raymi Minor roads Generating 
station for 
mine not 
suitable for 
rural areas 
High quality 
local schools in 
rural and urban 
areas; high 
quality rural 
health center 
10% of 
department 
budget 
(1998) 
Yanacocha Built and upgraded local 
roads; assisted in 
maintenance of road to 
coast 
None High quality 
school; rural 
water and 
sanitation 
$7 million 
per year 
(1993-
1997)a 
projects 
Antamina Major upgrading of road 
to coast and Lima (in 
progress); secondary 
roads upgraded 
None Technical and 
secondary 
schools (built by 
community with 
land payments) 
$16.6 
million per 
year once in 
production 
Escondida Port of Coloso (only for 
company use); road to 
mine; local roads in port 
area 
High voltage 
power line 
International 
school; water 
tanks 
$2.2 million 
(1997) 
Candelaria Port at Punta Padrones 
(only for company use), 
22 kms of road 
- Sports complex; 
created primary 
and secondary 
school 
- 
Diavik 
(projection) 
- - - $1.2 million 
per year 
Northern 
Saskatchewan, 
Canada 
Significant road 
expansion, including a 
connected network 
High voltage 
power lines 
with local 
access 
Recreational 
facilities; health 
care facilities; 
water and 
sewage 
1995 US 
$42.4 
million 
(1985-1996) 
Almadén, 
Spain 
Worse than national 
standards 
At national 
standards 
High school; 
university; 
hospitals; sports 
complex; much 
higher than 
national 
standards 
Negligible 
Medium-scale mines 
Puquio Norte Insignificant Electricity 
for rural 
areas 
None Negligible 
(paid to 
Santa Cruz 
department) 
Fachinal Road improvements (25 
kms) 
- - - 
Sussex - - - $6 million 
per year to 
provincial 
government
a This is the approximate regional contribution to regional taxes based on the legal 
percentage of taxes that are supposed to go to the regions, although it is not certain that 
they actually are redistributed. 
b This amount only includes royalty payments. An unknown amount of corporate income 
tax would also be paid. 
Training and education for mine employment was significant for all of the mines except 
Puquio Norte and Fachinal. The most interesting example of such training occurred at 
Escondida, where significant emphasis was placed on upgrading attitudes towards work. 
Finally, fears that the mining operations would result in large price increases were mostly 
unjustified in Escondida, Candelaria and Inti Raymi. But there were some problems in 
Yanacocha, Puquio Norte and Fachinal, primarily concerning rents and real estate values. 
Social and cultural externalities 
Discussions of the social and cultural externalities of large natural resource projects usually 
focus on the negative impacts, such as increases in crime and prostitution, cultural conflicts 
with indigenous peoples or local communities in general, the upsetting of existing social 
hierarchies, and the creation of envy between those who benefit from the project and those 
who do not. However, the studies in this book also illustrate that there can be positive spin-
offs also, especially in the areas of health, training, education, and the creation of social 
capital; that is, capacity for local governance, homogeneity of the community, as well as 
communication links with and within the community. In the absence of well-endowed local 
governments, foundations set up by the mining companies play a very important role in 
structuring, coordinating and funding the activities that make such positive externalities 
possible. 
It was noted earlier that the mining companies have played an important role in the 
development of health and educational infrastructure (Table 5). As can be seen in Table 6, the 
larger mines have also played a strong role in providing health facilities and programs and 
"non-mine" training and education. However, there appear to be economies of scale in the 
provision of such services, because the medium-scale mines do not provide them, nor any 
other social services of note, except to their own work force. 
Table 6. Social programs. 
Large-scale 
mines 
Found
ation 
Health Education Training Other 
Inti Raymi Yes Several Several Mine; 
agriculture; 
business and 
community 
management; 
weaving; small 
business 
development 
Social capital 
development 
Yanacocha Yes Several Large 
number 
Agriculture Forestation; food 
security program; 
social capital 
development 
Antamina 
(planning 
stage) 
No - - Agriculture; 
small business 
development 
- 
Escondida Yes Cancer 
research; 
upgrade 
children's 
hospital; 
out-patient 
hospice 
School 
upgrading; 
scholarships
; 
international 
school 
Technical mine 
training; micro-
enterprise 
development; 
labour market 
insertion; 
apprenticeship 
- 
program; quality 
training for local 
suppliers 
Candelaria No Various 
small 
projects 
Funds 
primary and 
secondary 
school; 
funding to 
technical 
school; 
scholarships 
Technical mine 
training, training 
in modern 
industrial 
practices, training 
for local suppliers
Funds 
"Environmental 
Brigades" in local 
schools 
Diavik No - - Support business 
development 
Socioeconomic 
monitoring 
agreement 
Northern 
Saskatchewa
n 
No Several 
communit
y health 
drug and 
alcohol 
treatment; 
healing 
lodges 
Scholarships
; awards; 
training 
program; 
northern 
college 
Multi-party 
training program 
— $7 million 
from 1993-
1998,50% of 
funding from 
industry; skills 
training; work 
placements 
Regional 
development 
programs by 
government and 
industry; 
community effects 
environmental 
monitoring 
committees; 
community 
economic 
development 
committees 
Almadén No Specific 
cares for 
mercury-
related 
diseases 
Elementary 
school with 
national 
standards 
Artisanal jobs - 
Medium-scale mines 
Puquio Norte No None Improvemen
t of local 
school 
None - 
Fachinal No - - Technical mine 
training for locals 
- 
Sussex No - - - - 
Some of the larger mines have set up "arm's length" foundations to provide these goods and 
services. The advantages of a foundation are that it can bring in money from other sources 
and it is independent of the mine operation. On the other hand, it may also be divorced from 
the strategic thinking of senior management and be one of the first areas cut during a 
downturn. All of the foundations place a strong emphasis on training to increase the skills 
necessary for sustainable community development, as well as health issues for women, and 
mothers in particular. 
The mining companies, generally through their foundations, are involved in creating social 
capital. The Inti Raymi Foundation, for example, trains locals in the design and preparation 
of projects that they can present for funding, including organizational matters. The 
entrepreneurial development program of Escondida was noted in the last sub-section. 
However, the indirect creation of social capital is likely more important for the communities. 
They are learning how to organize, how to negotiate with both companies and central 
governments, and how to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the mining 
operations to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. 
In addition to the previously mentioned economic dimension of land acquisition, there are 
strong social and cultural ramifications. The largest effects were in the two Peruvian cases 
where traditional socioeconomic relations among pastoral peoples were disturbed and family 
groups were occasionally broken. Social relationships may have also been disturbed by the 
large amounts of money paid for land in the cases of Inti Raymi, Yanacocha, and Antamina. 
Nevertheless, in none of these cases was there any significant upsetting of the social 
hierarchy, although there was often movement among the different levels. Of more 
importance was the envy created by the new economic opportunities and land payments. In 
particular, there was rivalry between those villages directly affected by the mine operation 
and those in the nearby region of the mine. In general, the majority of the direct economic 
benefits went to those directly affected by the mine, while the other areas were able to glean 
more from indirect benefits. In fact, one of the primary purposes of the foundations was to 
give a more widespread distribution of the benefits of the operation to the surrounding 
communities that were not directly affected by the mine operations. As previously noted, in 
one sense the foundations were doing what could be expected of tax dollars paid to the local 
and regional governments by the mining companies. 
Many of the mines are located in areas with substantial indigenous peoples that are familiar 
with mining, so the mine operations were not a cultural shock to them. Perhaps the only 
exception was the lowland peoples of Bolivia near the Puquio Norte mine but nonetheless, 
these indigenous peoples are quite westernized, and there are few true "Amazonian" 
indigenous peoples in the area. The only problem that the lowland people had was with the 
customs and work habits of the influx of the highland indigenous peoples. In fact, cultural 
and social conflicts among in-migrating national workers and local workers were quite strong 
in two of the areas which possessed no tradition of mining, and hence no established work 
force with these skills. The Fachinal mine avoided this problem by filling most of its posts 
with workers from the region, who underwent an intensive training program offered by the 
company. 
Prostitution and related diseases are the major social problem in most of the areas, although 
alcohol abuse was also noted. However, given the integration of most of the mineworkers 
with local communities, these problems were not very severe. They were most evident in 
Cajamarca (near Yanacocha), where residents have complained of the large increase of "sex" 
bars, and in Fachinal, where the community is very small. 
Environmental externalities 
When mining is the topic, the environment is never far behind. In the analysis of any 
potential mining operation, whether the benefits of the mine are greater than the 
environmental costs is often the first question asked. In these Latin American studies, one 
objective of the researchers was to analyze the environmental costs thoroughly; not by 
undertaking physical tests, but by investigating the damage caused by any ongoing 
environmental problem or major environmental accident. However, researchers found that it 
was hard to separate fact from fantasy when it came to the environmental performance of the 
mining companies. 
In none of the mines was there any obvious evidence of substantial environmental damage. 
All the mines made significant efforts to minimize environmental damage and when minor 
incidents occurred, the companies responded quickly. Nevertheless, in at least three cases—
Inti Raymi, Puquio Norte, and Yanacocha—many parties have complained of substantial 
environmental damage. However, the researchers were never able to verify such damage; nor 
was there any evidence of substantial accusations made by the usually vociferous 
international environmental NGOs.6 
It seems likely that the claims of environmental damage were due to a combination of two 
different forces. The first was poor communications with the communities and unsatisfactory 
efforts at public relations by the mining company, coupled with the regrettable historic 
environmental performance of mining companies in the three countries. Especially in the 
earlier years of operation, many mining companies were very secretive about their operations 
and did not do a proper job of explaining and demonstrating to the public that they were 
taking proper care of the environment. The second reason was that local politicians and 
community members in general used the environment as a political tool. They would create 
distrust towards the company on environmental concerns in order to extract larger 
concessions from it on other matters. This political motivation seems to have been 
particularly strong in the cases of Inti Raymi and Yanacocha. 
Latin America: negotiation and implementation processes 
In order to conclude which of the processes and strategies followed can be considered as 
being "best practices," the case researchers analyzed the processes used and the linkages to 
end results that were actually achieved. Therefore, the following definitions and objectives 
were applied to each case study. 
1. Processes: analyze strategies followed by stakeholders; 
2. Trilateral relationships: study the formal and informal relationships between the mining 
company, community, and central government; and 
3. Best practices: research the processes and policies that led to the best impacts. 
In the relationship between the mining operation and the surrounding communities there are 
always at least three major players: the local (and regional) community, the central 
government, and the mining company. Ideally this results in a trilateral relationship in which 
representatives of the three main parties keep an ongoing, three-way dialogue in order to 
facilitate the design and implementation of a local as well as regional development plan. 
However, as the cases reviewed illustrate, the more usual case in the Latin American context 
is that the company negotiates with the central government and the local community (or 
government) separately. There is very little communication between government and the 
local community. 
6 While the environmental performance of the seven Andean operations covered was satisfactory, 
some isolated, punctual incidents with little, if any, permanent impact, such as a mercury spill in 
Yanacocha in June 2000, were depicted as typical of the performance of the mines and as affecting 
the permanent impact of these operations on their neighboring communities. 
These "two-sided triangles" typified all Latin American studies with the possible exception of 
the ongoing case of Antamina in Peru. In most cases, the central government has only played 
a major role by previously establishing a legal and fiscal regime, environmental regulations, 
and major infrastructure projects, and only later granting the mine a licence. In fact, as all 
three countries have modern mining codes, most regulations are not negotiable. All mines 
must follow modern environmental laws, undertake environmental impact assessments, and 
are inspected by central government representatives. However, a pernicious effect of the 
weak communication between government and the local community (the incomplete side of 
the triangle) is that almost all fiscal revenues go to the central level, and that very few 
communities benefit from these resources. In Bolivia a royalty goes to the departmental level, 
which has benefited communities in the area of Inti Raymi but not those in the area of Puquio 
Norte, because the departmental capital is relatively far away. In Peru the "canon minero" —a 
type of royalty amounting to 20 percent of the income tax paid to the central government —
should be returned to the region. However, only a minimal amount has in fact been disbursed 
to the local communities. 
Given that these regulations were already in place, the initial concern of the companies dealt 
with land acquisition. There is very little in the mining laws of the three countries with 
respect to local economic benefits or social and cultural issues, a situation which pretty much 
left it to the initiative of the companies to define the quality of relationship they wanted with 
their neighboring communities. In such a context, the absence of a complete triangular 
dialogue becomes a serious shortcoming for the establishment of sustainable development. 
When mining operations were established, there was no formal relationship between the 
company and the local government (except for Antamina). In general, the local governments 
did not play a significant role when mining operations were established as companies dealt 
directly with landowners or community representatives. In recent years this is changing, 
however, and it is more common for local governments to represent the community interests. 
Despite the lack of a formal relationship, by far the most important side of the "triangle" has 
been the link between the companies and the local communities. In all cases there have been 
significant interactions, both negative and positive, between the companies and different local 
community groups (municipal authorities, community based organizations, NGOs, church, 
universities, landowners). In most cases these relationships have become much more 
profound over the years, partly due to a natural evolution of the relationships. But this is also 
due to changing global perceptions of the role of mining companies with respect to their host 
communities, and to a better understanding by the mining companies of the values and 
aspirations of the local communities. For instance, in the case of land acquisition from 
indigenous populations, it has taken decades for the companies to understand that the closure 
that they interpreted as finalizing a transaction was interpreted by the other side as the 
initiation of a long-term relationship, and that consequently land prices had to take into 
account social considerations. 
As a result of the above, the mines that were built most recently began with many of the 
community interactions that took several years to develop in other cases. Antamina, the most 
recent mine, has begun with an effort to build a "profound relationship" with the local 
communities. While part of this change is likely due to learning from experience, certainly a 
large part is due to increasing pressure on large mining companies by communities and other 
stakeholders, including international NGOs and the shareholders of the international mining 
companies. In the past, communities were often satisfied with the large number of jobs that 
accompanied a large mine operation. However, technological progress has greatly reduced 
the number of jobs, so communities want other things as compensation. 
The achievement of sustainable development by the communities is or should be the 
dominant goal of the relationship between mining companies and the communities. 
Communities want support from the mine in the economic, social, cultural, and 
environmental areas when it is operating. But they also need to address these issues once the 
mine closes. Accordingly, there has been a great emphasis on developing the human and 
social capital, as well as the physical infrastructure that will allow the community to continue 
to prosper after the mine closes. In this regard, outsourcing and the related development of 
new skills and businesses are seen as a crucial step in the evolution of the community. 
For the most part, although the central governments in the three Andean countries maintain a 
close relationship with the companies, related to the implementation and monitoring of the 
mining, fiscal, environmental and labour policies and norms, these governments have 
abdicated their local community responsibilities to the companies. As noted, communities 
gain little from tax revenues generated by the mines and there is little formal pressure from 
the central governments on the companies to provide services to the communities. However, 
companies are often put in a position where they have to fill a void left by the central 
government. This has become particularly important in the last five years. As the role of the 
state in the mining sector has diminished and the international community has become more 
involved, it is now generally accepted that the welfare and development of those most 
affected by mining—the local communities—must be prioritized. As the local governments 
do not have access to the resources, companies are put in the position of having to provide 
social services and to participate in the process of design, coordination and funding of local 
development programs or face social unrest. 
Over time, the participation of the mining companies in the local context of the three Andean 
countries has become much more sophisticated, as companies have moved from assistential 
type models, where the company primarily provides welfare types of services, to production 
oriented models based on fomenting new businesses linked to the mining operation to 
sustainable community development models. Each step has built on its predecessors rather 
than replaced them, and at each step there has been a large increase in the level of community 
participation in the decision and design process. This trend is consistent with the realization 
that sustainability can only be achieved when community members feel that they are partners 
in the decisions that affect their lives. 
Clearly there is a large role for the central government to play with respect to community 
development, even if it is as simple as transferring more of the fiscal revenues generated by 
the mine to the local and regional governments. In this next section, the role of the central 
government in Canada and Spain in filling in the third side of the triangle of communication 
will be examined. 
Case studies from developed countries: Spain and Canada 
Although environmental concerns are mentioned briefly, the main thrust of these studies was 
on the evolution of the tripartite relationship between communities, companies, and central 
(or higher level) governments. The main result is that the three parties are learning from 
experience. There is a strong positive trend over time with communities receiving 
increasingly sustainable benefits from mining operations. The scope and size of these can 
vary greatly, however, depending on the location of the mine and the access to markets, both 
of which can greatly shape the realistic economic alternatives. 
Almadén, Spain 
The Almadén mercury mine has been in operation for over 2 000 years, perhaps as long as 6 
000 years. It contained over 30 percent of the world's reserves of mercury. Other activities in 
this depressed, lightly populated area include crop-based agriculture, sheep farming, and 
tourism. The population of Almadén reflects the evolution of the mine. 
During recorded time, Almadén has been owned by the state. Community members have few 
alternatives and see the state as obliged to give them employment. The workers have low 
productivity and there is little innovation. The mercury is very high grade—six times the 
global average—so there has been little emphasis on increasing productivity. Management's 
main concern has always been producing more. The estimated present value of production 
from the 16th century is about $30 billion. In fact, historically the mine has been so important 
to the Spanish Crown that it was twice used to guarantee enormous sovereign loans. 
Although from the 16th to 18th century, the government used infrastructure improvements 
and tax incentives to attract workers, in the 19th and 20th centuries there was little investment 
of rents in the area until 1975. There has only been good road infrastructure to the zone since 
1985. (See Tables 1 to 6 for some of the main characteristics of the Almadén mining 
operation.) 
Surprisingly, mercury contamination in the area is negligible. The most serious 
environmental problem is heavy deforestation as wood has been used for centuries to build 
tunnels and feed the fires needed in the metallurgical processes. Nevertheless, except for the 
trees, the flora and fauna are in relatively good shape. 
In 1978, the Spanish government made the first serious attempt to diversify the area. These 
attempts became critically important as the market for mercury diminished, largely due to 
environmental concerns. The main elements of this plan, called Plan de Reconversion de 
Comarca de Almadén (PRECA, reconversion plan for the Almadén District) —were the 
following: 
1. develop new mercury mines as well as lead and zinc mines; 
2. develop a large 9 000 hectare agricultural area, including reforestation; 
3. increase the production and sale of local agricultural products; 
4. promote the production and sale of downstream mercury products; 
5. market mining technical expertise; and 
6. a slaughterhouse. 
PRECA was financed 75 percent by the state and 25 percent with resources of the mine. 
There was little or no private sector or community participation in its design. Despite some 
technical successes, it has had very heavy losses and the state has had to make large capital 
injections. The failure was due to poor planning, a lack of community buy-in, no involvement 
or responsibility of the private sector, and a general placement of financial concerns after 
technical concerns. The fall in mineral prices in the 1990s and the environmental pressure on 
the market for mercury complicated the situation further. To date, the state has bailed out 
PRECA to the amount of $150 million, although, to put this figure in perspective, in current 
dollars rents to the state from the mine just from 1960-1970 were about $900 million. 
The authors do not think that the problems with PRECA were caused by choices they made, 
but due to the poor methodology that was followed. Part of the reason for the lack of private 
enterprise in the plan was the long history of Almadén with state ownership and the district's 
almost complete reliance on the state. The plan also began way too late, only when the 
writing was on the wall. Project leaders were chosen by political connections, not by 
experience and professional capacity, and so the leadership of PRECA often changed with 
political fortunes. 
Clearly Almadén is a typical example of a mining operation resulting in non-sustained 
development. For most of its history the mercury mine was used as a treasure chest of the 
Spanish Crown. Little if any of the rents went back to the area, little attention was paid to 
developing the area or diversifying production, and the community never participated in the 
decisions that most affected it. The efforts that were made were not well thought-out and 
were probably too late. 
Canada: Evolution of mine-community relationships 
There is strong evidence in Canada that mining can both promote the socioeconomic well 
being of communities and be environmentally benign. Mining also leads to the development 
of clusters of activities centered on the mining operations, and it is even capable of resulting 
in the creation of a "mining metropolis" with a strong manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, 
socioeconomic agreements are crucial when dealing with aboriginal peoples. These should 
include employment quotas or targets, special training programs, targets for local 
procurement, support for local business development, support for women's employment and 
training, and a supportive work environment for distinctive cultures. 
The first of the two chapters on Canada gives an overview of the evolution of mine and 
community relationships, focusing on four mines or mining regions —Voisey Bay, Labrador; 
Diavik, Northwest Territories; Sussex, New Brunswick; and Sudbury, Ontario. (See Tables 1 
to 6 for some of the important economic and social characteristics of these mining 
operations.) The one factor common to most mining communities (however defined) in 
Canada is that their relationship with mining companies has evolved from paternalism to 
partnership, with both sides striving —with the help of governments —for sustainable 
community development. The active role of government in working with the local 
communities to facilitate this evolution has solidified the triangular dialogue which has been 
particularly important in the context of aboriginal communities, as there is usually a strongly 
asymmetric relation in the information held by mining companies and these communities. 
Given the poverty of many of these communities, it will usually be necessary to provide 
public funding for NGOs or consultant services to work with aboriginal peoples confronting a 
new mining project. Furthermore, a very important element in the evolution of the 
community-company relationship is the strong trend for new Canadian mines to be located in 
remote areas with predominant aboriginal populations. In most cases, high levels of poverty 
and unemployment characterize the aboriginal communities. Consequently, the needs of the 
inhabitants of the communities are generally very acute and their demands reflect their 
situation. 
There are many different types of mining communities in Canada: 
1. long-established communities dependent on the mine; 
2. company towns; 
3. long-established communities with diversified economic bases that have become home 
to new mines; 
4. fly-in, fly-out operations; 
5. temporary encampments; and 
6. major, long-established mining cities. 
Of the six types of mining communities identified by the authors, in recent decades the fly-in, 
fly-out and major, long-established mining cities have become the most important. Where 
feasible —due to a combination of location and the number of deposits —there has been a 
determined effort to develop a "mining metropolis" in Canada, of which Sudbury is the best 
example. At the other extreme, given the remote and difficult, cold climate locations of many 
new mines, fly-in, fly-out operations have become quite common. 
The pattern of community development in Canada is similar to the Latin America cases, 
albeit more evolved. In the first years of the mining operations, local community members 
tend to fill the lower skilled jobs and provide unsophisticated services to the mine, especially 
if it is in a remote location. However, as the community matures it is common for it to 
provide vehicle repair, machine shop services, welding, sheet metal work, plumbing, and 
electrical services. In areas with multiple mining projects, the next step for local business is 
complex construction projects. Finally, in major mining areas, production occurs of complex 
mine equipment that is also sold to other regions or countries. The Sudbury Basin is probably 
the best example of such a "mining metropolis" with a population of about 250 000 persons, 
5 000 jobs in manufacturing, and a number of important government services. 
The development of a well-established tripartite process among communities, companies, and 
governments has been instrumental to laying the foundations of sustainable development in 
many mining communities in Canada. As noted above, many of the new mines in Canada are 
located in areas predominantly inhabited by aboriginal peoples. While these operations 
provide many opportunities, there are many social problems to overcome, including the 
impact of the mine on traditional activities. Until the 1990s aboriginal peoples had very little 
participation in negotiations of mine development on or near their lands. Aboriginal peoples 
now can and do demand training programs for mine work and some assurances of buying 
local inputs. Companies must negotiate impact and benefits agreements with their 
communities. The Diavik diamond mine in the Northwest Territories provides for substantial 
purchases from northern businesses and includes a policy of eventual 100 percent northern 
employment. 
Oddly enough, the increase in fly-in, fly-out operations coupled with employment guarantees 
in the impact and benefits agreements are now helping aboriginal communities. This is 
because: 
• there are no semi-permanent or temporary communities to attract southern 
Canadians; 
• small aboriginal communities are not broken up as young males flock to new mine 
sites; and 
• traditional activities can be pursued in down periods. 
In Canada, as in most mining countries, there has been a strong trend towards stricter 
environmental regulations and better environmental performance. In particular, there is a 
heavy emphasis on mine closure and rehabilitation. Companies usually have to set up 
environmental funds, especially when tailings must be stored into perpetuity. Comprehensive 
environmental reviews that include detailed analysis of social and cultural factors must be 
undertaken and they are generally functioning well. There is also a trend towards cooperative 
monitoring of environmental management programs, especially in aboriginal areas. 
Uranium mining in northern Saskatchewan, Canada 
The uranium mining experience in northern Saskatchewan demonstrates the evolution of 
company and community relations —with the participation of the provincial government —
from one in which local communities had little input, to one that may well approach the most 
sophisticated models of tripartite relationships to be found anywhere in the world. Over about 
a twenty-year period the situation in northern Saskatchewan evolved from one characterized 
by minimal direct impacts and large negative externalities to one with large and positive 
direct impacts and externalities. Over this relatively short period of time, good policies and 
practices have moved the mining industry from a situation in which it primarily generated 
revenues for faraway governments, to one in which it is the leading force for dynamic 
community development. Such development is clearly more sustainable in a regional context 
where new mines are replacing old mines, and the effects can take place over several 
generations. 
Northern Saskatchewan is a remote area, home mostly to aboriginal peoples, who make up 87 
percent of the population. Only 40 000 of Saskatchewan's one million inhabitants live in this 
area, which is about 60 percent of the size of France. In 1995, 44 percent of the population 
was still below the Canadian poverty line. Uranium exploration began in the 1940s and in the 
1950s the first significant production began. Until the late 1980s, companies belonging to the 
provincial or federal governments undertook most production. 
The first large-scale operation was El Dorado, a state-owned enterprise which began 
operations in 1953 near Beaverlodge. The province and the federally owned company built a 
town called Uranium City. Most of the jobs and virtually all of the procurement at El Dorado 
—which closed in 1982 —went to persons and companies from outside of northern 
Saskatchewan. Uranium City attracted migrants from all over the region, resulting in social 
problems such as crime, alcoholism, and prostitution. Perhaps more importantly, it caused 
out-migration from small, traditional aboriginal communities. When the mine was 
decommissioned, local communities were not invited to participate in the planning, even 
though closure meant the death of the town of about 3 000 persons. 
The unsatisfactory situation at El Dorado gave rise to significant opposition to uranium 
mining in Saskatchewan, from both southerners —mostly for environmental reasons —and 
aboriginals —due to a lack of economic benefits combined with potentially large social, 
cultural, and environmental costs. Concern with the effects of uranium mining coupled with 
the discovery of new, very rich deposits near Cluff Lake resulted in the Bayda Commission, 
which finished its report in 1978. 
Implementation of the recommendations of the Bayda Commission resulted in an about-face 
in the acceptance of uranium mining by aboriginal peoples. In fact, their opposition to 
uranium mining declined by over 50 percent in the 1980s as the benefits to aboriginal 
communities increased and the costs declined. Among the recommendations of the Bayda 
Commission were: 
• a movement from bipartite to tripartite consultations; 
• inclusion of socioeconomic and cultural effects into the decision making process 
rather than a sole focus on the environment; and 
• northern revenue-sharing of those fiscal revenues generated by uranium mining. 
More importantly, the Commission laid out the foundation for uranium development in 
northern Saskatchewan that evolved and developed through the 1980s to include: 
• best efforts (rather than targets) to deliver social and economic benefits; 
• cooperative tripartite negotiations; 
• increased monitoring of environmental and occupational health and safety 
performances; 
• community based consultation procedures; and 
• recognition of social spending as a legitimate royalty deduction for companies. 
The movement from state-owned to privately-owned corporations has also been very 
important with respect to the levels of investment, ability to quickly adapt to new situations, 
and a stronger commitment to community development by firms whose survival and 
prosperity depends on strong, healthy relations. By the end of the 1980s the state was no 
longer involved directly in uranium mining after the provincial and federal state-owned 
companies merged to form Cameco Corporation, which was in turn quickly privatized. 
Cameco and other privately owned uranium mining companies have moved rapidly in the 
1990s to take advantage of the lessons learned during the period of state-run mining 
operations. They have worked with the communities and various levels of government to 
dramatically increase the levels of benefits to residents of northern Saskatchewan, while at 
the same time they have been fulfilling more and more stringent environmental regulations. 
The heart of the programs supported by Cameco and other mining companies are training for 
northern residents—most of whom have not completed secondary school —for both direct 
mine employment and mine procurement. (See Table 6 for some of the social programs 
supported by Cameco.) The training for mine employment of aboriginal peoples has had large 
cost savings to the companies by reducing the prevalent extremely high turnover. Moreover, 
the government investment has also been rapidly repaid simply due to the decrease in welfare 
related payments. With respect to procurement, similar to Escondida in Chile, Cameco has 
placed strong emphasis on quality enhancement. 
Employment in uranium mining of long-time northern Saskatchewan residents has increased 
from 31 percent in 1983 to 48 percent in 1998. Employment in contractors to the mines of 
long-time northern Saskatchewan residents has increased from 38 percent in 1992 to 52 
percent in 1998. 
Fly-in, fly-out has become the preferred method of mine employment. This practice allows 
members of small traditional communities to enjoy the benefits of mining without having 
adverse effects on the population of these villages. It also allows the miners to participate in 
traditional lifestyles for roughly 50 percent of the time. 
Lessons learned and recommendations 
The above studies on community costs and benefits of mining operations have generated a 
number of significant results. While any conclusions must be treated with caution, given the 
size of the sample and the differences across countries, there are important lessons to be 
learned for most or all countries involved in mining. 
The studies have demonstrated clearly that there often are substantial social and economic 
benefits to local communities from mining operations, but they do not come automatically. 
Mining is an activity that will come to stay in a region "through thick and thin," and it is a 
powerful vehicle for transferring technologies and skills to developing countries and remote 
regions. Yet, some regions that possess no history of mining and hence no work force, nor an 
industry ready to take advantage of new opportunities, have needed proactive interventions to 
jump start the development process. 
The key issue is the identification and sustainability of benefits. It was particularly important 
that there were proactive policies and training with respect to mine employment, non-mine 
employment, and goods and services provision. The most successful cases were those where 
the local communities (often gradually) provided many of the goods and services needed by 
the mining companies. In some cases, the mining companies played an active role in training 
their suppliers to enhance the quality of their products. The skills developed in all of these 
cases often were transferable to other industries. Companies and communities that took a 
long-term view, including mine closure, were also more likely to have a clearer vision of 
what types of training and programs might provide sustainable benefits. 
The studies confirm that sustainability is closely related to the local participation of the 
neighboring communities in the decisions affecting them. The need to ensure sustainability 
through increased participation of the local communities is present in the Canadian cases and 
quite consistent with the more recent—and less evolved—Latin American experiences. Most 
importantly, the Canadian cases illustrate the importance of the participation of government 
in the process, and the establishment of a trilateral dialogue. It is critical that the three main 
stakeholders —the community, company and government —all have direct communication 
with each other, in addition to a formal three-way dialogue where other stakeholders also 
participate. A key result of the studies is that legal licence is no longer adequate. Companies 
must obtain a social licence, and this depends on consultation, participation, and, 
increasingly, a strong trilateral dialogue. 
Sustainability is partially dependent on the provision of infrastructure that could be used for 
other activities. In our sample, the case of Sudbury showed how in the right conditions, 
infrastructure provision can result in a vibrant industrial community. It seems likely that 
infrastructure creation will be one of the largest benefits of the Antamina mining operation in 
Peru. 
In sum, the key characteristics of sustainability are:7 
• non-renewable resource development should not threaten the environment and the 
renewable resources upon which future generations depend; 
• mineral wealth should be maintained from one generation to the other; 
7 These are summarized from Conservation Strategy Committee 1986. 
• sustainable mining balances economic growth and protection of the environment by 
sensible trade-offs that consider all costs and benefits in the decision making 
process; 
• recognizing that mining will affect the social structure and culture of local people 
and considering these impacts as part of the decisionmaking process; 
• reducing, reusing and recycling while avoiding the waste of the resource base by 
inefficient mining techniques; and 
• policy and taxation decisions which consider the economic health of the mining 
industry. 
There were few negative social and cultural effects in the sample. With the exception of 
Canada, none of mines were in areas with substantial numbers of indigenous peoples who 
had not been exposed to mining or at least modern industrial culture. In the Canadian case, it 
has taken many years of experience and learning to eliminate or mitigate negative effects on 
aboriginal peoples. In the Latin American case studies, the biggest social problems were 
associated with land acquisition and the cultural clash between (usually domestic) immigrants 
and residents of the area. Clearly, there is no issue that is more likely to cause long-term 
damage to company-community relations than land purchases that are lacking in transparency 
and fairness, where the latter signifies that the company pays the same amount for land of 
similar quality, whenever it is purchased. 
At a more general level, when a company is about to enter a new country or a new region it 
should ensure that it knows the country and communities that it is entering, including their 
social composition and political dynamics. In this regard, baseline studies must be undertaken 
in order to have a good understanding of the local situation, and to monitor the progress of 
the community. The relationship that it is endeavouring to establish must include a long-term 
vision, even if—as in the case of the junior companies —the development is not permanent. 
The company must be clear that the responsibility it is about to assume in front of the local 
communities is part of its corporate ethics. It is not an obligation, but a practice, that the 
medium-term must benefit both the company and the community. Thus, the final objective of 
a company's assistance must be to strengthen local governance and the local capability to 
formulate projects. 
The implementation of a successful development strategy for the local communities demands 
an adequate institutional design and the organized participation of the community. An 
important consideration for a company which is about to undertake an initiative related to 
local economic development refers to the instruments to be used for the channeling of funds 
and project implementation. Some companies have chosen to set up a "foundation" as an 
independent institution and assign them such responsibility. However, the foundation is, in 
fact, controlled by the mining company and the degree of local participation is independent 
from the mere presence of a foundation or of a company. A more recent alternative is the 
establishment of an informal "Governance Board" where the main stakeholders are 
represented and which acts on the basis of consensus building by the main stakeholders. 
The creation of local social capital was found to be extremely important in all of the studies. 
Local communities are generally at a profound disadvantage when negotiating with large 
mining companies, and it often takes considerable effort and several years before they can be 
considered true partners. In the interim, higher level governments must fund NGOs or other 
institutions to provide advice and training to the local community members. Over the longer 
term, foundations or similar institutions —funded by both companies and governments—
have become a very common way of providing social services and, more importantly, 
building up human and social capital in communities. In many respects, these have become 
partial substitutes for governments. It also seems likely that there are economies of scale in 
the delivery of such services as the medium-scale mines in the sample provided relatively 
much smaller amounts. A regional approach, grouping mining operations with considerable 
public input, may be necessary in such cases. 
There were also few negative environmental effects. As the focus of the study was on modern 
mining operations, most of the mines were using up-to-date environmental practices. In the 
older mines that were included (Sudbury and Almadén) there was an environmental legacy 
from the past, although much had been done to improve the situation. Nevertheless, the 
communities and other stakeholders often used the environment as a political tool in order to 
extract concessions from the mining companies. At times, the mining companies partially 
invited problems due to poor communication strategies. 
In sum, there were not many minuses in the accounting ledger. But in some cases there were 
also not many positives. Accordingly, the communities were not always very accepting of the 
mining operations. This was particularly true of the smaller medium-scale mines. Note that 
while the past agenda has been on reducing the minuses, the new agenda is on increasing the 
positives. 
With respect to processes, there is a clear tendency for them to become more open. The more 
recently developed mines in the sample followed more open processes than older mines. 
Moreover, the processes of older mines generally became more transparent over the years. 
These results are probably not unique to the mining industry, but all part of a global trend in 
this direction, partially due to pressure from interest groups. The supposed trilateral 
relationship was mostly two bilateral relationships with the exception of the more recent 
Canadian experiences and Antamina. In general, the company and the central government 
had a relationship with respect to macro issues, and communities were rarely at the table 
when negotiations took place. On the other hand, the company and the local communities had 
a bilateral relationship with respect to micro issues that developed in an informal manner. 
Most community initiatives were led by the companies, often with substantial community 
involvement. Central governments largely abdicated responsibility on community issues to 
companies with the exception of Canada. Nevertheless, most fiscal revenues generated by the 
mine went to central (or higher level) governments. 
The importance of good communication from the company to the communities cannot be 
overestimated. Companies should begin early, be open, and give lots of information. It is 
essential to have a clear mission statement and human resource and environmental policies. 
There must be a dedicated group in the company with this task. 
It is clear from the case studies that that central government needs to become more involved 
in the community development work in the Andean countries. Its role in the trilateral 
dialogue with the local communities and the mining companies is essential. Only the 
participation of central government will ensure the adequate insertion of the local plans with 
the national programs, thus multiplying their beneficial impact. In this context, central 
governments should: 
• redistribute more tax revenue to local governments —or simply ensure that law-
mandated redistributions are complied with (although often this will need to be 
accompanied by capacity building at local levels); 
• promote social responsibility among the companies and the opening towards mining 
enterprises among the communities (this could initially be accomplished by playing 
the role of go-between that shows both the company and the community the 
fundamental nature and legitimate aspirations of each side); and 
• play a proactive role in community development programs either directly or 
indirectly through the use of NGOs, community-based organizations, or religious 
organizations.8 
A strong lesson from the Andean studies is the need for a concerted local economic 
development plan to be available as early as possible. Institutional and organizational 
weaknesses of the local populations constitute one of the key bottlenecks to local economic 
development. Capacity-building takes time, thus the need for an early start. A concerted 
process involving the participation of the local population (not just the local leaders) should 
bring about a reasonable action plan where the company can express its priorities. This is 
very different from unilaterally deciding what is good for the community. The company 
should start working on such a plan at the earliest possible stage, and, preferably during 
exploration, an information and consultation strategy should be implemented quickly. 
 
8 The Andean countries have preferred not to include community development provisions 
in their national mining legislation, as it bureaucratizes a process that they believe needs to 
be left flexible, given the unique considerations of each mining operation and the local 
communities in the area. Yet, it must be noted that some countries, such as the Philippines 
and (potentially) Indonesia, are opting to move in this direction. Companies are generally 
against such provisions as it gives them legal obligations even when the mine is not 
profitable. 
The funds assigned by a company to finance a community development program should 
constitute only the seed capital of a broader financial strategy funded through other means. 
The company's contribution should be a minority contribution under a reimbursable credit 
scheme, once the productive projects are in operation. This support should be positioned to 
recover at least part of the amount invested —and certainly not the total assigned to 
productive projects. This financing would not subsidize nor lend at rates below market; it 
would simply make available to the community financial instruments that the market does not 
offer. 
There were strong lessons for developing countries from the case of Almadén. Despite over 2 
000 years of operating one of the most profitable mines in history, there had been little 
community development. For centuries the central government took everything and gave 
nothing back until it was too late to be effective. Even the community development programs 
that were undertaken in the last 20 years were run by the central government with very little 
community involvement or private-sector participation in their design or operation. 
The Canadian studies contain equally strong lessons for developing countries. They show a 
number of cases of successful, proactive community development. Particular importance 
should be placed on the process that has evolved in Canada over time and the development of 
a tripartite relationship. This tripartite relationship was made viable by the proper funding of 
the process. While provincial and federal governments have extracted large financial flows 
from the mining companies in the form of royalties, fees and taxation, a substantial portion 
was returned to the mining region in the form of health and social service payments, welfare 
and regional development spending. The Canadian experience also shows that the role of 
government is more important in areas where there are indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, 
even in such cases, the private sector should still play the lead role in sustainable community 
development. 
The most important result of the Canadian experience, however, is that it clearly 
demonstrates that although there are some rules that apply to all mining operations —e.g. 
tripartite negotiations, transparency —each mine has its own historical, social, cultural, and 
geographical characteristics that preclude the use of a "one size fits all" prescription. For 
example, not every mining city has the potential to be a mining metropolis —for this to 
occur, it is important to be in an area with many operations and not too far off of the beaten 
track. Training programs and other community initiatives are also more likely to have long-
term success if a regional approach is taken, which in turn is only feasible when a succession 
of mines is being developed. Similarly, while the infrastructure that a large mining operation 
brings to a region can be its most important contribution to the local community, in remote 
regions with little possibility of significant industrial development due to climatic or 
geographic conditions, fly-in, fly-out mining is the preferred choice. 
In sum, the goal is not to provide the community with a given package of benefits but to 
maximize the benefits that it receives. In the Latin American and the Canadian examples, the 
benefits received were partially due to the policies and strategies followed. But they are also 
partially due to the situation. It is important that the policies and strategies followed are 
adapted to the realities of the given operation, including its size, geographic location, climate, 
and socioeconomic and cultural conditions. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
Bolivia: Turning Gold into Human Capital 
Fernando Loayza, Ismael Franco, Fernando Quezada, Mario Alvarado 
Introduction9 
Mining in Bolivia 
In spite of developments in agriculture and agro-industry and the corresponding economic 
diversification in eastern Bolivia, mining continues to play a significant role in the country's 
economy. Table 1 illustrates the importance of mineral exports with respect to total exports 
and foreign exchange earnings. Although the dominant role of mining has decreased, it 
continues to be the primary export sector in the national economy. Mining also plays a 
secondary role as a generator of funds for the national treasury, although in this area, too, the 
sector's contribution has decreased significantly. 
Table 1. Bolivia: Principal indicators of the mining sector's impact (percent). 
  Average 1980-1985 Average 1993-1998 
Mineral exports 48.2 39.4 
Mining royalties 8.0 0.6
Contribution to GDP 9.0 5.9 
Employment 4.4 2.1
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, External Bulletin N° 20 and External Bulletin 1980-1988. 
Mining's contribution to the GDP and employment levels has decreased and is not highly 
significant at the national level. Within traditional mining regions such as Potosí and Oruro, 
however, this industry's contribution remains significant, as shown in Table 2. Between 1993 
and 1998, these sectors received between 73 percent and 92 percent of mining royalties, a 
principal source of financing. 
Table 2. Mining's contributions (percent) to GDP of Oruro, Potosí and Bolivia. 
Departments Average 1980-1985 Average 1991-1996 Difference
Oruro 32.3 28.1 -4.3
Potosí 51.4 35.2 -16.2
Bolivia 9.0 5.9 -3.2
Source: Based on information provided by the National Institute of Statistics, National 
Accounts Department. 
Potosí and Oruro's mining has decreased in importance since the 1950s. This decline was 
exacerbated by the crisis in tin mining of the mid-1980s. Currently, both sectors register the 
lowest income and human development levels in the country, and consequently the region 
experiences high levels of emigration. This situation appears to offer proof to those people  
9 The authors would like to thank the Mining Policy Research Initiative of the International 
Development Research Centre of Canada and the Mining and Industry Division of the 
World Bank for providing funding that made this study possible. 
 
who believe that mining does not contribute to sustainable development at the local or 
regional level. 
Mining and local development 
Various studies on the mining industry and its local context have identified a typical model in 
which a specific type of local community and its relationship to a given mining operation can 
be predicted. In this model, the community is usually located in a remote region. Although 
the literature recognizes that such communities are not totally isolated from the market 
economy, in general the community's link to the market is secondary and complementary. 
The community's economy is essentially self-sufficient and sustains a culture and particular 
form of organization that is different from the market economy. (MEM 1996, 1997; Labat-
Anderson Inc. 1997; May 1998; Kumalo 1999) Meanwhile, the type of mining operation 
prevalent in the literature is one characterized by its large size, with an annual turnover of US 
$100 million or more. Such operations are usually run by a transnational mining company 
that maintains the corporate culture of competition in international markets, such as Rio 
Tinto, P.T. Freeport Indonesia, and Comalco. 
The relationship between these specific types of local communities and mining operations 
produces several predictable results. Workers and others are attracted to the area by road 
construction and the promise of job opportunities because of the mine's opening. This 
migration entails high risks for the local communities, since the new arrivals bring diseases or 
alcoholism to the area. In addition, the migrants compete with local residents for the use of 
natural resources (May 1998). Increased demand for land causes a rapid increase in property 
and land prices. Worsening inequalities in income distribution favours young adults, 
modifying their position and prestige vis-à-vis their elders and affecting traditional social 
structures in the process (Labat-Anderson Inc. 1997). The growing population places excess 
demands on services and infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals. 
According to Bisset (1996), such impacts are common during the mine's construction and 
exploitation phases and typically are followed by more severe impacts after the operation 
closes. Unemployment would increase significantly and property and land prices plummet. 
The demoralizing nature of a recession and unemployment causes an increase in alcohol and 
drug use among residents. The author even predicts that "many people would lose their 
cultural ability to survive without a paying job. Faced with the lack of alternative economic 
activities, severe social impacts can be foreseen —a potentially spectacular contraction." 
(Bisset 1996, pp. 9-10) In response to this situation, "local communities are demanding 
compensation far above what they have received in the past. They want infrastructure, 
training for mining or other jobs, and social services, including education and health." 
(McMahon and Strongman 1999, p. 8). 
Evidence from case studies of large mining and petroleum projects show that a purely 
compensatory attitude on the part of the company toward the community is incapable of 
achieving sustainable development at the local level. Thus, a new trend proposes to replace 
compensation with the formation of social capital. (Labat-Anderson Inc. 1997; May 1998) 
Social capital formation focuses on the importance of strong social ties that make human 
groups more cooperative, productive and innovative. According to this focus, progress and 
development require groups or communities capable of identifying their limitations and the 
strategies necessary to overcome them. This in turn requires trust and experience among 
group members (May 1998, p. 22). The social capital focus favours community 
empowerment over mere compensation in goods and resources. A community's ability to 
identify its problems and their possible solutions is the best mechanism for promoting 
sustainable development. 
From compensation to social transformation 
This study evaluates the relationship between mining operations and local communities, 
identifying the impacts and transmission mechanisms for a type of local community that is 
substantially different from the predominant model in the research literature. Although the 
local community in this study is still a rural community whose economy is based on 
subsistence agriculture, its distinctive characteristic as an indigenous social unit is its state of 
"de-structurization." This means that the local community is in an advanced state of 
assimilation regarding the values of urban culture and the market economy. In contrast to the 
remote community so predominate in literature, these communities are connected to the 
urban realm by way of markets, roads, and highways. More importantly, the community's 
adolescents and young adults struggle to integrate into the urban world and end their 
marginalization. In this struggle, however, they do not abandon their ties to the community or 
the land, since these are the last refuges to which they can turn if insertion in the urban world 
becomes too difficult. Such communities represent some of the principal sources of marked 
migration from the country to the city that are so prevalent in Latin America. 
As this study will argue, the opening of a large mining project next to local communities of 
the type described above produces impacts that are distinct (and usually opposite) to those 
expected under the prevalent model. For example, migratory flows involve displacement to 
urban centers because periodic commuting to the mine becomes an option. Moreover, 
employment at the mine or with associated subcontractors may provide sufficient income to 
enable a relatively smooth transition to the urban world and, in many cases, a higher rank on 
the socioeconomic scale. 
In other words, the opening of a large mining operation can serve as the catalyst for a 
socioeconomic transformation at the local level, reducing the importance of compensation. In 
addition, the concept of sustainable development of a community takes on a different 
meaning, since it does not take place within the community itself but rather in the negation of 
the community within a westernized, urban social context. This implies that, in such cases, a 
socially responsible company should contribute to enabling the community to transform 
itself. It is not a matter of compensating for changes to a social system. What is critical is to 
convert these changes into a new or different equilibrium within a social entity which is in the 
process of change. 
The significance of this study is to show that the relationships between large-scale mining 
and local communities do not follow a singular pattern, as literature suggests. It is necessary 
to establish a taxonomy of possible and relevant cases that contribute to the formation of 
recommendations. When this is achieved, then the state, mining companies and local 
communities can take actions oriented toward achieving the highest levels of well-being for 
members of the communities involved. 
Methodological focus 
This investigation analyzes two case studies: the operation of Minera del Sur at Puquio Norte, 
and the operation of Inti Raymi at Kori Kollo. 
The Puquio Norte mining operation represents an excellent pilot case because the 
socioeconomic, cultural and environmental baseline of its area of social influence was easily 
determined. It began operation in March 1997, less than two years before the fieldwork for 
this study commenced. Therefore, reconstructing the baseline was less difficult and more 
reliable than an operation such as Inti Raymi, which began operations during the second half 
of the 1980s. Although the region where Puquio Norte is located has been home to mining 
operations since colonial times, these were largely artisanal operations. Until the discovery of 
the Puquio Norte deposit, there had been no industrial-scale mining operation in the region. 
Because of this historical presence, the Puquio Norte case presented little "noise" or 
interference in the perceptions of local residents. A similar situation in western Bolivia is 
unlikely. 
The main disadvantage of Puquio Norte was its size. Although this investigation is geared to 
an analysis of the impacts of large-scale mining operations, Puquio Norte is a relatively small 
operation by international mining standards. For example, Yanacocha in Peru produces 1 050 
000 ounces and Inti Raymi in Bolivia produces 350 000 ounces of gold per year, while 
Puquio Norte produces just 27 500 ounces per year. Not counting silver production, Puquio 
Norte represents only 3 percent of Yanacocha's production, and 9 percent of Inti Raymi's 
production. This is a structural limitation of the Bolivian mining industry, which apart from 
Inti Raymi and the San Cristobal project10 (currently in the engineering design phase and thus 
not eligible for this study), consists solely of small mining operations. 
Inti Raymi was chosen because it is the most important mining operation currently underway 
in Bolivia and because it contrasts with the Puquio Norte case. While Puquio Norte's area of 
social influence enjoyed economic growth during the period of study, Inti Raymi's area of 
social influence, at the rural level, experienced economic decline. In contrast to Puquio Norte, 
Inti Raymi had to compete with local community members for access to mining resources. 
Inti Raymi's policy toward the local community has consistently supported social and 
economic development requirements without demanding, in exchange, a counter-contribution 
on the part of the community, as has been the case with Puquio Norte. 
In our investigations of the case studies, we adopted an empirical research focus. The study's 
design and execution, therefore, did not assume a specific theoretical focus. We have 
favoured a multidisciplinary analysis with the goal of establishing, through detailed and 
integral fieldwork, how and why a mining operation impacts on its area of social influence. 
Puquio Norte 
Antecedents 
At the end of the 1980s, the Minera del Sur Company, (COMSUR 1992)11 began exploration 
activities in the new Bolivian mining frontier of the Precambrian region. This is part of the 
Brazilian Shield located in the eastern part of the country where geological formations of 
economic interest exist, including precious metals and stones, as well as manganese. The 
company's exploration activities resulted in the discovery of the Puquio Norte gold deposit 
located 11 km from the town of San Ramón by highway. Puquio Norte is an open-pit 
operation that treats 1 500 tonnes per day by way of the carbon-in-leach process; the mine's 
lifespan is estimated at seven years. 
COMSUR's exploration activities in this region were made possible after Rio Tinto, a British-
based transnational mining company, acquired one-third of its shares. This enabled the 
incorporation of strict environmental and occupational safety standards at COMSUR's 
operations. Rio Tinto's association with COMSUR was geared toward the discovery of a 
large-scale mineral deposit, which has still not occurred. When small deposits like Puquio 
Norte are discovered, COMSUR develops and administers them, defining all necessary  
10 A silver mining project in the Los Lipez area that would require an investment of 
approximately US $450 million. 
11 COMSUR is a Bolivian company composed of several mining operations. Its most 
significant undertakings are: Porco (zinc-silver-lead), Don Diego (zinc-lead-silver), 
Bolívar (zinc-lead-silver), COMCO (silver) and Puquio Norte (gold). 
policies for their exploitation, including environmental, personnel and community relations. 
Rio Tinto makes suggestions in any area it considers pertinent, but does not define business 
policies or administer the mining operations. 
Environment 
COMSUR was the first company to discover, develop and exploit a mineral deposit in the 
Precambrian region on an industrial scale. Thus, the company became a source of 
information on modern mining's impacts on ecologically sensitive regions such as the 
Bolivian Amazon. According to company executives, the mining operation complied with the 
most stringent international standards as well as with Bolivian regulations. In addition, 
officials decided not to construct a mining camp in order to minimize the risks and social 
costs involved in relocating the miners after the mine's inevitable closure. Instead, Puquio 
Norte's miners and employees integrated with the civil population of San Ramón. 
Following practices that are in place at the international level, environmental management at 
Puquio Norte is based on principles of zero discharge and systematic monitoring. The zero 
discharge principle means that effluents are not discharged from the production process. Ore 
is crushed, milled and put in solution, then circulated from water tanks to the processing plant 
and back. Sterile solids from the plant are pumped to the tailings dam where they are 
separated from liquids by gravity. The water from the dam is recycled back to the plant. In 
this way, water loss occurs only through evaporation. 
The effectiveness of this process depends on the stability and impermeability of the tailings 
dam. The material used in the dam's construction are the solids that remain after the mining 
process, and because of this region's climatic and ecological characteristics, these have a high 
natural capacity for revegetation and regrowth. To guarantee its impermeability, the dam is 
lined with compacted clay covered with a layer of geo-membrane, a flexible plastic. 
According to company personnel, monitoring activities are fundamental to Puquio Norte's 
environmental management. Monitoring is performed on: surface water (10 points) and 
ground water (3 points); the volume and level of the San Julián River12; the pH and cyanide 
content of the tailings dam; soil at four points located north, south, east and west of the mine; 
sterile material from the mine; and dust and noise. Since the mine is currently extracting 
oxidized material from the deposit, there is no acid rock drainage. 
In terms of closure and rehabilitation, Puquio Norte plans to cover the dam with oxidized 
material and revegetate the area. Despite its projected seven-year lifespan, our fieldwork 
research was unable to identify a closure and restoration plan in place for the operation. 
Local community perceptions 
Although the town of San Ramón is aware of COMSUR's presence in the area because of the 
Puquio Norte operation, this knowledge is fragmentary, partial, and often incorrect. Such a 
situation becomes fertile ground for false perceptions and misunderstandings regarding the 
impact of the mining operation. 
Several interviewees expressed concern about the environmental risks associated with Puquio 
Norte and supposed benefits that the mining operation would leave in the region. For 
example, due to the intense rains the region usually receives, some residents worry about the  
12 The San Julián River provides water to the town of San Ramón and the Puquio Norte 
mining operation. 
stability of the tailings dam, which is located upstream from the capture point for the town. 
This concern is expressed because, according to reports, the tailings dam at COMSUR's 
Porco operation in Potosí ruptured in August 1996 from severe climatic conditions. 
The sensitivity of some San Ramón residents to potential environmental impacts of the 
Puquio Norte operation was evident when the morning paper El Deber reported that the 
tailings dam had burst, contaminating the San Julián River. The report was a false alarm. The 
company reacted with an open door policy, welcoming inspection visits and the collection of 
samples by authorities from the government, San Ramón, and the university. Such a response 
allowed national, regional and local authorities to verify, in situ, the high environmental 
standards by which the operation is managed. Nevertheless, not all San Ramón residents 
share this opinion, and some still express concern about the environmental risks of the mining 
operation. 
This type of perception regarding mining is not exclusive to the area around Puquio Norte. 
Although the issue has not been studied systematically, the Bolivian population generally 
distrusts the mining industry. According to business people and field experts, this perception 
is due to the mining sector's history since the colonial era, which has been fraught with 
frustrations as well as negative environmental and social impacts. As such, modern mining 
operations such as Puquio Norte or Inti Raymi must bear the brunt of this legacy in spite of 
the fact that they comply with stringent environmental standards. Moreover, as we will see in 
the section on Inti Raymi, this legacy can give rise to a situation in which the environment 
becomes a mechanism for political pressure by local organizations toward the company or 
government in order to obtain greater returns at the local level from mining. In this context, 
an objective analysis of the company's environmental management is influenced by political 
positions that seek greater benefits from mining activities. 
The local context: the town of San Ramon13 
During the period of discovery, construction and opening of the mine, Puquio Norte's area of 
social influence —the town of San Ramón14 —experienced rapid economic growth. 
According to our estimates, between 1992 and 1998, the average monthly income in San 
Ramón grew at an average annual rate of 17.4 percent. This growth prompted the 
construction of the interdepartmental Santa Cruz-Trinidad highway, which passes through 
San Ramón where the road forks toward Trinidad one way, and the towns of San Javier, 
Concepción, San Ignacio de Velasco and San Matías in the other direction. The highway 
provides a link to the department's capital, serves as a connecting axis between the 
departments of Santa Cruz and Beni, as well as a link between the towns located in the 
western part of Santa Cruz, near the Brazilian border. 
13 Based on secondary information and an orientation field visit, the towns of San Ramón, 
Santa Rosa de la Mina and San Javier were selected as Puquio Norte's area of social 
influence. During the course of our field work it became evident, however, that San Javier 
was linked to Puquio Norte solely by way of municipal responsibilities. In addition, the 
mine has no presence in Santa Rosa de la Mina and none of its residents work at the 
mining company. In contrast, a highway links San Ramón to Puquio Norte. A few San 
Ramón residents work at the mining company and the company's technicians, 
administrators and workers live in San Ramón. For the most part, Puquio Norte workers 
and their families shop at the local market, and access local health and education services. 
14 San Ramón is located 180 kilometers east of the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. It 
belongs to the Santa Rosa de la Mina canton, Ñuflo de Chávez province, Second Municipal 
Section (San Javier) of the Department of Santa Cruz. 
Prior to the discovery of Puquio Norte, San Ramón experienced an intense immigration 
process because an alluvial gold deposit was discovered in the surrounding area and the 
construction of a highway. People from the interior of Bolivia were attracted by the prospect 
of amassing a fortune or simply earning a bit of money during the fierce economic crisis of 
the 1980s. As a result, towns such as San Ramón, where gold deposits accessible to artisanal 
mining were discovered, became migration magnets for hundreds of people. Almost all San 
Ramón residents were caught up in the gold rush. In addition, hostels, hotels, bars, cantinas 
and street stalls sprang up, offering various goods and services. 
Although artisanal mining activities declined in the early 1990s, the interdepartmental 
highway's termination at the nodal location of San Ramón meant the town remained a 
destination point for migrants. According to our estimates, between 1992 and 1998 the town 
grew at an annual rate of 17.8 percent. This population growth invigorated economic activity 
(especially commerce), accelerated the process of urbanization, and prompted the regional 
electrification project. The fact that significant population growth was accompanied by 
exceptional economic growth is indicative of the notable dynamism experienced by San 
Ramón during the 1990s. 
Mestizaje and westernization 
It is evident that by the mid-1990s, when construction of the Puquio Norte mine began, the 
population of San Ramón was extremely diverse, both socially and culturally. First, there 
were the long-standing San Ramón residents who, even before 1980, did not recognize an 
ethnic identity, spoke only Spanish, did not use traditional dress, and did not make traditional 
crafts, despite the fact that the area was once inhabited by Chiquitano Indians (D'Orbigny 
1994). Second, there were the immigrants to the region's communities and villages who 
arrived between 1982 and 1987 during the gold rush, and who consider themselves peasants 
or cambas due to their mestizaje — or advanced state of acculturation. Third, there was a 
wave of immigrants from the Andean region and the valleys. According to the majority of 
interviewees, less than 50 percent of the current population of San Ramón is made up of 
collas (western Bolivia natives). 
Land tenure 
Until 1995, San Ramón had 3 200 hectares of communal land. Due to population growth 
from constant immigration, these lands were divided for the benefit of the most senior 
residents. Lands adjacent to the urban center were ceded to the municipality so that they 
could be divided into urban lots. This enabled a process of relatively ordered urban growth 
for San Ramón, but in exchange, the town lost its communal lands, which were the principal 
reference and space for collective unity. 
In terms of lands affected by the mining operation, there was no transaction with San Ramón 
residents or authorities, since COMSUR had acquired lands from a citizen of foreign origin 
by the name of Gehard. Now COMSUR owns 250 hectares of land, of which approximately 
30 hectares are affected by the mining operation. Subsoil rights were acquired from the state 
by way of 7 200-hectare mining concession. COMSUR acquired plots within San Ramón 
from the municipal agency in order to build housing for the company's technical personnel. 
Other employees and workers have acquired their own plots of land or rented housing, 
according to their convenience and needs. 
 
 
Impacts of the mine on San Ramón 
Employment 
Although COMSUR tried to hire the greatest number of local residents possible, Ramoneños 
are nevertheless a minority of the 118 member work force, equivalent to 30 percent. There 
are two reasons for this. First, Puquio Norte's salaries provide income levels similar to those 
San Ramón residents can earn in alternative activities. In addition, 13.5 percent of a worker's 
salary is withheld for social security and contributions to the National Housing Fund. For 
families used to working as independent producers, as the majority of San Ramón residents 
are, such withholdings are considered simple taxes, since many view their condition as 
salaried workers as a temporary situation. Second, local residents prefer activities that do not 
imply a relation of dependence and it is difficult for them to become accustomed to the 
discipline of working at a mining company that entails complying with a work schedule and 
safety measures. This attitude was confirmed by 100 percent of the interviewees. 
Table 3 presents the statistics for absenteeism and acts of disobedience by workers at Puquio 
Norte between February 1998 and January 1999. Workers from eastern Bolivia (San Ramón 
and Santa Cruz) had an average absenteeism rate that was 45 percent higher than the rate for 
workers from other regions of the country. In addition, workers from other parts of Bolivia 
committed 38 percent fewer acts of disobedience than workers from eastern Bolivia.15 
Table 3. Puquio Norte: Absenteeism and worker disobedience. 
Origin Workers Absenteeism (days) Acts of disobedience 
San Ramón 19 67 9 
Santa Cruz 3 20 3 
Other regions 67 183 23 
Total 89 270 35 
Source: Puquio Norte, COMSUR. 
Approximately 50 percent of workers are western migrants who arrived on their own accord 
before the mine opened. Only 20 percent of workers, mostly experienced miners, were 
contracted directly by the company in the western part of Bolivia. Thus the majority of mine 
workers are from San Ramón, (30 percent locals and 50 percent immigrant residents from the 
western Bolivia), representing 25 percent of the total salaried workers in San Ramón. 
Income 
The opening of Puquio Norte has had direct and indirect impacts on income levels in San 
Ramón. Direct impacts include workers' salaries and subcontractors' fees. As we mentioned 
earlier, the monthly salaries at the mining operation are similar to the average monthly 
income in San Ramón, or approximately US $290 in 1998 according to our estimates.16 
 
15 To address the problems of absenteeism and worker indiscipline, guidelines have been 
issued and the area superintendants and section bosses conduct motivational workshops. 
16 The estimate for income levels for 1998 was obtained through a random stratifed sample 
that involved in-depth interviews with 47 people. 
 
Three types of subcontractors in the region provide goods and services to Puquio Norte. 
During construction, local sawmills sold important quantities of wood to COMSUR. Since 
production began, COMSUR has employed transport services available in the area. Four of 
the 42 transport firms in San Ramón were contracted by Puquio Norte, two for the daily 
transport of company personnel to the mine site and the other two for transportation of 
material from the mine to the mineral processing plant. Approximately 30 dump-truck 
subcontractors are from the interior of Bolivia. During the construction and exploitation 
phases, hotel owners have also benefited from the periodic arrival of delegations of technical 
personnel and executives from COMSUR's central and regional offices. In addition, San 
Ramón's location along the highway means there is a constant flow of travellers to local 
hotels and hostels. 
In addition to the economic agents mentioned above, our fieldwork found that other classes 
of San Ramón society increased their income levels from spending by Puquio Norte 
technicians, workers and employees. For example, merchants and farmers benefited from the 
sale of staple goods. However, this effect was lessened by the fact that most clothing 
purchases were conducted at large markets in San Julián or Santa Cruz de los Andes, which 
offer greater variety and are easily accessible by highway. Nevertheless, several technicians, 
workers and employees invested in houses or land in San Ramón. Due to San Ramón's 
condition as an immigration center, many Puquio Norte personnel invested in the region. In 
addition, a portion of workers' income was spent in town, implying that part of the payment 
to workers and, to a lesser degree, subcontractors was converted into income for other town 
residents. In other words, the mine-generated income has a multiplier effect in the area of 
social influence, which shows the importance of systematically evaluating not only the direct 
income paid by the mine to local residents, but also the destination of spending by the mine's 
personnel and subcontractors. Such an analysis was conducted for the Inti Raymi operation 
that is discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
Prices 
Approximately 22 percent of San Ramón's population are vendors, primarily of clothes and 
food, though a small minority sells agricultural inputs and tools. Most vendors have 
agreements with suppliers from the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra regarding the provision of 
mass goods to San Ramón at wholesale prices. As such, retail prices of mass goods in San 
Ramón are equal to those in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Thus the market in San Ramón is highly 
competitive and any price increase resulting from product scarcity is immediately eliminated 
from the market. In this context, increased spending directly and indirectly attributable to the 
mine is unlikely to have affected the consumer price index in San Ramón. 
The cost of housing and rent in San Ramón has increased dramatically in recent years due to 
the wave of immigrant arrivals. In consequence, the opening of Puquio Norte may have had 
positive impacts on inflation in the housing market, although it has not been possible to 
obtain sufficient information to conduct an analysis of this. 
Company policy toward the community 
COMSUR's policy strove to avoid a paternalistic or benefactor relationship with the 
community of San Ramón. The objective is to avoid a situation in which the community 
becomes accustomed to subsidies, leading to possible conflicts with the company. According 
to COMSUR executives, the policy is also the result the operation's moderate profit margin, 
which has lead the company to focus on cost reduction. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
COMSUR does not cooperate with San Ramón; rather, the company provides assistance on 
the condition the community provides a counter-contribution in exchange. The community of 
San Ramón is aware that it can enter into agreements with COMSUR on the condition that it 
complies with the principle of mutually beneficial counter-contributions. 
For example, high rates of population growth during the 1990s lead to chronic overcrowding 
at the San Ramón primary and secondary schools. School directors were forced to reject new 
students or move students to other classes in the interim. Contributing to this difficult 
situation was the influx of the children of those immigrant families that provided services to 
COMSUR, leading the company and school directors to sign an agreement of mutual 
cooperation. In the agreement COMSUR committed to monthly contributions of 
approximately US $500 during the 10-month school year; the school in turn agreed to enroll 
the children of COMSUR personnel. 
Infrastructure and mining royalties 
COMSUR and the Rural Electrification Cooperative (CRE) co-financed the construction of a 
220-km gas pipeline between Mineros and the San Julián River. It provides energy to the 
mine and gas to the recently constructed thermoelectric plant in San Ramón that provides 
electric energy to the region north of Chiquitanía. 
Initially, COMSUR planned to build a gas pipeline between 1.5 and 2.0 inches in diameter at 
a total cost of US $1.6 million for the section between Mineros and the San Julián River. 
Nevertheless, the company had no problem agreeing to the joint construction with CRE of a 
3-inch diameter pipeline, at a cost of US $2.4 million. COMSUR contributed US $1.6 million 
to the project's financing, while CRE contributed the additional US $800 000 required to 
widen the pipeline's diameter to 3 inches. Thus COMSUR is the owner of two-thirds while 
CRE owns the remaining third. 
This project was possible thanks to the opening of Puquio Norte and has had significant 
positive impacts in San Ramón and the surrounding area since it enabled rural electrification 
in the region of Chiquitanía. However, the project required the installation of a thermoelectric 
plant and subsequent infrastructure for the distribution of electric energy, works that could 
have been financed by mining royalties paid by the Puquio Norte mine.17 However, mining 
royalties constitute a departmental income and are distributed according to the department's 
budget. Rural municipalities such as San Javier (to which San Ramón belongs) have no 
control over budget allocations, and have not received any development projects or similar 
works that could be directly attributed to COMSUR's mining royalties for the Puquio Norte 
mining operation. 
This lack of coordination between public investment policy and mining royalties as a 
potential financing mechanism generated undeniable social losses in the case of the rural 
electrification of San Ramón and the Chiquitanía region. The CRE had been negotiating with 
international cooperation agencies regarding financing for the construction of the 
thermoelectric plant, a process that delayed the project for three years. This illustrates the 
need to improve public investment policy instruments in order to avoid situations where the 
needs of small local communities surrounding a mining operation, such as San Ramón, are 
marginalized in favour of centrally determined needs at the departmental or national level. 
 
 
17 Puquio Norte pays royalites equivalent to 9.5% of San Ramón's income. This is a 
significant figure, since it is equivalent to approximately 85% of the total taxes paid by San 
Ramón residents. 
Overall, the Puquio Norte operation has had a positive impact on jobs, income levels, and 
infrastructure development within its area of social influence. It is important to emphasize 
that the intensity of these impacts is at least partially related to population flows in the area. 
For example, in the case of San Ramón, the mine's positive impact has been heightened by 
the town's role as migration center. Several minor negative impacts were identified, such as 
an increase in housing prices and the saturation of public services, including schools. Among 
the corrective measures taken, the company is making extra tax contributions to improve the 
local school system. 
In terms of the distribution of benefits generated by the mining operation, the local 
population has suffered the consequences of the lack of coordination between fiscal mining 
policy and public investment policy. This is an area that could be improved considerably for 
the benefit of the local communities. There are important benefits from investing in 
infrastructure or complementary public services resulting from works linked to the opening of 
a mine, such as the generation of electric energy from the construction of the pipeline. 
Finally, there is concern among some San Ramón residents regarding the environmental risks 
entailed by a relatively large mining operation and its impact on the regional ecology. The 
company's policy of openness regarding the environment has been useful but apparently 
insufficient given the negative precedents established by the national mining industry's 
traditional lack of attention to environmental impacts. 
Inti Raymi and its local context 
Antecedents 
The Inti Raymi mining company was founded in 1982 by the Bolivian group Zeland Mines 
S.A. and the Texan group Westworld Inc. Its goal was intensive exploration of the Kori Kollo 
deposit located in the province of Saucarí, 42 km northeast of the city of Oruro. Since then, 
Inti Raymi's shareholder structure has evolved, reflecting changes in the mining operation. In 
1999, 88 percent of the shares belonged to Battle Mountain Gold Company of the United 
States and 12 percent to Zeland Mines. In the same year, Inti Raymi had no other exploration 
activity underway except for Kori Kollo, although it had several exploration prospects. In 
1999, preliminary results indicated important gold reserves in La Joya that could possibly 
double the operation's lifespan if the bio-oxidation metallurgical tests were positive. 
Inti Raymi is a pioneering and innovative company whose Kori Kollo operation has been the 
reference point in Bolivian mining since its discovery and development. Inti Raymi brought 
new technology and production methods to Bolivian mining, including open pit mining and 
the concentration of minerals through leaching. The operation has been active in the 
introduction of technological changes, such as induced polarization and magnetic prospecting 
in exploration, cycle optimization and the use of pregnant solution. Such changes have 
enabled important increases in the recovery of gold and the reduction of costs (Loayza 1999). 
Moreover, Inti Raymi is the first industrial company in the country to establish a foundation 
to promote the social and economic development of local communities within its area of 
influence. 
The mining operation 
The Kori Kollo deposit is located within sub-volcanic or intrusive rocks, possibly originating 
in the tertiary period. The operation had two phases for oxide and sulfide production that 
provided much of the income necessary for the company's social policy, which will be 
addressed in following sections. 
The oxide and sulfide projects have been mined in an open pit. This has required the 
excavation of the Kori Kollo mountain, which over time will become a lake. In Andean 
culture, some mountains are considered gods and thus the object of adoration and worship; 
however, this is not the case with the Kori Kollo mountain. Nevertheless, some community 
members feel that the disappearance of Kori Kollo has influenced the climate, since the 
mountain served as a windbreak for the strong air currents that affect the area. 
Oxides were treated by heap leaching followed by the precipitation of gold and silver using 
the Merril-Crowe method. In total, approximately 9.4 million tonnes of oxide were treated, 
the wastes from which were re-treated once the sulfide project had finished and then 
deposited in the tailings dam constructed for the sulfide operation. 
Once the existence of approximately 64 million tonnes of mineral sulfide was proven, the 
company decided that the best method of treating this reserve were the carbon-in-leach 
process and the ZADRA process for putting the gold and silver in solution. The project was 
designed to treat 14 500 tonnes per day and in 1999 the company reached a capacity of 
approximately 20 000 tonnes per day. The product is gold ore, whose approximate content is 
80 percent gold and 20 percent silver. Refining is done outside Bolivia. 
Local context and population flow 
Inti Raymi's mining operations, deposit, and camp are located within the territory of two 
communities, Chuquiña and La Joya, located in the cold and dry central highlands. In 
addition, the operation has relations with communities adjacent to Chuquiña and La Joya, as 
the action radius of the company's social arm, the Inti Raymi Foundation, encompasses 25 
communities. Finally, Inti Raymi has important direct and indirect relations with the city of 
Oruro, the department's capital and administrative base. 
Chuquiña 
When Inti Raymi began operations in the area during the mid-1980s, Chuquiña's structure 
constituted a social and territorial unit, whose central axis was the village of Chuquiña. The 
community of Chuquiña is of Aymara origin and is part of the province of Saucarí. In 
addition, it forms part of the ayllu18 Chariri, which together with 11 other ayllus, makes up 
the larger social and territorial unit known as the Marka,19 with its ceremonial center in the 
village of Toledo (Ayllu Sartañani 1994). Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, this traditional 
system of organization had lost practically all relevance in the area dominated by the 
republican state organizational system. 
During this time Chuquiña's lands were divided. One secondary road connected the 
community to the principal highway to La Paz and another connected it to the city of Oruro. 
Transportation service was restricted to trucks or a few buses once or twice a week. It was 
necessary to cross the Desaguadero River at different points by boat. During the rainy season, 
the road became impassable since there were no embankment or drainage ditches. 
Chuquiña's economy depended on sheep farming. Average family income, although the 
highest among the adjacent communities due to larger sheep flocks, was not sufficient to 
prevent the gradual migration toward urban centers, especially to the city of Oruro. In 1969,  
18 The ayllu is the territorial, social, kinship and identity unit in the socio-ethnic 
organization of Andean culture. 
19 The Marka is the territorial unit that corresponds to the grouping of ayllus that constitute 
a larger unit in the Andean organizational system. 
 
out of a total of 220 families, 91 emigrated to other parts of the department of Oruro and the 
country's interior. In 1987, out of a total of 97 families, 62 emigrated outside of the area 
(Rojas 1995). 
Nevertheless, this migratory process has not been definitive since many families continued 
administrating their land and livestock from the city of Oruro. Normally, they returned to 
their lands on the weekends and during planting and harvest times. This behaviour stemmed 
from a development strategy consistent with the maintenance of two complementary sources 
of income: a job in the city as a worker (either public employee or merchant) and agricultural 
producer in their own community of origin. This strategy was possible due to the short 
distance between Chuquiña and the city of Oruro (42 km) and the availability of cheap labour 
from the region's impoverished campesinos. These people were contracted on a part-time 
basis by the migrants for agricultural and livestock tasks necessary to maintain production. 
La Joya 
The village of La Joya is approximately 5 km from Chuquiña. During the mid-1990s, this 
community also adapted its organization to the political administrative system in effect 
throughout Bolivia. In contrast to Chuquiña, however, La Joya was not part of an Andean 
social and territorial organizational system. Until 1953, the area now occupied by La Joya 
was the hacienda20 of La Barca, which was later expropriated during the agrarian reform 
process in favour of the families living on the estate. 
By the mid-1980s, the most important activities in the community of La Joya were 
agricultural and livestock production and cooperative mining. Because they were not located 
along the Desaguadero River, the population's land parcels were smaller and less appropriate 
for grazing than those in Chuquiña. After the severe drought of 1982-1983, many residents 
migrated to the city of Oruro and other towns throughout the country. Other residents were 
obliged to take up artisanal mining in the La Joya mountain in the hopes of obtaining a 
complementary source of income. By the beginning of the 1980s, artisanal miners had 
formed the mining cooperatives of La Joya Ltd. and Concepción de Mayo Ltd., which 
exploited the mining concessions belonging to Inti Raymi. 
Adjacent communities 
In the mid-1980s, the adjacent communities that benefit from the Inti Raymi Foundation had 
an organizational structure similar to those for Chuquiña or La Joya. Their economy was and 
still is based primarily on subsistence agriculture and livestock production—a reality that is 
similar to Chuquiña and La Joya, except that these communities lack the presence of artisanal 
mining. Infrastructure consisted of an embanked road connecting several communities with 
the city of Oruro, while passing through Chuquiña toward Carangas. The most distant 
communities were linked by way of less-passable back roads. As with Chuquiña and La Joya, 
migration was the common denominator in the area. 
The city of Oruro21 
By the mid-1980s, the department and city of Oruro suffered a severe economic recession 
due to the drastic contraction in the mining industry, whose decline affected all other sectors.  
20 Rural estates, or haciendas, were large extensions of land belonging to a single 
landowner and dedicated to agricultural production. Their domain included the residents 
who lived on the land. 
21 The city of Oruro is the capital of the department of the same name, located 230 
kilometers south of the city of La Paz. 
The city was favourably located for national and international commerce. It is linked to the 
Chilean port of Iquique by way of the Oruro-Pisiga-Iquique highway and to the port of 
Antofagasta by way of the Oruro-Uyuni-Antofagasta railroad. In addition, a paved road links 
Oruro to the largest cities in the country. Because of its strategic location, the city of Oruro 
has become the commercial emporium in Bolivia, especially for imported goods. 
Acquisition of lands 
As owner of the concessions in the La Joya-Chuquiña mining district, the Inti Raymi Mining 
Company S.A. (IRSA) acquired the lands necessary to exploit the deposit and to install the 
mining and administrative infrastructure. Inti Raymi believed that the richest part of the 
deposit was in La Joya, and so paid community residents nearly US $1 000 per hectare, in 
spite of the fact that local market prices were on the order of US $20-30 per hectare. Once the 
exploration study was concluded, however, it revealed that the Kori Kollo mountain, located 
in the jurisdiction of the Chuquiña canton, had a much more attractive deposit than that 
located in La Joya. But to acquire land in Chuquiña, the company adopted the following 
policy: acquire lands by phases according to the needs of the operation22; negotiate separately 
with each landowner; offer a price per hectare significantly higher than the average price in 
the area23; and once the mine closed, make every effort to restore the lands to their natural 
condition and return them to their prior owners. 
In spite of the agreements signed by the parties, community residents continued with 
complaints, disagreements and pressures toward the company. During the course of our 
fieldwork, it was evident that community members used the issues of land and the 
environment (which will be addressed in a following section) as mechanisms of pressure with 
which to obtain additional benefits from the company. While pressures based on supposed 
environmental contamination by the mining operation have not been effective, pressures for 
additional compensatory benefits in exchange for the land are growing. In July 1999, 
community members staged a one-day work stoppage and occupied the area near the crusher, 
demanding additional compensation for the relocation of the community of Chuquiña. 
The relocation of Chuquiña 
In the early 1990s, the sulfide exploitation required the installation of a new processing plant 
near the town of Chuquiña. The company bought 9 hectares of land in Chuquiña at a cost of 
US $200 000 in the eastern section of the town. The technological change from heap leaching 
to leaching in agitation tanks was going to require a finer grain in the mill as well as a 350 
percent increase in production, entailing a significant increase in noise and dust levels that 
would have disturbed community residents. Thus, the company began negotiations with 
community residents, proposing to move the town to a new location far enough away from 
the mining operation to avoid disturbance. In contrast to what occurs in most towns in the 
Bolivian highlands, the company offered to build new housing for all current Chuquiña 
homeowners and to provide all basic services, including a new modern hospital. 
22 Inti Raymi bought 500 hectares from the Chuquiña community for the construction of its 
productive facilities, paying US $500 per hectare. Later, for sulphide mining operation, the 
company acquired approximately 1 000 hectares at a cost of US $300 per hectare for the 
construction of the tailings dam. Finally, the company bought nearly 4 100 hectares at US 
$350 per hectare for the construction of the evaporation ponds for the sulphide operation. 
23 According to company officials, the value of these lands was estimated at between US 
$15 and US $30 per hectare. 
 
After lengthy negotiations, community members finally accepted the company's offer to 
move the town to a new location called Villa Nueva Chuquiña. The houses would consist of 
two bedrooms, a kitchen, dining room, bathroom, and patio. The company would provide 
construction material that did not exist in the area, such as cement and iron bars, as well as 
labour. For their part, community members provided locally available construction material, 
such as rocks, sand and an assistant bricklayer. The relocation process attracted several 
community residents who had years before moved to the city of Oruro or other departments. 
These return residents were included in the Villa Nueva Chuquiña project. By 1999, 135 
houses, market facilities, hospitals and educational centers had been built at a cost of US $1.8 
million for the company. 
In spite of the agreements mentioned above, Chuquiña's relocation was not free of 
discrepancies and criticisms. Some residents resisted the move to the new town out of fear of 
being tricked by the company and losing their houses in the old town. Those who rented 
houses feared losing their tenants. Some residents argued that since the town of Chuquiña, 
especially its church, dated to the colonial era, it had great historic value in terms of 
preserving the memory of their ancestors and would be at risk from the company's mining 
activities. 
Toward the middle of 1992, a conflict developed between the company and the Oruro Human 
Rights Assembly over complaints lodged by Chuquiña residents.24 For its part, the company 
demanded compliance with the negotiated agreements, renewing its commitment to conduct 
operations in a way compatible with the environment and citizens' rights. Finally, the 
community agreed to the relocation and several members ended up renting their houses to 
workers from the interior of the country because many of them had already established 
residence in the city of Oruro. 
Company-community relations 
As analyzed above, one of the company's most serious challenges from the beginning was 
achieving local community acceptance within an unfavourable context created by the 
company's competition with locals for access to mineral resources and land. In addition to 
land acquisition and the town's relocation, Inti Raymi was able, after several conflicts, to buy 
and freely transfer the gold concessions of "Independencia," "Vera," and "Iroco" in favour of 
the cooperatives holding the La Joya concession, even assuming subsistence costs for the first 
month. From then on, the company gradually dedicated itself to activities of cooperation and 
assistance to local communities in order to facilitate its insertion in the local context. 
During the oxide phase, Inti Raymi became subject to multiple demands on the part of 
neighboring communities and civic institutions in Oruro that included the donation of 
sporting equipment and the construction of social infrastructure works such as secondary 
roads. When construction on the sulfide project began in the early 1990s, Inti Raymi was a 
pioneer in social assistance. Nevertheless, Inti Raymi's experience shows how easily a 
company's efforts at social action can be diluted in the medium term if they are not 
24 Complaints included: supposed threats by company officials to demolish the church and 
the town; company pressures regarding relocation to Villa Chuquiña; invasion of the 
town's urban radius; that the new mining methods would contaminate the town, which 
would end up inhabitable due to its proximity to the smelter; impediments to the residents' 
free movement because of the construction of a TRANCA; and the suspension of 
transportion of children to the school in Villa Chuquiña. See Córdova, 1993. 
accompanied by an adequate sustainable development strategy for the region. In order to 
systematically attend to these needs, in 1991 the company decided to create the Inti Raymi 
Foundation. 
The Inti Raymi Foundation 
The foundation was established as a means of leveraging financial resources (in addition to 
those provided by the company) for investment in the region. Initially, the foundation was 
successful at mobilizing state resources from the Social Investment Fund in the area. Since 
1997, the foundation has received funds from Spanish and Dutch international cooperation 
agencies as well as the Inter-American Foundation. 
The Inti Raymi Foundation adopted a participatory policy designed to include community 
priorities in its plans and projects, as well as involve community residents in its activities. 
The foundation has presented itself as a willing partner eager to cooperate in the design and 
execution of projects sponsored by the communities. From the administrative and financial 
points of view, this policy entailed the foundation's role as a counterpart agency and pre-
investment funder for community projects. The foundation's important role in developing 
effective community management capacity, however, has not been understood by some 
residents. During our fieldwork, it was evident that several beneficiaries view the foundation 
as illegitimate since it does not exclusively invest its own resources but rather, in many cases 
uses public funds. 
In order to define the activities to be discussed with the communities within its scope of 
action, the foundation carried out a two-stage process involving: 
1. a diagnosis and characterization of its area of action; and 
2. creating a series of community workshops designed to identify and prioritize 
infrastructure needs. 
Using these demands as a starting point, the foundation designed projects that emphasized 
agricultural and livestock activities, as well as those geared toward improving health, basic 
education, hygiene and water supply. 
Mining's dual role 
Despite the creation of the Inti Raymi Foundation as a mechanism for social development 
projects that address the communities' most pressing needs, the company continued to 
directly attend to the demands and requirements of the communities of La Joya and 
Chuquiña. There were two reasons for this. 
First, the company considers these communities part of its area of strategic action. Interaction 
with such communities was much less structured than with the other communities targeted by 
the foundation. Avoiding conflicts was a priority for the company and relations with La Joya 
and Chuquiña were the responsibility of the highest executive levels within the company. For 
its part, residents of the two communities did not directly relate to the mining company; 
instead their interaction was always mediated by community authorities. For example, during 
the land acquisition phases, the company always initiated contacts with community leaders, 
while residents waited for the go-ahead from their leaders prior to any direct negotiation with 
Inti Raymi. 
Second, the mining company has been much more accessible to La Joya and Chuquiña's 
demands than the Foundation because the latter uses a clearly defined methodology for 
approving projects. Its priority is to support activities that promote regional development, 
including after mine closure, rather than merely avoiding conflicts that could delay the 
normal timeframe for a mining operation. 
It is important to note that this duality in relations between Inti Raymi and its area of social 
influence has been successful in avoiding conflict or confrontations. In some cases, it led the 
company to adopt assistential and even paternalistic positions with respect to La Joya and 
Chuquiña. This occurred due to the joint circumstances of a favourable market and the high 
quality of the Kori Kollo deposit. Now that gold prices have dropped to their lowest point in 
30 years, the sustainability of this policy is precarious, to say the least. The company has 
been systematically reducing costs but pressure from La Joya and particularly Chuquiña have 
not let up. Since there has been little change in the area's difficult social and economic 
conditions, the communities could react confrontationally to the company and its mining 
activities. The company is faced with the serious challenge of how to maintain trouble-free 
community relations during a market slump, after having established relations during an 
economic boom. 
Environment25 
Just like a coin, the issue of the environment at the Kori Kollo operation presents two 
opposing sides that form a whole. On the one hand, there are the technical aspects of the 
company's environmental management policies; on the other, there is the natural 
environmental degradation prevalent in the area and the resulting political pressure on the 
company and the government. Both aspects are fundamental to understanding the relationship 
between the company and its surrounding social context. 
The analysis that follows addresses each side of the coin. We have attempted to emphasize 
that in a context like that faced by Inti Raymi, the relation between a large mining project and 
its environmental impact is not limited to technical management of the operation itself, as 
many companies wrongly assume. On the contrary, interest groups use the environmental 
issue as an opportunity to question the legitimacy of mining activities, particularly at the local 
community level. If this reality is not incorporated in a timely and appropriate manner within 
the company's environmental management and communication policies, the best technical 
efforts can do little, later on, to reverse the mutual distrust between the mining operation and 
the local community. This not only constitutes a source of conflicts and tensions during the 
operation of the mine, but also will likely continue beyond the closure of the mine. 
Environmental management at the mining operation 
As we saw in the first part of this section, the Kori Kollo operation advanced rapidly. In less 
than a decade it went from a project worth a few million dollars (the oxide mining operation) 
to the most important industrial project in the country. By the early 1990s, it had an estimated 
investment of US $150 million. Financing this was beyond the Bolivian financial and 
banking system's capacity. Thus, the project turned to international financial 
25 This section is based on information from different sources. Its goal is to obtain an 
objective analysis of Inti Raymi's environmental management. The sources were: (i) 
Oruro's regional environmental evaluation as undertaken by the Swedish Geological AB in 
the Oruro pilot project (1993 and 1996); (ii) Internal company documents such as 
"Environmental Management at the Inti Raymi Mining Company" written by Marwin 
Columba, Superintendant of Environmental Control; (iii) Interviews with key company 
and community informants; (iv) Press articles and other information found in bulletins 
such as "Informa y Opina" by the Pastoral Society; and (v) the technical evaluation 
conducted by one of the present authors during the early 1990s with the support of 
environmental specialists (Loayza 1999). 
institutions such as the World Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the 
Andean Development Corporation. Even though Bolivia had not passed an environmental 
law at that time, Inti Raymi's operation had to comply with strict monitoring and 
environmental impact mitigation norms.26 
The Inti Raymi mining operation, like Puquio Norte, is based on the principles of zero 
discharge and systematic, continuous monitoring. The water used in the processing plant is 
recycled. The resulting tailings from the concentration process are sent in pulp form to the 
tailings dam, where the solids are separated from the liquid, which is recycled back to the 
treatment plant. Following international standards, the leftover cyanide solution in the dam is 
kept under 50 parts per million by way of the application of hydrogen peroxide, which 
facilitates radiation's ability to break down cyanide. Due to their high salinity, waters flowing 
from aquifers into the mining pit are not discharged into any water body. They are discharged 
into the evaporation ponds, specifically constructed to liberate water through evaporation. 
The salt that remains at the end of the project is deposited in the base of the mine pit and, 
over time, covered with water. 
In order to avoid the formation of acid rock drainage, both the tailings dam, which will 
accumulate approximately 65 million tonnes of tailings, and the sterile solids generated by 
the mine, which will be in the magnitude of 70 million tonnes, will be encapsulated with 
oxidized material. The base of the sterile deposit is a four-foot thick liner made from oxidized 
material extracted during the operation's first stage. The liner of the tailings dam has been 
made impermeable with a layer of compacted clay in order to avoid the tailings coming into 
contact with ground and surface water. 
Because the Desaguadero River flows close to the mine, a 5-km dam has been constructed 
around the mine site. The dam will prevent floodwaters from entering the mine as well as 
discharge from the mine entering the river. The site also has a ring of monitoring ponds 
throughout the operation, which are used to take monthly samples of physical parameters and 
tri-monthly tests of chemical parameters. In addition to water quality, soil and air quality are 
also monitored. The goal of the restoration program is to restore lands affected by the mining 
operation to their original condition. 
While conducting the fieldwork, we observed that the mine's restoration programs have 
already begun, affecting 70 hectares in 1999. In addition, also underway within the area of 
the mining operation are the rehabilitation of green spaces and artificial lakes which are home 
to regional bird species such as ducks and flamingos. Finally, according to company officials, 
the company has established a fund to cover the costs of adequate closure measures.27 
Currently, there have been no confirmed incidents of contamination or environmental damage 
due to the mining operation. Nevertheless, visits to the area and conversations with local 
residents and Oruro inhabitants demonstrate that the dominant perception is that the operation 
has significantly and negatively affected the region's ecology. 
 
26 As an example, in 1997, Inti Raymi was granted first prize by the Latin American 
Mining Organism (OLAMI) in the category of large-scale mining in the ecology and 
environment competition. 
27 Bolivian environmental legislation does not require the establishment of a fund or 
monetary reserves for restoration or rehabilitation activities associated with the closure of a 
mine. 
 
The environment as an instrument of political pressure 
As we explained earlier, the discovery and exploitation of the massive Kori Kollo deposit 
coincided with the crisis in the state-directed economic model, revealing this model's defects. 
First, centralism resulting from the state's role as economic planner had practically  
asphyxiated regional aspirations. Thus, the crisis provoked regional movements. Second, with 
the drop in metals prices, the mining departments of Potosí and Oruro suffered severe 
unemployment and recession. Inevitably, the population of these mining regions has 
questioned the mining industry's long-term contributions to the areas. Among other aspects, 
criticism has been leveled against the amount and distribution of mining royalties paid to the 
central government and the regions. 
Within this context of decline, Inti Raymi's arrival as a dynamic operation (and the most 
important gold mine in South America) served as a starting point from which to attack the 
centralist model and promote its reform. Newspapers from the period 1993-1998 reflect the 
uncertainty regarding gold and mining royalties on the part of Oruro institutions. Oruro 
institutions lobbied the central government to impose higher royalties on Inti Raymi's gold 
operation, suggesting that a greater percentage of these royalties go to the department. One of 
the main arguments employed in this fight was the environmental degradation that the mine 
left in its wake. In other words, Oruro institutions were demanding higher royalties not only 
because the resources were located in the department, but also as a form of compensation for 
the environmental harm or risks associated with mining. Western Bolivia's experience with 
mining contamination since colonial times was cited. Because this perception was based on 
experience, Inti Raymi faced the difficult challenge of persuading the population of its 
responsibility and commitment to environmental management. The situation became even 
more complicated because Inti Raymi's sulfide project commenced simultaneously with the 
natural degradation of the Uru-Uru and Poopó lakes. Mining's negative environmental 
reputation led to the belief that such degradation was largely due to the Inti Raymi operation. 
The department of Oruro is part of the closed basin or high Andean plateau that serves as a 
drainage system from Lake Titicaca to Lake Poopó by way of the Desaguadero River. The 
volume and depth of Lake Poopó depends primarily on the level of Lake Titicaca, which in 
turn is subject to cyclical fluctuations due to natural events such as the El Niño phenomenon. 
"The close relationship between water levels in Lake Titicaca and the 
size and depth (or even the existence) of water in Lake Poopó, is due, 
of course, to the fact that the volume of the Desaguadero River (which 
contributes approximately 80 percent of the water that feeds Lake 
Poopó) varies depending on the level of water in the lake that it drains. 
Between 1984 and 1987, Lake Titicaca reached its maximum level... 
The result was a tremendous expansion of Lake Poopó, which reached 
a surface area of 3 500 square kilometers in 1986 and a maximum 
depth of 9 meters... In subsequent years, Lake Titicaca's water level 
dropped once again... It is not surprising that during recent years, Lake 
Poopó has almost ceased to exist as a lake with a visible surface of 
water" (SGAB 1997, pp. 38-39). 
The gradual disappearance of the principal lake in the department of Oruro, which coincided 
with Inti Raymi's sulfide mining operation, had serious effects on the region's flora and fauna. 
For example, as the lake disappeared, fish species such as orestia and pejerrey could no 
longer feed many of the communities scattered around the lake. In addition, the lake's 
disappearance negatively affected local flora, because soil salinity increased. This situation 
negatively affected local campesinos. Inti Raymi was accused of being responsible for these 
processes, in part so as to pressure the company for compensation.28 
Initially, the company did not realize that mining's environmental impacts and risks could be 
cause for such concern and fear among local communities. The company was slow to develop 
a communications or community relations policy to focus on dispelling fears and creating 
trust, even at the cost of suffering a few delays or adjustments in the project's schedule. Local 
residents say they were not consulted about the use of cyanide in the oxide mining operation, 
which could have served to dispel fears in a timely manner. Moreover, after a few isolated 
incidents involving animals that evaded company security and drank from the cyanide ponds, 
the company compensated the owners far above the market value of their livestock in order to 
avoid conflict. Such action gave the community the false impression that the operation's 
negative environmental impacts explained the high compensation. 
Thus, the mining industry's negative environmental legacy, the local population's distrust of 
the company and its activities, combined with the company's insufficient and tardy attempts 
at communication with local residents all opened the door to fear and uncertainty. If we add 
in the political manipulation of the environmental issue, together with the phenomenon of the 
natural degradation of the area, the discrepancy (which in the authors' opinion exists) 
between the operation's level of environmental management and the communities' negative 
perception of the operation is not surprising. 
In conclusion, this section has shown that the most basic feature of the relationship between 
Inti Raymi and local communities is the distribution of benefits generated by mining 
activities. For local residents, the arrival of the mining operation is both an opportunity and a 
threat. It is a threat because the mine competes with residents for land and mineral resources, 
but it is also an opportunity because it can provide them with resources or, as we will see in 
the following section, well-paid jobs. Due to the deposit's richness and the cooperation of 
company executives, Inti Raymi adapted to the situation by developing an assistance policy 
vis-à-vis local communities with the goal of avoiding conflicts that could affect the normal 
functioning of mining activities. Over time, it became apparent that the region's pressing 
needs required a more structured and effective response, and so the company created the Inti 
Raymi Foundation. Thus, the company's initial assistential role matured into the role of an 
agent committed to local development. But because the company's assistentialist policy was 
not eliminated, it effectively developed a dualistic response to local residents' demands. In 
other words, the company seeks to promote local development but also seeks to avoid 
conflicts. 
28 For example, the following press clippings from the time are highly revealing: "The use 
of toxics and poisonous chemical products represents a grave danger, not only to residents' 
health, but also to soil fertility, water quality and environmental equilibrium, the 
contamination of which is caused by Inti Raymi's use of cyanide in its gold mining 
operations, poisoning not only the site but taking its deadly effects to the Poopó and Uru-
Uru lakes, endangering and destroying the fish populations, the only source of sustenance 
for the residents and town of Oruro." OPINION, 3 September 1991, "Mining companies 
contaminate the soil, water and environment." 
"Jaimes (from the department of Oruro) was emphatic in attributing the disappearance of 
all vestiges of life in the area around lakes Poopó and Uru-Uru to the effects of lethal 
cyanide used by the Inti Raymi company in Saucarí... Lake Poopó is dead, there is no 
longer any life because all the species of flora and fauna have disappeared, afirmed the 
interviewee..." La Patria, 27 October 1993, "Inti Raymi responsible for ecological disaster 
in the department." 
Impacts of Inti Raymi 
In this section we analyze the principal economic and social impacts in the mining operation's 
area of influence. 
Employment and human resources management 
Inti Raymi's policy is to give hiring preference to workers from the communities of Chuquiña 
and La Joya. Table 4 shows the evolution of the local communities' share of mine 
employment. 
From 1990 to 1997, between 54 percent and 68 percent of Inti Raymi workers were from the 
communities of Chuquiña and La Joya. The number of contract workers, as a response to 
pressures from local communities for jobs, is notable. Thus, between 1997 and 1998, when 
international gold prices fell approximately 30 percent and Inti Raymi was forced to reduce 
costs, contract workers were the most severely affected, practically disappearing from the 
work force. Clearly, this type of employment was largely surplus or unnecessary to the 
operation and had to be abandoned when the company's economic situation went through 
difficulties. This explains the smaller percentage of workers from Chuquiña and La Joya for 
the year 1999. 
Training 
Initially, Inti Raymi's mining operation was heavily weighted toward unskilled labour. 
Nevertheless, the technological changes implied by the shift to sulfide mining required the 
company to train workers by way of three programs focusing on equalization, 
professionalization and specialization. All operators and employees at the oxide operation 
were trained in order to proceed to the sulfide operation. 
 
Table 4. Inti Raymi: Employees from Chuquiña and La Joya. 
Classification 1990 1995 1997 1999 
Workers 120 158 179 217 
Workers at Sermat and La Barca (*) 50 53 — — 
Contract workers 30 250 283 15 
Workers from Chuquiña and La Joya 200 461 462 232 
Technicians and employees 0 0 0 0 
Total from Chuquiña and La Joya 200 461 462 232 
Total workers at Inti Raymi 295 855 761 493 
Workers from Chuquiña and La Joya as a 
percent of total workers IRSA 
67.8 53.9 60.7 44.0 
(*) Until 1996, the mining operation contracted the services of Sermat and La Barca, 
dedicated cargo transport and mining exploration service providers, respectively. Starting 
in 1997, these companies were acquired by Inti Raymi, with many of their workers being 
absorbed in the process. 
Source: Prepared with information provided by Inti Raymi S.A. 
The equalization program involved the development of cognitive tools such as language, 
technical knowledge and quantitative training, as well as general technical skills in areas such 
as mechanics or electricity. The professionalization program was oriented to training 
operators in relation to their job positions. Courses consisted of 20 percent theoretical training 
and 80 percent practical training. Finally, the specialization program formed specialized 
resources within the area of professionalization. For example, within the area of auto 
mechanics, a specialty could be electronic injection. Whereas 51 percent of workers were 
trained under the first program, 25 percent were in the second and 3.3 percent in the third. 
Importance of employment originating in the mining operation 
The impact of the mining operation on employment in Chuquiña and La Joya can be 
evaluated in relation to the communities' economically active population (EAP). The analysis 
includes employment by subcontractors engaged in various services such as transport, food 
service, operative contracts, cleaning and civil works. In 1997 an estimated 143 additional 
jobs for local residents were created with subcontractors. 
Table 5 presents the total impact of the mining operation on employment in Chuquiña and La 
Joya. Note that the direct employment at the mine plus indirect employment with 
subcontractors equals 56.2 percent of the EAP of Chuquiña and La Joya for the year 1997. 
Due to the human capital development experienced by much of Inti Raymi's labour force, 
which we will discuss later, the possibility of unemployment problems once the mine 
inevitably closes is low. 
Table 5. Inti Raymi: total impact on the EAP of Chuquiña and La Joya. 
Employment generated by the 
mining operation 
Jobs Impact on the EAP of Chuquiña 
and La Joya 
Workers at the mining operation 462 42.9% 
Subcontractors 143 13.3% 
Total 605 56.2% 
Source: Prepared using information from Inti Raymi S.A, the National Institute of 
Statistics, and fieldwork data. 
Income 
Direct impact on income of local communities 
Table 5 showed that most employment generated by the company in Chuquiña and La Joya 
was through the direct hiring of workers at the operation, who have always received salaries 
higher than the regional average, as we can appreciate in Table 6. 
The wage differential between Inti Raymi workers and the department's average is increasing 
over time. A similar situation occurs with the variations in the opportunity costs for the 
average worker from Chuquiña or La Joya, which is the sum of the average income of a 
worker in the city of Oruro and that of an agricultural producer in the department of Oruro. 
As a result, residents from La Joya, Chuquiña and adjacent communities have a strong 
incentive to enroll as workers at the mining operation. During our fieldwork, various 
interviewees from the rural area adjacent to the mine expressed their indifference and — in 
some cases — opposition to the Inti Raymi Foundation's activities. Nevertheless, they all 
expressed the desire to one day get a job at the mine. When asked about their expectations 
regarding Inti Raymi, they have very clear ideas: they value the foundation's support, but do 
not expect it to significantly change their lives; in contrast, a job at the mine represents a 
significant change. 
Table 6. Inti Raymi: Average monthly salary (US $). 
Classification 1990 1995 1997 1999 
Workers 218 535 678 760 
Contract workers (*) 200 280 350 390 
Average monthly income in the department of 
Oruro (**) 
99 132 142 n.a. 
Average monthly income for a worker in the city 
of Oruro 
89 120 129 n.a. 
Average income for rural farmers 42 41 44 n.a. 
Opportunity cost 131 161 173 n.a. 
(*): Including workers at Sermat and La Barca. 
(**): Average earnings from work, capital, natural resources, and business training. 
n.a.: Not available. 
Source: Prepared using information from Inti Raymi S.A, the National Institute of 
Statistics, National Employment Survey, Nov., 1999, and data obtained in field work. 
Indirect impact on income of local communities 
Indirect impacts on communities' income result when wages earned at the mining operation 
are spent on goods or services produced in Chuquiña and La Joya. Among the goods 
consumed by mining personnel are meat, different varieties of potatoes and potato products, 
and Andean grains such as quinoa, wheat and barley. In turn, this indirect income is not 
usually spent on goods produced in these communities. However, because recipients view it 
as an extraordinary income, they usually spend it on the acquisition of durable goods or 
clothing. Thus the wages spent by workers in the area around the mine do not have an 
expanded multiplier effect in the area. 
Migration to the city of Oruro 
Until 1995, 83.7 percent of mine personnel resided in Villa Chuquiña and La Joya, while 10.6 
percent lived in the city of Oruro and the rest in other cities. However, this high level of local 
residence was not desired as local residents aspired to live in a city like. Oruro, and their 
income levels made this possible. Due to a growing state of frustration, in spite of repeated 
refusals by mine administrators to provide transportation from the mine site to Oruro, in 1996 
the union decided to contract a transportation fleet using its own resources. Later, union 
negotiations with the company resulted in an agreement that Inti Raymi would cover 50 
percent of transportation costs and later assume all such costs. 
Figure 1 illustrates two unmistakable tendencies. Between 1990 and 1995, the number of 
mine workers, employees and technicians residing in Chuquiña and La Joya reached its peak, 
due fundamentally to the company's policy. In contrast, between 1995 and 1997, the local 
population decreased drastically while the number of workers living in the city of Oruro 
increased. 
 
 
Figure 1. Place of residence of mine workers. 
 
The year 1995 represented a historic turning point for Chuquiña and La Joya residents. 
Consolidating their residence in the city of Oruro implied a better standard of living and 
multiple new opportunities for them and their families. Moreover, this change did not imply a 
jump into the unknown or the transition to an unfamiliar and risky world. In addition to 
having stable incomes, the company facilitated access to housing and vehicles and, in some 
cases, assisted with real estate investments in other cities in the country.29 
Impact on income in the city of Oruro 
Table 6 showed the mine workers' salaries were significantly higher than the average income 
in the city of Oruro. This was also true of technicians and professionals employed at the 
mine. In the following section we analyze the impact of these salaries on the city of Oruro. 
Workers invest approximately 40 percent and technicians 25 percent of their income in real 
estate. Nearly 45 percent of the income is spent in the city of Oruro. According to data 
collected during our field work, the average worker is relatively frugal and has the following 
investment priorities: the purchase of a plot of land in Oruro; the construction of a house on 
this plot; their children's education (with aspirations of becoming a professional with a 
university education); the purchase of a plot of land in another city; the purchase of a store or 
commercial venue; the purchase of a minibus to provide urban transport services; and the 
purchase of an automobile. 
Although mine workers earn considerably less than technicians, they devote a greater 
proportion of their income to savings and investments. For their part, technicians and 
employees have the following investment priorities: acquisition of real estate (or if they are 
already owners, additions to and improvement of their property); changing their existing 
automobile for a more recent model, which involves a mixture of investment and 
consumption; and financial assets, which are generally obtained in the banking system, such 
as savings accounts or fixed-rate deposits. 
 
29The facilities granted by the company to workers were interest-free cash loans in order to 
obtain bank credits. 
Discounting wages spent on investments and in the communities of Chuquiña and La Joya, 
nearly 100 percent of the remaining wages are spent in the city of Oruro. This is because 
Oruro is probably the cheapest city in the country. As a result, investment spending and 
consumption in the city of Oruro together represent 78 percent of workers' income and 86.25 
percent of technicians' and employees' incomes. A portion of this spending, however, leaves 
the city of Oruro in the form of payment on imports and goods and services produced 
elsewhere in the country. Discounting these losses, the resulting net spending in turn becomes 
income for other families in Oruro, and so on, successively. 
The sum of this successive spending represents the income multiplication of wages and 
salaries paid by Inti Raymi. The estimate of this multiplier effect is presented in the first 
column of Table 7. 
Table 7 shows that in 1997, every dollar paid by Inti Raymi as wages and salaries became US 
$2.6 in income in the city of Oruro's economy. For example, the approximately US $7.1 
million paid in salaries became US $18.3 million for the economy of Oruro. This impact can 
be more concretely appreciated comparing it to the number of families that the income could 
maintain. The average family in Oruro had an annual income of US $2 691 in 1997; thus the 
indirect income generated by the mining operation would have maintained approximately 6 
800 families that year, or 18 percent of families living in the city. 
Table 7. Inti Raymi: Impact on income in the city of Oruro, 1997 (US $). 
Impacts Workers, technicians 
and employees
Subcontracted 
employees
Total 
Income earned 7 132 961 3 649 151 10 782 961
Direct impact 5 580 000 3 650 000 9 230 000
Indirect impact 12 720 000 8 210 000 20 930 000
Direct plus 
indirect 
18 300 000 11 860 000 30 160 000
Multiplier 2.5656 3.2528 2.7982
Source: prepared by the authors using their fieldwork data. 
Using this methodology, we can estimate a multiplier of 3.25 for the income earned by the 
operation's subcontractors30 residing in Chuquiña, La Joya and the city of Oruro, as shown in 
the second column of the same table. Considering both the direct and indirect effects, in 1997 
approximately 6 percent of Oruro families could have been maintained with this income. The 
multiplier effect of both types of income — workers plus subcontractors —is shown in the 
third column, which could have maintained approximately one-fourth of the families residing 
in Oruro. 
Infrastructure 
Inti Raymi's infrastructure development program constructed road and communications 
works. These works were incremental improvements in the area's roadway system. 
 
30 The interviews conducted established that Inti Raymi's subcontractors consume or invest 
100% of their income in the city of Oruro. This could be due to the fact that in most cases, 
the companies are already in the process of consolidation in the Oruro market. 
The company built a bridge across the Desaguadero River and a highway connecting the city 
of Oruro at a cost of US $320 000. The project benefited various communities in addition to 
Chuquiña and La Joya by significantly improving the links among the communities and to the 
national highway system and the city of Oruro. Instead of travelling along poorly maintained 
roads and crossing the river by boat, community members could now travel quickly and 
comfortably along well-maintained highways, completing the journey in much less time than 
before. The project also helped facilitate the migration of families living in these 
communities to the city of Oruro. With the new highway and the bridge it is now possible to 
live in Oruro and work at the mining operation. In addition, the project facilitated the 
integration of the rural population into the city of Oruro. 
Departmental income 
Gold production in Bolivia was subject to minimal royalties on the order of 1 percent and 1.5 
percent of the gross sales value. This was because most of the country's gold came from 
alluvial river deposits north of La Paz, produced by mining cooperatives and individual gold 
panners. Gold nuggets were easily smuggled out of the country, which invariably happened 
when the government raised gold royalties beyond minimum levels. Thus, during its first few 
years, Inti Raymi's oxide operation benefited from this exceptionally favourable tax 
treatment. 
Once the oxide operation became well-known and was treating several thousand tonnes a 
day, the government decided to differentiate the gold produced in Kori Kollo from alluvial 
gold and subjected the former to royalties of 3 percent. Estimates realized by the National 
Mining Secretary show that for the period 1993-1996, during which gold prices fluctuated 
between US $350 and US $400 per troy ounce, Inti Raymi paid mining royalties equivalent to 
between 9 and 12 percent of profits. During this same period, taxes on profits in Chile 
fluctuated between 15 and 35 percent, in Argentina and Venezuela reached 30 percent, Peru 
38 percent and Mexico between 35 and 40 percent. 
In 1997, the government reformed the mining tax regime and established a single system that 
combined mining royalties with income tax. Since then, Inti Raymi's gold production has 
been subject to the Impuesto sobre las Utilidades de las Empresas (IUE, Corporate Income 
Tax) and royalties between 4 percent and 7 percent of the gold value according to 
international market prices. Under the new regime, the IUE is applicable as a fiscal credit 
upon paying mining royalties. All royalties paid are destined to the department in which an 
operation is located — in Inti Raymi's case, the department of Oruro. 
As shown in Table 8, Inti Raymi contributed 14 percent and 10 percent of the total 
departmental income during the years 1997 and 1998, respectively. These figures reveal the 
absence of other large mining operations in the department of Oruro and the country in 
general, a phenomenon that has existed since the 1980s. This is even clearer when we 
consider Inti Raymi's contribution to the department's total royalty-related income. Between 
1993 (when the sulfide operation commenced) and 1998, Inti Raymi was responsible for 
between 74 percent and 99 percent of Oruro's income from mining royalties. Thus, the Inti 
Raymi deposit is the principal natural resource currently exploited in the department of 
Oruro. Without the Inti Raymi operation, the department would be virtually without income 
from natural resources. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Inti Raymi: Mining royalties and departmental income (thousands of US $). 
Income and royalties 1990 1993 1997 1998 
Oruro's budget     33 094 41 776 
Royalties paid to Oruro 1 679 2 443 6 284 5 358 
Royalties paid by Inti Raymi 964 2415 4 643 4 179 
Inti Raymi's contribution to the 
department 
    14.0% 10.0% 
Inti Raymi's contribution to royalties 57.4% 98.8% 73.9% 78.0% 
Source: Vice Ministry of Mines and Metallurgy, Sector Policy Analysis Unit; Inti Raymi. 
In terms of the department's budget appropriations, there is no correlation between the source 
of income and how it is spent. Instead, income is expended according to political 
considerations and usually goes to areas with greater influence within the department, such as 
the city of Oruro. As a result, it is possible that the mining royalties could, for example, be 
spent on agricultural development projects, on projects in the city of Oruro, or the community 
of Chuquiña. During the interviews with regional government officials, we did not detect that 
the actions of Inti Raymi or its foundation had had the effect of displacing public investment 
in the area. On the contrary, it is more probable that public investment in the region increased 
due to the Inti Raymi Foundation's active role as a mobilizer of public resources. 
Human development and social capital 
Personnel at the mine 
Although subject to debate, perhaps the greatest impact on human development in the area 
resulted from employment of a significant number of Chuquiña and La Joya residents at the 
mine. The company's work conditions favoured the social and economic development of 
workers' families by offering higher incomes as well as access to quality health and education 
services. 
For Chuquiña and La Joya residents, employment at the mining operation brought a 400 
percent increase in income levels. Residents went from being agricultural producers and 
poorly paid workers or functionaries in the city Oruro to stable and well-paid jobs 
comparable to middle-class levels in the city. Moreover, since their frugal habits enabled 
them to save approximately 40 percent of their income, and because the company did not 
tolerate alcoholism, workers spent their income acquiring land, real estate, and small 
businesses such as stores. Thus workers and their families went from being socially and 
ethnically marginalized to being upwardly mobile residents in Oruro. 
In terms of health care, the change was also positive and significant. In many cases, families 
had neither individual or family health coverage, and employment at the mining company 
entailed full coverage of medical insurance. In terms of education, the mine brought 
favourable conditions both for workers and their children. As mentioned earlier, workers 
were exposed to an educative process framed around developing and applying the skills 
required by a company such as Inti Raymi. It is not difficult to imagine that these workers 
and technicians are well paid both within and outside the mining industry. For example, the 
workers, technicians and employees interviewed during our fieldwork did not express 
concern for their future after the mine closes. They assume they will be able to find work at 
other mining companies or in other industries if need be, thanks to their professional training 
and specialization in such jobs as a mechanic or electrician. 
In addition, migration to Oruro increased the educational opportunities available to Inti 
Raymi workers' children, both in terms of formal education and the advantages offered by the 
environment of an of urban society. The children of these new members of the middle class 
were able to advance beyond a primary school education, which is the level attained by 59 
percent of the department. (National Institute of Statistics, National Housing and Population 
Census 1992; Muller and Associates 1997). 
Human development in communities adjacent to the operation 
The presence of the company and the Inti Raymi Foundation in these communities enabled 
the development of alternative economic activities and the improvement in health and 
education services. 
The company and the foundation constructed primary and secondary schools capable of 
housing 1 000 students in the communities of Chuquiña and La Joya.31 The schools are 
similar in quality to the average private school in the city of Oruro, and include mechanics 
and welding workshops, computer laboratories, library, and sports facilities. In addition, the 
company provided children from La Joya and Nueva Chuquiña with breakfast, uniforms, and 
school supplies. 
In addition, the Inti Raymi Foundation supported the construction of an educational 
infrastructure through the formulation of pre-feasibility and feasibility projects presented to 
the Social Investment Fund. The result has been an improvement in learning conditions and 
compliance with the population's demand for quality educational infrastructure. In addition, 
Caritas and the Anti-Hunger Foundation, with participation from parents, have been 
providing school breakfasts in order to combat the low nutritional levels that negatively effect 
learning. Likewise, the foundation has provided teaching material each year. Schools have 
received book donations that complement other learning materials and help improve learning 
conditions. Finally, the foundation granted bonuses to local teachers who agreed not to 
interrupt their teaching responsibilities. However, such improvements have not improved 
dropout rates caused by migration. 
Simultaneous to building the new community of Chuquiña, Inti Raymi constructed a hospital 
similar to a top-level private medical center in the city of La Paz. According to the hospital's 
director, "there is no health center of this kind in the city of Oruro." Among other services, 
the hospital offers medical and dental attention, childbirth facilities, an isolation ward, and a 
laboratory for the detection of tuberculosis. The hospital attends to 24 area communities with 
a total of approximately 5 200 inhabitants. 
The foundation has established a health care system composed of a reference center (the 
Health Center of Villa Chuquiña); monthly visits to the communities by an itinerant doctor-
and-nurse team; health promoters32 in each city; and transportation service to the city of 
Oruro for those requiring specialized medical attention. This system has allowed important 
gains, as shown in Table 9. 
The principal efforts of the Inti Raymi Foundation at the rural level were focused on 
improving the region's agricultural productivity in order to boost incomes and living 
standards for the region's inhabitants. To that effect, the foundation conceived and developed 
the Livestock Promotion Center (CEPROGAN), which provides technical assistance and  
31 These works had 90 percent co-financing from FIS. 
32 Community members trained as health workers promoted health-care programs offered 
at the local health center. They also assist in childbirth and first aid. 
 
training to agricultural and livestock producers within the foundation's scope of action in the 
areas of livestock production, soils, grazing lands, and forestry. Although this program has 
benefited local campesinos, it has not managed to raise income levels sufficiently to avoid the 
systematic abandonment of the region. 
Table 9. Adjacent communities: Comparative health indicators. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 
  No. % No. % No. % No. %
New consultations per 100 
residents 
2 
998
55.1 3 
179
58.4 3 
831
70.4 4 
446 
96.2
Dental consultations per 100 
residents 
265 9.7 541 19.9 615 22.6 723 65.7
Malnutrition (moderate and 
severe) under 2 years of age 
44 14.5 22 7.2 22 7.2 32 29.4
Malnutrition (moderate and 
severe) under 5 years of age 
69 9.3 41 5.6 40 5.4 32 29.4
Prevalence of malnutrition 
under 5 years of age 
349 47.3 232 31.4 289 39.2 174 55.9
Attention to pregnancy 
before the 5th month 
– 24.9 - 21.8 - 35.2 - 27.7
Coverage of home 
childbirths by medical 
personnel 
34 26.2 29 22.3 34 26.2 1 4.8
Childbirth coverage 58 33.3 61 35.1 64 36.8 27 57.4
Tetanus vaccinations 345 33.9 399 39.2 224 22.0 61 21.0
Source: SNIS 1995 to 1997,1998 Villa Chuquiña Health Center. 
Formation of social capital 
The Inti Raymi Foundation's policy is to seek community participation so that its projects 
reflect local priorities and get community members to participate in the solution of their 
problems. The Local Development Fund (FONDEL) illustrates such efforts and their results. 
FONDEL is an investment fund created by the Inti Raymi Foundation and Inter-American 
Foundation (IAF) with initial capital of US $300 000, to which each institution contributed 
50 percent. FONDEL was created to counteract widespread poverty in the area by solving 
some basic problems, such as the lack of negotiating and management capacity on the part of 
local communities. These problems are relatively simple for most organizations in the 
modern world, but have long been unsurpassable for communities within the foundation's 
area of influence. 
The strategy adopted by FONDEL was that each participant — FONDEL, the beneficiary 
community, and the state — has clearly defined roles and responsibilities with which they 
must comply. FONDEL establishes the procedures, fixes relations among diverse actors, and 
co-finances projects. The community identifies, develops and executes the projects, in 
addition to providing local materials and labour. Other private organizations and the state 
provide co-financing and technical assistance. 
FONDEL works according to projects. Each must comply with the following stages: 
identification of the project; formulation of the project profile; successful search for 
financing; project execution; supervision of the project execution; and project maintenance 
for the benefit of current and future generations. In each of these stages, the communities are 
trained by the foundation. 
FONDEL's initial results are encouraging, including the construction of productive and basic 
hygiene infrastructure and the strengthening of communities' management capacity. It is 
important to note that initial FONDEL contributions were multiplied by 2.85. In addition, 
communities have been the principal contributors to FONDEL projects, providing 37 percent 
of total resources. 
Human development in the city of Oruro 
Although subject to debate, the foundation's principal contribution to human development in 
the city of Oruro (which as we have seen is a center of attraction for human resources) has 
been the establishment of the Multi-Service Educational and Intercultural Center (CEMEI). 
The foundation became involved in education because it is an issue common to all foundation 
projects; one which represents its central thrust of development. The city of Oruro suffered 
poor-quality public education services, characterized by lack of infrastructure and equipment 
such as libraries, furniture, and teaching materials, as well as low professional levels among 
teachers. 
In the area north of Oruro, the foundation initiated an innovative project inspired by the 
Jesuit-sponsored Multiservice Educational Center (CEMSE) in La Paz. The foundation's 
project, known by its initials CEMEI33, provides teaching materials to the city's public 
schools and implements innovative teaching methodologies at a well-equipped center 
periodically attended by all students from area schools. CEMEI encourages free expression 
and creativity, and provides access to technology, new teaching methods and resources that 
complement the educational process. 
According to parents and teachers, the center's support is very important because it provides 
children with a space offering novel elements—workshops, a gymnasium, sports field, video 
library, and computer lab — that keeps them off the street. Students receive support to enjoy 
those school activities that teachers cannot always provide given the lack of equipment in 
their schools. CEMEI figures confirm these goals. Between 1996 and 1998, coverage 
increased from 12 000 to 16 000 participants, reaching the limit of 1 000 participants per day, 
above which the quality of attention and services would suffer. CEMEI's attends to 
approximately 30 percent of Oruro's students. 
Impacts, best practices and sustainability 
Using the Bolivian experience, this study has evaluated the positive and negative impacts that 
the opening of an industrial mining operation can have on the its socioeconomic area of 
influence. In this section we discuss the study's implications for public policy and business 
strategies, with the goal of contributing to a maximization of benefits and minimization of 
identified costs. 
 
 
33 CEMEI was constructed by the Inti Raymi Foundation with co-financing from FIS. In 
addition, FIS gave support to cover the 25% of the administrative costs for 18 months. 
One of the study's most important results has been to show that a mining operation's costs and 
benefits (and their intensity or magnitude) depend on the characteristics of the socioeconomic 
and cultural context into which the operation inserts itself. As a result, in a socioeconomic 
context, the potential costs and benefits identified, as well as the best practices recommended, 
are applicable in Inti Raymi and Puquio Norte's areas of influence. The fundamental 
characteristics of these areas are: origin linked to native cultures (the predominance of 
western culture notwithstanding); rural communities connected by good highways to urban 
centers or important cities; marked migration of local populations; and an agrarian-based 
economy which possesses an important and growing flow of commercial goods. 
Potential benefits 
Employment and income 
Employment is one of the most efficient mechanisms for distributing benefits among rural 
communities. Employment permits the productive use of the labour force with high levels of 
productivity and, as a result, income. In addition, the growing importance of information and 
advanced technology used in the mining industry provides local workers with opportunities 
for training and skills acquisition, as well as work discipline. For example, the Inti Raymi 
sulfide operation provided local workers with education and training to which they would 
never have had access, otherwise. Finally, high and stable income levels provide workers and 
their families the means to acquire assets as well as access to new opportunities. This is 
essential if rural peasant families are to escape the social and economic marginalization to 
which they are commonly subjected. 
In addition to these multiple benefits, other forms of compensatory (or surplus) employment 
also usually arise, as in the case of Inti Raymi. In such a situation, that policy should be 
considered part of an efficient benefit-distribution policy rather than a strictly personnel 
policy. 
This study has shown that while employment at the mine has significant impacts on rural 
communities, affecting a significant portion of the EAP, the multiplier effect of mine salaries 
primarily occurs at the urban level, especially in cities where the provision of goods and 
services and a considerable population is concentrated. In the case of Inti Raymi, for 
example, the multiplier effect in rural communities was practically zero, while in the city of 
Oruro, each dollar paid by the company became approximately 2.8 dollars in income, 
benefiting approximately one-fourth of the families residing there. 
Infrastructure, mining income and public investment 
Since mining operations are located in rural areas with infrastructure deficiencies, the 
construction of these facilities is another important mechanism for promoting regional 
development in a mining project's area of social influence. Puquio Norte, for example, 
required the construction of a 220-kilometer pipeline, which provided an opportunity for the 
Rural Electrification Cooperative to assume the additional cost of widening the pipeline in 
order to electrify not only the town of San Ramón but also all of Chiquitanía Norte. 
The maximization of benefits derived from the infrastructure works depends on the level of 
state involvement in their construction and financing. Infrastructure works are commonly 
public goods that can produce high social benefits that do not correspond to the private 
sector. For this reason, works initiated exclusively by private sector entities, such as a mining 
company, do not maximize the collective well being. For example, if the gas pipeline to 
Puquio Norte had been extended to Trinidad in the department of Beni, the benefits for the 
eastern region of the country would have been considerably greater. A work of such 
magnitude, however, would not only have required widening the pipeline but also nearly 
doubling its length. Investment in infrastructure works represents an additional cost that can 
make a mining project less feasible and thus endanger all the other positive effects for the 
region's development. This situation can be minimized if the state assumes partial or total 
financing. 
In current circumstances in Bolivia, portions of mining royalties or taxes are seldom invested 
in rural areas contiguous to the mining operation. We suggest incorporating infrastructure 
works with clear local benefits within the department's budget in relation to royalties or taxes 
paid. 
Local development promotion 
Increasingly, mining companies are taking part in the local development process by 
establishing foundations. Inti Raymi is a pioneering company in this respect. In general, this 
study found that the Inti Raymi Foundation had positive effects. The most effective programs 
were those oriented to basic infrastructure development, the provision of basic health and 
education services, and the formation of social capital. In other words, the most effective 
programs were those oriented to the provision of goods and public services. Projects geared 
toward productive ends, which are part of private investment, have had positive impacts but 
their efficiency and sustainability is debatable. 
The study also showed that, notwithstanding the creation of the Inti Raymi Foundation, the 
company continued to directly address community needs within its area of social influence. 
Over the long term, this dualistic approach to company-community relations hurt the 
company's image. A best practice for a socially responsible strategy would be to avoid 
dualistic actions in the social context. It is evident that entities specializing in social work, 
such as a foundation, provide the greatest benefits. 
Magnitude and sustainability of benefits 
This study has shown that population flows will determine the magnitude and sustainability 
of the benefits from a mining project to its area of social influence. Benefits are diluted or 
even disappear when they are focused on an area with high emigration levels. In contrast, 
benefits are heightened in an area receiving migration flows. Thus, mine-sponsored 
productive diversification will be more effective and sustainable in a migrant-receiving area, 
where the multiplier effect of mining-related income is most evident. As such, a diagnosis of 
general population flows within the area of social influence is important when designing a 
company's social programs. This analysis should be conducted during the project's 
environmental and social baseline studies. 
Potential costs 
Natural resource competition 
Mining companies often compete with local communities for natural resources, particularly 
land and water. For example, Inti Raymi had to compete with its neighbors for natural 
resources, land, and minerals. One practice that allowed the company to avoid or overcome 
conflicts with the local community has been compensation, in the form of assets similar to 
those displaced or, when that was impossible, compensation by an asset whose market value 
exceeded the value of the displaced asset. 
Nevertheless, problems have arisen due to the fact that Inti Raymi established a mechanism 
for individual negotiation with each one of the community members that sold land. Due to 
differences in prices among land of similar quality, a few community members have 
complained to the company, arguing for higher compensation and, in some cases, have 
initiated legal action. While it would be naÏve to deny the existence of opportunistic attitudes 
aimed at obtaining advantages from the company, it is also evident that the company's 
approach to negotiation generated mistrust within the community. As a result, land 
negotiations should be collective or the conditions offered by the company be made public. 
Transparency is essential to building the trust necessary for conflict-free, company-
community relations which can so easily compensate for additional costs. 
Environment 
This study has shown that in countries like Bolivia, the environmental management of an 
industrial mining project has two intimately related facets: The technical facet linked to 
environmental standards and practices applied, and the public facet related to the company's 
and the industry's image within society. As a result, it is not enough to comply with strict 
environmental standards or practices; it is also necessary to respond to the public's perception 
of mining. Both facets merit careful attention from the outset, which will give results in form 
of community relations based on mutual trust. 
In addition to impeccable technical standards, sound environmental management means 
creating trust and credibility among local communities. We suggest the adoption of ongoing 
information and consultation policies with local communities, particularly those that feel 
exposed to risks from mining activities, and certification of a company's environmental 
programs by a credible third party that inspires confidence in the local communities. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
Chile: Size Does Matter 
Julio Castillo, José Miguel Sánchez, Verónica Kunze, and Rodrigo Araya34 
Introduction 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between large-scale mining 
projects and affected local communities in Chile. There are three fundamental dimensions 
that we will consider: the economy, the environment, and social development. 
Our analysis is based on detailed case studies of three mining projects. While the cases 
selected do not pretend to offer a statistical representation, they present a range of 
characteristics (in size, geographic location, type of operation, and methods of relating to 
local communities) that allow us to draw conclusions and lessons applicable to other mining 
projects. The usefulness of the case studies is not limited to the knowledge of concrete 
experiences between large mining projects and the community, nonetheless they permit us to 
propose some "best practices" for future mining projects. These best practices derive from 
observed "actions" in the cases or "omissions" detected over the course of the study. 
The three mining projects analyzed are La Escondida (Region II), La Candelaria (Region III) 
and Fachinal (Region XI). The first two projects are located in areas with long mining 
traditions, while the third is where mining has never had much economic importance. In 
terms of size, Escondida is a mega-project, according to international standards, while 
Candelaria is a medium-sized operation. Fachinal is a much smaller operation, but one that 
can nevertheless be considered large-scale mining and which has a significant impact on the 
area where it is located. 
34 Jose Miguel Sánchez, economist, is currently a professor at the Economic Institute of the 
Catholic University of Chile and the director of this project. Send all comments to 
jsanchez@volcan.facea.puc.cl. Julio Castillo, anthropologist, is an associate researcher in 
the Economics Department of the University of Chile. Verónica Kunze, economist, is an 
instructor and associate researcher in the Economics Department of the University of 
Chile. Rodrigo Araya is an anthropologist. 
This study presents the conceptual framework, followed by an exploration of three case 
studies. We then present a series of conclusions and propose a series of best practices to 
follow. 
Conceptual framework 
The objective of this section is to present the conceptual framework and the variables 
analyzed in the three cases. These variables are grouped together in the areas of the economy; 
the environment; as well as social and human development capital, and community-company 
relationships. We use each variable group to analyze the relationships between mining mega-
projects and local communities. In addition, we present the methodology used to collect, 
organize, and interpret information for each case study. 
Methodological model 
The methodological model used to analyze the dimensions and variables is common to the 
three case studies. It distinguishes between the corporate context that gives rise to the projects 
(the internal realm of the companies themselves) and the greater community (the external 
realm). This schema is presented in Graph 1, which is used to systematize mining companies' 
"best practices" with regards to both the internal and external realms. 
We gathered primary information through qualitative techniques and used secondary 
information taken from studies conducted by public entities, universities, business 
organizations, and the mining companies themselves. The qualitative primary information 
was obtained through in-depth interviews with key informants, such as managers from the 
three companies, regional mining, labour, and health authorities, Regional Environmental 
Commission officials, union leaders, NGO and regional association representatives, in 
addition to university professors and researchers specializing in mining.35 
We will focus on the companies' policies and their impacts on the community. Nevertheless, 
the information generated by various company officials is contrasted with the visions of other 
relevant actors from the external realm mentioned earlier. 
Internal context 
The companies' internal realm is composed of a series of institutional relations that comprise 
a corporate model. It determines the way in which the company defines its corporate policy, 
organization, and the processes between the different actors within the company. 
The first component of a company's internal realm is its corporate policy, which is a mental 
model shared by company representatives and understood as a series of corporate decisions 
that characterize the institution's culture. This model defines the corporate guidelines for 
"how things are done." Two important elements of a corporate policy are the mission 
statement and standards that the company establishes or assumes. 
35 The methodology of the In-depth Interview (II) supposes a situation of direct 
conversation on specific themes proposed in a broad manner by the interviewer. The 
interviewee is asked for his/her perspectives that emerge during the interview. The 
interviewer turns over the direction of the conversation to the interviewee, although the 
interviewer controls the conversation by way of content guidelines. This method enables 
the argument sequences and emotional positions that structure the conversations to be 
studied. In particular, the way in which distinct collectives participate in the conversations 
are studied, with a view to analyzing their experience and social practice. Interviews lasted 
aproximately 20 to 40 minutes. 
Figure 1. Internal and external environment of the firm. 
 
The mission statement outlines the company's corporate model and defines its reason for 
being. It provides the guidelines that are translated into policies and strategies with regards to 
the company's internal and external realms. 
Safety standards help define the quality of the workplace by establishing the correct operating 
procedures for activities within the company. These standards can be based on international 
norms, such as ISO 9000 and 14000, which companies can assume in order to create safe 
working conditions. 
A company's "organization" refers to the definition of functions and the rights and obligations 
associated with each function. Organization allows companies to establish each person's 
responsibilities in order to avoid overlap or omissions in certain areas. For example, it is 
important that the company define which organizational division is in charge of information 
generation and distribution, both internal and external. 
A company's "processes" refer to conditions under which work is carried out, production 
takes place, materials are moved and shipped, etc. The company defines guidelines for how 
both direct employees and subcontractors should perform these processes. In some cases, 
companies put more emphasis on guidelines for direct employees, while subcontractors and 
suppliers (in the areas of exploration or food service) are not subject to the company's internal 
guidelines. This can generate inconveniences, especially in terms of community relations. 
Thus, it is important that everyone associated with the company be held to and understand its 
guidelines. 
External realm 
The external realm in which a company operates is often heterogeneous in terms of its 
organizational characteristics, complexity and level of participation. In such cases, companies 
must adapt to the structured discourses expressed in national, regional and local policies, but 
should also incorporate the opinions and impressions held by other, less organized members 
of the community. Likewise, in terms of organization, companies relate with highly 
organized social actors such as national, regional, and local political authorities, universities, 
business associations, workers associations, NGOs, producer confederations, and social 
organizations — as well as with the community in general. 
Given the complexity of the external realm, companies should design strategies for optimal 
relations with each of the distinct social actors. An important element is the information 
policy toward the community, which determines the level of consultation with and 
participation of each community actor with respect to the mining project. Another important 
element is the distribution of benefits within the community, which range from taxes and 
royalties to sporadic petitions from less organized groups. It is necessary to distinguish 
between short- and long-term actions that a company can undertake regarding community 
benefits. 
Issues such as training, education, health, local development, and environmental impacts are 
important in the external realm. Companies should define their role in each of these areas, as 
well as their corresponding rights and obligations. They should define their level of 
involvement in each of the aforementioned themes, which can range from a commitment to 
comply with the applicable laws to full participation in local or regional bodies. The type of 
commitment made has strong implications for the definition of short- and long-term policies. 
Variables analyzed 
In this section, we present the variables analyzed in each case study, which are classified as 
economic variables; environmental variables; social and human capital variables; and 
variables in community-company relations. 
Economic variables 
Economic variables quantify the economic impact of the mining project in terms of its 
contribution to the economic development of the host region, as well as the direct economic 
benefits that can accrue to the country, such as foreign exchange earnings, employment, 
investment, trade balance, and technological support. 
Environmental variables 
The environmental policies of the companies in our three case studies allow us to identify the 
practices they develop as part of the relations they establish with the surrounding area. 
The safety and quality standards variable refers to the designs, controls, evaluations and 
actions that companies establish in order to mitigate the impacts of productive processes such 
as mineral extraction and processing. For our objectives, it is important to define these 
standards and identify the potential best practices that the companies employ in this area. 
 
 
Social and human capital 
Socio-cultural dimension of the project 
The socio-cultural dimension of a mining project refers to the impact the project has on 
variables such as health, education and training, work shifts, community relations, 
communication strategy, and citizen participation. 
The socio-cultural impact of a mining mega-project on the community has been one of the 
most relevant issues for environmental authorities, community organizations, and the mining 
industry. From the exploration stage to the mine's closure and abandonment, there are diverse 
points of contact and potential conflict between communities and mining interests with 
regards to social, socioeconomic, and environmental issues. 
In northern Chile, mining is without a doubt the most important economic activity. The 
history of mining goes back to the first settlements recorded in the area. This tradition has 
been a central component of regional identity. The presence of international companies in the 
first decades of the century had a considerable impact on the region's history. Workers' 
movements and political parties appeared as early strategies of establishing community 
counterweights to the presence of mining mega-projects. Thus, there are historical references 
to the relations between mega-projects and local communities that are present in the 
collective memory. This long history has produced resistance to the presence of foreign 
mining companies.36 
Health 
There are various dimensions to relation between health and mining, which are important to 
distinguish. 
An analysis of the issue of health within a mining company requires the identification of 
company strategies for addressing problems related to worker health, stress management, 
obesity, alcohol and drug use, sexually transmitted diseases, and accidents. The common 
denominator among these strategies is that the company has control over detecting and 
neutralizing the effects of mining work on the health of its workers via the design of 
preventative plans and programs. 
The health and community theme refers to the impact that large mining projects can have on 
the health of the general population of a specific community. At this level, issues such as 
prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, alcoholism and drug use are significant. Another 
important aspect of the relationships between large mining projects and health is the benefits 
that mining companies can provide to local communities. 
Education and training 
Education and training have become recurring themes within discussions of the modern 
mining industry. The industry's general shift to clean production technology has produced a 
strong demand for a skilled, multifunctional work force for its diverse operations. The 
country's educational centers have not necessarily produced workers who can meet this 
demand. Faced with this reality, the companies in this study have developed diverse 
strategies for the formation of the work force their operations require. 
 
36 There are several phases to the presence of foreign companies: first the Spanish, then the 
British (both for nitrates), later the North Americans (copper mining) and currently 
multinational companies (mostly copper). 
Companies can organize work shifts in different ways, from a normal work shift in which the 
worker returns home each day (in cases where the mine is located close to town) to 20 or 10-
day stints that oblige the worker to remain in camps adjacent to the mine. There are pros and 
cons to each of these schemes for the company, workers and their families. In many cases, 
the mine's remote geographic location requires prolonged stays at the project site in order to 
maintain continuous exploitation. However, long stays at camp generate a series of problems 
for workers and their families that are difficult to evaluate. 
Community-company relations 
The community's perception 
Traditionally, good relations with the local community have not been an important part of the 
mining culture. For its part, the local community tends to view mining activities as isolated 
and oriented toward a purely economic end. The community is apprehensive about being 
excluded from the benefits produced by the mining project and requires information about the 
status of the project. 
In turn, the mining industry is conscious that its activities are costly, risky and require huge 
investments in exploration in order to determine if a deposit is worth exploiting. Given the 
uncertainty of success, the mining company has little interest in establishing relations with 
the community until the project is well underway. In this scenario, community relations have 
traditionally not been a company's first priority. 
Thus, a situation of fear and mistrust arises from the lack of communication and 
comprehension between the mining industry and the community. 
A community's response to mining company interests is shaped by mining's historic legacy. 
Thus, in areas with a long mining tradition, such as northern Chile, communities' 
expectations are different from those in areas where this tradition does not exist, such as the 
extreme southern region of the country. 
Strategic communication with the community 
A company's communication strategy is key to understanding certain aspects of its relations 
with the community. In this study, we examine the ways the three mining companies 
approached such communications from the beginning of operations. 
Citizen participation 
Citizen participation refers to the degree of involvement by the general public or community 
organizations in the mining project's development. Participation can vary depending on the 
different stages of the mining operation. It is important to understand each company's 
strategies with respect to citizen participation in order to determine whether it really exists. 
Integration of company employees in the community 
Another important variable in community-company relations is the integration of employees 
and workers in the cities and towns near the mine. The way the company approaches this 
integration can be a determining factor in how the community perceives the project. 
Community benefits 
The variable of community benefits refers to the positive impacts from the mining companies 
or alliances established with other firms that directly benefit the community. 
 
The Case of La Escondida Mining Company 
Description of the project 
On March 15, 1989, construction began on the La Escondida mining project. The first 
shipments of copper concentrate began on December 3, 1990. Exploration activities began in 
1978 and lasted four years, after which ensued a period of technical studies and the search for 
financing. 
La Escondida is located in the Atacama desert 3 000 meters above sea level, to the southeast 
of Antofagasta and 240 kilometers south of Chuquicamata. It is the third-largest copper 
deposit in the world after Chuquicamata (Chile) and Bingham Canyon (USA). The mine is 
owned by BHP-UTAH (57.5 percent), Río Tinto of London (30 percent), Jeco of Japan lead 
by Mitsubishi (10 percent) and the International Finance Corporation (2.5 percent). 
The mineral deposit has reserves of 1.8 billion tonnes with an average grade of 1.59 percent 
copper. Planning for the mine considered the utilization of 662 million tonnes with an 
average copper grade of 2.12 percent. Initially, the mine's lifespan was estimated at 52 years 
from the start of production. Nevertheless, new investments have increased production 
capacity significantly and the lifespan is now estimated at 34 years. 
Project infrastructure includes a well field 25 kilometers east of Escondida in the Punta Negra 
salt flats, with a water supply system capable of providing 65 000 GPM at an average of 12 
000 GPM at maximum capacity. This salt water is treated by reverse osmosis for 
consumption. Additional infrastructure includes a high-voltage energy line connected to 
SING, a 165-kilometer mineral pipeline for transporting concentrate from the plant to the port 
of Coloso and a filtration plant to eliminate water from the concentrate. The port facility at 
Coloso, located 15 kilometers south of Antofagasta, can house ships of up to 45 000 DWT. 
Economic variables 
In recent years Region II has experienced a series of social and economic changes, to which 
La Escondida mine has contributed significantly. Nevertheless, it is difficult to isolate those 
impacts directly attributable to the mine. This is because various mining companies have 
been operating in the region simultaneously with La Escondida. 
In 1999, Region II had an estimated population of 461 300 inhabitants and a population 
density of 3.7 inhabitants per square kilometer. The region's economy is based on mining, 
which generates close to 59 percent of the gross regional product. Copper is the region's 
principal product, representing between 52 percent and 55 percent of national copper 
production. 
Production 
Within the region, GDP per capita rose from US $2 923 in 1985 to US $11 420 in 1996, a 
290 percent increase. Meanwhile, GDP per capita for the entire country rose from US $1 360 
to US $4 994 in the same period, an increase of approximately 260 percent. 
Region II has been one of the country's fastest growing regions during the last decade. 
Between 1988 and 1997, while the country grew at an average rate of 8 percent per year, 
Region II grew at a rate of 9.6 percent. The mining sector grew 71.6 percent in the region for 
the same period, while the national average for mining sector growth was 43.2 percent. While 
these figures are not solely attributable to Escondida, the company has had a significant 
influence. 
The company's production levels, for both concentrate and cathodes, are represented in Table 
1. 
The production of copper concentrate (41.4 percent fine copper content) in 1997 was 2 098 
256 tonnes. National copper production in 1998 was approximately 3.7 million metric tonnes. 
Escondida contributed 23 percent of national copper production for that year. Its average 
share from 1994 to 1998 was also 23 percent. Thus we can determine that Escondida's 
contribution to the national GDP was on average approximately 2 percent between 1991 and 
1996 (Escondida Mining Company 1997a). 
Table 1. Escondida Production: 1990–1998. 
  Metric tonnes 
Year Concentrate Cathodes Total 
1990 8 900 0 8 900
1991 298 386 0 298 386
1992 336 632 0 336 632
1993 388 756 0 388 756
1994 481 249 2 382 483 631
1995 438 831 28 083 466 914
1996 792 272 49 089 841 361
1997 868 678 64 021 932 699
1998 829 495 47 418 876 913
Source: Escondida Mining Company. 
In 1997 copper production in Region II was approximately 2 million metric tonnes and 
Escondida's contribution to regional copper production was 55 percent for this year. This 
means that Escondida contributed to 34 percent of the regional GDP between 1991 and 1996 
(Escondida Mining Company 1997a). Meanwhile, 54 percent of Region II s GDP came from 
the mining sector in general (Aroca 1999). 
Investment 
Foreign investment in the region during the period 1990-1998 was US $5.33 billion, or 
approximately 20 percent of the national total, almost US $27 billion. Approximately US$11 
billion correspond specifically to mining investments during this period, in which Escondida 
invested nearly US $2.3 billion. Thus Escondida's impact on foreign investment was 8.9 
percent at the national level, 21 percent at the regional level and 44.4 percent within the 
mining sector. 
Exports 
Escondida's exports quadrupled between 1991 and 1998, from US $466 million to US $1.96 
billion. In 1997, exports from Region II represented 30.2 percent of the total national exports. 
For that same year, Escondida represented 30.3 percent of exports from Region II, 18.3 
percent of national mineral exports and 9.1 percent of the country's total exports. 
 
 
Taxes paid 
It is possible to determine Escondida's direct contribution to the Chilean government by 
looking at the destinations of national and regional budget allocations. Contributions to the 
national budget are related to income tax payments. Tax contributions to the region are 
related to payments for land rights and permits related to the Escondida operation. 
Between 1990 and 1998, the company paid US $1.19 billion in income taxes, of which 
US$253 million were paid in 1996, US$331 million in 1997, and US$111 million in 1998. 
The decrease in taxes paid for 1998 reflects lower incomes due to the drop in world copper 
prices. The 1996 value represents 25.6 percent of total income taxes paid by the mining 
sector37 and 10.5 percent of total income taxes collected by the state. 
Table 2. Destination of Escondida's regional payments (US $). 
Payment destination National Regional Total %
National budget 331 000  331 000 12.9%
FNDR  1 260 000 1 260 000 49.2%
Municipal  970 000 970 000 37.9%
Total 331 000 2 230 000 2 561 000 100.0%
Percent 12.9% 87.1% 100.0%  
Source: Escondida Mining Company. 
In addition, Escondida made periodic payments of surface fees and permits, which are 
necessary for the normal functioning of operations. These include mining patents, real estate 
contributions, purchases, obligations, leases, patents, rights, and municipal circulation 
permits. 
These payments go to the state budget according to the distribution represented in Table 2, 
which shows Escondida's contribution to the estimated budget for the year 1997. According 
to the table, 87 percent of payments for land rights and permits go the regional budget, 
whether through the National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR) or the 
municipalities.38 
Escondida's contribution to the regional budget is significant, considering that for 1997, 
Escondida made payments of US $1.26 million that went to the FNDR for Region II, which 
represented 20 percent of the total contribution of mining patent payments and more than 6 
percent of the fund's total. 
Employment 
Escondida directly employs approximately 2 000 permanent workers, of whom 80 percent are 
from Region II, 11 percent from Regions I and III, with only 9 percent being from Santiago 
and other regions in Chile. 
 
37 Estimate by Gémines Consulting using a representative sample of mining sector 
companies. 
38 In this case, corresponding are payments made to the Illustrious Municipality of 
Antofagasta. 
Using an input-product matrix for Region II, Aroca (1999) estimated the employment 
multiplier for Escondida. Considering subcontractors as service providers and not as direct 
Escondida workers, and without considering the effect of salaries and wages paid to workers 
in the region, this author arrives at a multiplier of 3.1. In other words, for each worker hired 
by Escondida in the region, 3.1 additional workers are hired. The employment multiplier for 
the rest of the regional mining sector is only 1.04. 
By assuming that all wages and salaries are spent in the region and adding a line for these 
remunerations and a column for regional consumption to the input-product matrix, the author 
obtains a multiplier of 5.7. In other words, for every worker hired by Escondida, 5.7 
additional workers are hired in the region once it is taken into account that the workers — 
whether working in the mine itself, subcontracted firms, or suppliers to the mine — will 
spend some of the money they earn and generate more jobs. This tends to overestimate the 
effects on employment, since not all salaries and wages are spent in the region. 
This same calculation for the rest of the regional mining sector produces a multiplier of 1.76 
workers for every worker hired in the sector. The difference between figures obtained for 
Escondida is due to the different management systems used by various companies in the 
sector. While Escondida subcontracts many activities associated with the project operations, 
other companies in the region subcontract few activities. As a result, they have more 
personnel directly working at the operation. In sum, total employment (direct and indirect) in 
the mining sector represents around 9 percent of the region's total employment, without 
considering those jobs at projects related to investment and construction. 
By using the multiplier of 5.7 indirect jobs for each job in the mine, it is possible to estimate 
the indirect effect that the salaries received by the workers and management in the mine. In 
Table 3, the direct, indirect, and total expenditure in the region resulting from the mine is 
calculated. As noted earlier, it is assumed that all expenditures are made in the region, so 
these estimates can be considered upper-bound impacts. 
In Table 3, the direct impact is the expenditure of the mine workers, while the indirect impact 
is the expenditure of those receiving employment indirectly due to the mine. The income 
multiplier is total income generated in the region divided by the income earned by the mine 
workers and management. Note that it is different from the employment multiplier as: it is 
lower because some money is saved and, hence, not recycled; it is higher as it includes the 
first round of expenditures (by the mine workers), while the employment multiplier is only 
the additional jobs and thus does not include the mine workers jobs; and it can move in either 
direction if non-mine workers earn on average different salaries than mine workers. In this 
case, (the usual one), it is lower because mine workers earn more, (i.e., the same expenditure 
will create more jobs resulting in a relatively greater effect on the employment multiplier). 
Table 3. Impacts generated by the incomes received by workers and management in 
Escondida (US $; 1999). 
  Workers Management Total
Income 148 059 780 110 543 939 258 603 719
Direct impact 120 520 661 87 440 256 207 960 917
Indirect impact 686 967 769 498 409 457 1 185 377 227
Direct plus indirect impact 807 488 431 585 849 713 1 393 338 143
Employment multiplier 5.7 5.7 5.7
Income multiplier 5.45 5.30 5.39
Environmental variables 
Company policy 
Environmental concerns are prominent in the company's mission statement, which also 
includes aspects of the internal realm, such as safety, the workplace environment, human 
relations needs and worker well-being. Attention to these areas is considered as a 
fundamental part of its mission and corporate principals. 
In the external realm, the company's mission statement establishes the responsibility to 
constantly inform local authorities, especially with regard to the environment. From our 
conversations with company representatives, we could detect a corporate attitude recognizing 
the need to anticipate possible environmental events, which are approached through the 
environmental impact studies conducted at each phase or step the company takes. 
Another principal that characterizes Escondida's mission with regard to the external realm is 
the rapid response to any occurrence that could affect the company. For example, it hired an 
expert in a marine species that was supposedly at risk from activities performed in the port of 
Coloso, who conducted a thorough investigative study. Something similar happened in the 
case of Andean flamingos, which are found in the Punta Negra salt flats, which are the object 
of constant study. An element of this best practice with the external realm is the policy of 
company relations with the university and academic worlds, which admit the company into a 
scientific society dedicated to investigation. 
Since the start of operations, Escondida has complied with all health and safety regulations in 
the country and with the corporate polices of the companies operating the mine. Escondida 
conducted an environmental impact study before this was required or regulated under Chilean 
law, and has introduced clean technologies to its productive processes. 
To comply with its environmental programs, the company has signed cooperation agreements 
with different national public agencies, including SAG (Agriculture and Livestock Service) 
and CONAF (National Forestry Corporation). In addition, Escondida is a member of the 
National Oceanographie Committee, the Chilean Society of Sea Sciences, and other 
organizations having to do with environmental protection (Escondida Mining Company 
1998). 
Nevertheless, the local population frequently expressed concerns about possible problems 
stemming from company activities. For example, coastal residents as well as professors at the 
University of Antofagasta mentioned in interviews that the company is causing pollution 
problems in Coloso Bay. When we asked the company's environmental manager about this 
concern, he said the company was informed about the matter and had conducted the relevant 
studies in order to control possible contamination problems in the bay. Study results did not 
find contamination problems. 
Water use is another issue that sparks a certain level of controversy. Since the mine is located 
in a desert region, water must be obtained from groundwater tables below the salt flats by 
way of 120-foot wells, on average. Again, academics from the University of Antofagasta 
expressed concern during the course of our interviews about groundwater extraction. They 
worry that since water table recharge takes years, over the long term, water levels in the salt 
flats could drop drastically, adversely affecting the area's flora and fauna. 
Nevertheless, the results of studies conducted by the company do not anticipate the existence 
of adverse effects on local flora and fauna. In addition, the company is very conscious of the 
region's water scarcity and has taken all the necessary measures to maximize water recycling, 
such as reusing tailings water in the process. The tailings pond has a system to reduce surface 
area and therefore the loss of water through evaporation, which maximizes the amount of 
water recycled.39As part of its environmental program, Escondida controls groundwater levels 
to ensure there are no negative effects on the ecosystems surrounding the Punta Negra salt 
flats, where the company has its well field. 
Given the project's long lifespan, closure studies have not yet been conducted, although in the 
future this will be an important issue in terms of restoring the environment to its normal 
conditions. 
It is important to note that Escondida recently certified its Coloso port facilities under the ISO 
14 000 system, which certifies the existence of an environmental management system. 
Safety and quality standards 
Escondida's environmental management system allows company personnel to conduct 
inspections and evaluations, as well as implement mitigation measures. The system provides 
for both internal and external audits. Some of the company's main environmental 
considerations include tailings management, dust control at the mine, hazardous waste 
management, and the continuous and permanent monitoring of the marine environment at the 
port facilities in Coloso. 
Social and human capital 
Health 
Internal company health 
Escondida has implemented an integral health plan, which includes a pre-employment exam 
and an annual preventative medical exam. The annual exams are voluntary and provide 
company employees with the means to discover potential pathologies. In addition, the 
company has a fully equipped first-aid center with qualified medical personnel to manage 
emergencies and health problems that can occur in camp. This allows for the timely diagnosis 
and effective treatment of common illnesses. 
With regard to work-related stress, Escondida's work shifts are organized according to the 
"4×4 system," explained more fully later. The system avoids the adverse health effects of 
remaining at high altitude for prolonged periods of time. 
Obesity problems stem from two main causes: the lack of healthy eating habits among rural 
workers or "old timers," and the over-consumption of products from the cafeteria, especially 
during the first days when new workers are getting used to their surroundings. Faced with 
this, the company has obesity prevention and control programs, which are complemented 
with sports and recreational facilities inside the camp comparable to the best and most 
complete in the region. 
The company treats other, more sensitive health issues with special care. The introduction of 
drugs and alcohol to camp is controlled by an electronic detection system. If such substances 
are detected, the worker is punished and could be subject to dismissal. The existence of 
sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS, is verified by annual preventative medical 
exams, although the company does not yet have any specific policy in place to address the 
issue. 
 
39 The company's water recuperation system has allowed for a reduction in the operation's 
water needs such that 75% of the water needed for the milling process is recycled. 
Work shift 
As we mentioned earlier, Escondida has a "4×4" work shift system. In other words, workers 
spend four days at the mine and four days at home. During the mine stay, workers have 12-
hour shifts, from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., or from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m. The company maintains that its 
analysis shows this system is better for workers in terms of personal health and family 
relations. In the event that problems arise from the work scheme, the company consults and 
converses directly with the affected worker. According to the Labour Secretariat for Region 
II, the 4×4 work scheme does not constitute a problem. 
Community health benefits 
One of the areas in which Escondida has been very deeply involved is precisely in the area of 
health benefits for the community. However, all the actions related to this area have not been 
done directly by the company but through the Escondida Foundation which is described 
below. In fact, community health programs form the largest share of its budget. Among the 
programs financed by the foundation are: implementation of an emergency primary health 
service, contest for research projects on cancer in Region II, development of a children's 
oncology unit at the regional hospital of Antofagasta, hospitality housing for oncology 
patients, and an early cancer detection program. 
Education and training 
Training 
Due to the lack of training centers and qualified technicians in Region II, Escondida created a 
professional institute in Antofagasta to provide training and develop required skills. In 
January 1997, the company contracted the services of the British Columbia Institute of 
Technology (BCIT) to oversee technician training. The company built a 2 200 square meter 
facility to house the institute, which together with other necessary components required a 
total investment of US $8 million. 
Since training began in January 1997, 307 technicians have completed the first of four stages 
in the heavy machinery mechanic, plant mechanic, and electrician training programs. It is 
estimated that all 560 participants will complete their training and aptitude evaluations in 
order to reach the level of master of trades (maestro de oficios) at the end of 2002. 
In addition, Escondida implemented an extensive career development program for company 
personnel in April 1998. The company hired specialized personnel to conduct trainings and 
develop a resources system to support the respective activities. Moreover, utilizing the 
SENCE (National Training and Employment Service) Antofagasta facilities, Escondida 
places first (SENCE 1996) in terms of courses offered, personnel trained and amount 
invested. In addition to the courses authorized by SENCE, this effort involves training 
programs specific to each employee. In total, Escondida invested US $2.105 million in 
diverse training programs through 1998, the equivalent of approximately US $1 000 per 
person. 
Education 
Escondida created the Escondida Educational Foundation, which runs a four-year 
apprenticeship program in which 70 percent of the skills are learned within the company, 
according to standards set by Canadian specialists. Currently, the company is creating an 
educational establishment in the area north of Antofagasta. 
Through the Escondida Foundation, the company has addressed the issue of high-school 
graduates' technical skills and work attitudes. The foundation uses tests and rigorous work 
orientation programs, which, in addition to providing training, strengthen personal attitudes 
regarding work. Certain basic values are addressed, such as punctuality, responsibility, and 
the ability to work as a team. The Escondida Foundation also seeks to address the gap 
between high-school level technical formation, which is characterized by a lack of direct 
experience in the company, few practical skills, and many lecture classes, and university or 
professional institute training, which bestows a professional title but also low skill levels in a 
given specialization. 
The Escondida mine has also clearly contributed to an improvement in the capacities of local 
suppliers. These small-and medium-sized firms have benefited from training programs 
oriented at improving their service quality as suppliers to the mine. 
With respect to the themes of education and its relation to the community, the opinions that 
we collected generally agree that there is a generalized demand for educational services 
starting from the arrival of the mining mega-projects such as Escondida. In particular, there is 
a demand for private schools (colegios particulares pagados), due to the arrival of workers 
from outside the region who look for quality services. There is also a demand for these 
schools on the part of local mine workers whose high salaries allow them to access these 
services. In addition, these workers value higher education, which they desire for their 
children in order to consolidate their social status. 
The Antofagasta International School is an Escondida school that initially offered 
correspondence courses through the home countries of the mine owners. The school had 20 
students from Escondida and 20 from Zaldívar. Like the mine, the school is run by 
subcontractors and is currently administrated by ISS, a US company. The school offers levels 
1 through 8 with curriculum similar to that in the United States. Mid-level students still study 
by correspondence. Almost all of the professors are from the United States and Canada, while 
there are only two Chilean instructors. The school offers an international bachelor's degree. 
Though the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) does not recognize it, the school is trying to 
obtain certification in order to incorporate Chilean students. One of the biggest problems 
faced by Chilean executives moving to Antofagasta is the lack of quality schools. 
Community-company relations 
Community perceptions 
The community's perception is heavily influenced by Antofagasta's current economic 
situation. The city's economy has grown explosively in recent years, primarily due to large 
mining-related investments. The population views Escondida as the milestone that marked 
the beginning of the growth period. Economic growth is evident in the increasing number of 
companies offering subsidiary mining-related services, the arrival of national and 
international hotel chains, commercial store chains and travel agents with high national and 
international demand, as well as population growth, the construction boom and an increase in 
consumption and debt. 
There are two points of view regarding Escondida's impact. Local authorities and company 
directors consider the city's economic growth a result of the mining operation. But small-and 
mid-sized business owners feel excluded from the benefits of economic growth as a result of 
Escondida's high technological and environmental standards. The latter sector tends to feels 
that resources are not retained or obtained in the optimal manner, which obliges them to 
engage in productive re-engineering in order to satisfy the potential demand for services 
associated with mining and thus access the highest subcontractor links. 
The region's over-dependence on mining, together with the temporary nature of a mining 
economy, result in moderate forecasts for the future. Residents have a strongly ingrained 
vision of the cyclical nature of the regional economy, while the past experience of the rise 
and fall of nitrate mining is ever-present to successfully contain excess enthusiasm. 
Strategic communication with the community 
Escondida's organizational structure consists of a Corporate Affairs division and, within this, 
a Communications and External Affairs department, which is in charge of community 
relations. This department develops the communications policy oriented toward processing 
information related to the mine's impact on national and regional development. The company 
has contracted local universities to measure the project's impact on the local community, 
especially in socioeconomic terms. 
Initially, development of the cathodes plant in Coloso sparked fierce opposition by organized 
community groups, especially local environmental groups backed by national organizations. 
Faced with this pressure, Escondida adopted a strategy of informing the community through 
local media and organizing informational meetings with various groups. The meetings were 
used to inform participants about the company's safety measures and environmental risk and 
impact analyses. According to company officials, this strategy managed to reverse the 
situation and win over groups that originally opposed the project. 
The company's communication strategy also includes project site visits open to the 
community. 
Citizen participation 
Company officials say that even before the Environmental Law regulations were published, 
they provided information concerning every new project in an official manner, first to the 
authorities and later to interest groups such as the Lion's Club, the Rotary Club, the Red 
Cross, local universities, small business groups, and the Businessperson's Association. 
Insertion of workers and employees in the community 
Escondida has a housing plan that builds new houses for workers and employees, available 
through a finance plan with low-interest loans. As part of the company's policy, the houses or 
apartments are built in different parts of Antofagasta in order to avoid the creation of a 
"miners' ghetto" and to promote the natural insertion of company employees in the 
community. 
In the southern part of Antofagasta is an area known as the Southern Gardens, a modern 
gated community on the south side of the University of Antofagasta planned as a barrio alto 
with lawns, small plazas and gardens. Residents are business people, wealthy professionals 
and Escondida employees. 
According to articles in the Antofagasta newspaper El Mercurio, in the last five years 
Antofagasta has become a real-estate paradise due to the region's economic boom. The arrival 
of mining companies and their subcontractors has generated a floating population that 
demands a large quantity of real estate. 
Community benefits 
Escondida Foundation 
One of the company's primary strategies for establishing links with the local community was 
the creation of the Escondida Foundation. The idea was approved in 1994 and began 
operations in 1996. It represents the way the company chose to pursue the increased 
effectiveness of its community relations program as well as more effective social actions both 
for the poor and extremely poor sectors. 
The foundation's principal objectives are centered on the areas of education, health, and 
technology. Projects presented to the foundation must comply with a series of requirements 
regarding formulation, programming, costs, and management before they are submitted to the 
board of directors for consideration. The board of directors consists of 11 people, five of 
whom are distinguished members of the community at the national and regional levels. 
The foundation's programs focus on five principal areas, each of which has its own specific 
projects: micro-enterprise, labour insertion, educational support, health support, and 
development funds programs. 
The foundation avoids assistentialism, aiming instead to train people to resolve their own 
problems, a clear indication of their long-term objective. The foundation's main strategy is to 
form teams or strategic alliances with other organizations in its program areas. From its 
founding as a non-profit institution, the majority of the foundation's resources have been 
oriented toward the poor and extremely poor sectors, as is evident in the list of current or 
completed projects that received support. The foundation's development programs are geared 
to job creation and access, as well as quality of life issues, which constitute the backbone of 
its objectives. 
The fishermen of Coloso Bay (the copper concentrate port) constitute another community 
group that has benefited directly from the Escondida mining company. The company 
financed the construction of market stalls, public bathrooms, road improvement, drinking 
water tanks and the group's office headquarters. The company also finances school 
transportation for children and drinking water. 
Escondida has collaborated with local universities and the Antofagasta Industrial School on 
cultural, educational, sports, and recreational activities. It has organized art and literary 
activities with secondary schools, and sponsors Antofagasta Day, the municipal orchestra's 
concert series, and the professional football (soccer) team, Deportes Antofagasta. 
Productive Development Corporation 
An interesting way in which the company builds relations with the local community is 
through the Productive Development Corporation, which began as a regional government 
initiative in accordance with its development strategy. One of the corporation's central 
objectives is to link the regional development strategy to large companies and universities, to 
foster joint public-private efforts. 
The informed community (technicians, academics and local authorities) views this 
corporation as an important initiative for long-term regional development. The corporation 
seeks to strengthen the capacities of small-and medium-sized companies associated with the 
mining industry. Once installed, these capacities become part of the region's human capital. 
Incorporating the concept of a "productive association" and encourages measures to promote 
it are seen as important for strengthening the abilities of small businesses to compete and 
capture resources. 
The regional government, the mining companies of Escondida and Codelco and other mid-
sized firms participate in the Productive Development Corporation. Important electric and 
sanitary companies from the region are also involved, as well as the University of 
Antofagasta and Northern Catholic University. The corporation's composition is similar to 
that known as the "strategic peak," which brings together the principal regional actors 
involved in development. The corporation's associates consider Escondida's participation as 
very important, both in terms of start-up and subsequent maintenance. Escondida's support of 
the Productive Development Corporation is part of its policy for linking the company with 
the community. 
The Case of the Candelaria Mining Company 
Description of the project 
The Candelaria mining project was inaugurated in March 1995. The Phelps Dodge 
Corporation, the main owner of the Candelaria mine, began explorations in 1983 and finished 
in 1987. The mine is located 9 kilometers south of Tierra Amarilla and 20 kilometers south of 
Copiapó in Region III, at approximately 650 meters above sea level. The operation extends 
over approximately 4 000 hectares that include the mine, the concentrator, the tailings dam 
and other facilities. The Candelaria Mining Company is owned by Phelps Dodge (80 percent) 
and a consortium made up of the Japanese companies Sumitomo Metal Mining and 
Sumitomo Corporation (20 percent). Estimated mineral reserves are 366 million tonnes with 
a grade of 1.29 percent, which at an extraction rate of 50 million tonnes per year should last 
34 years. 
The water needs of the mine are met by five wells in the town of Alcaparrosa. Each is 
between 60 and 100 meters deep, more than sufficient to reach the groundwater table that lies 
30 meters below the surface, on average. The concentrator consumes approximately 95 
percent of the water used in the mining operation, or some 2 800 cubic meters per hour. 
Eighty-five percent of the water is recuperated, meaning that fresh water consumption is 
about 130 liters per second. 
The concentrate (with an approximately 9 percent humidity level) is transported by truck to 
the port of Padrones, located opposite Caldera Bay on Padrones Point about four kilometers 
south of the city center. This is where the company built the Clean Mechanized Port, where 
the concentrate is prepared for shipment. Construction began in August 1993 and the facility 
was inaugurated on 3 February 1995. Preparation capacity is 1 200 tonnes per hour, which 
means that it takes two or three days output to fill a 35 000-tonne capacity ship. 
Economic variables 
Mining is the principal economic activity in Region III, which has an estimated population of 
269 100 inhabitants and a population density of 3.6 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Production of copper, gold, silver and iron represent 41 percent of the gross regional product. 
Agriculture accounts for 17 percent, especially the production of table grapes for export in 
the Copiapó and Huasco valleys. Fishing and construction have emerged as important 
activities in the last several years. During recent years the growth of Region III (Atacama) 
has been strongly influenced by the arrival of large-scale mining projects, principally the 
Candelaria project. 
Production 
During 1993–1995, Atacama's gross regional product grew at an annual average rate of 11.5 
percent, which was significantly higher than the average national growth rate of 6.3 percent. 
Indeed, in 1995, when Candelaria began Phase 1 of production, Atacama's gross regional 
production grew at a rate of almost 24 percent. In the same year, mining accounted for 11.3 
percent of the gross regional product. 
Candelaria's production is presented in Table 4. 
In 1997, national copper production was nearly 3.7 million metric tonnes. Candelaria's share 
of national copper production was 5.8 percent for that year. Between 1994 and 1998, 
Candelaria accounted for an average of 4.4 percent of national copper production. 
Region III produced approximately 380 000 metric tonnes of copper in 1997, 41 percent of 
which was attributable to Candelaria. Its average contribution to regional production for the 
years 1994 to 1997 was 36 percent. Finally, copper mining in Region III accounted for 10.8 
percent of national copper production. 
Investment 
With an investment of more than US $565 million during Phase I, the Candelaria mining 
project is the largest investment in Atacama in the last several decades. The project represents 
48 percent of the total foreign investment in the region's mining industry realized via DL 600 
between 1974 and 1997 and 5 percent of the country's total foreign investment under the 
same system for the same period. In 1997, the company's accumulated investment reached 
approximately US $902 million through the end of Phase II of the project, which increased 
annual average production to 175 000 tonnes of high-grade copper. At these production rates, 
the project lifespan dropped to 17 years. 
Table 4. Candelaria production: 1994–1998. 
Year Concentrate (mt) Silver (oz) Gold (oz)
1994 30 900 119.4 27.4
1995 150 300 981.2 97.8
1996 136 800 478.6 82.6
1997 155 700 527* 76*
1998 215 000 616* 69*
Source: Candelaria Mining Company. 
* Estimated figures. 
Total foreign investment in the region for the period 1990–1998 was approximately US $1.3 
billion, of which 68 percent came from the Candelaria project. At the national level, total 
foreign investment for the same period was nearly US $27 billion, of which 3.4 percent was 
attributable to Candelaria. Finally, Candelaria's contribution to total foreign mining 
investments is 8 percent. Based on these indicators, we can conclude that Candelaria has a 
significant regional impact. 
Exports 
In 1998, Candelaria exported 206 000 metric tonnes of high grade copper, which represents 
approximately 39 percent of total regional exports and 6 percent of national mineral exports. 
Employment 
Originally, Candelaria employed 650 workers, which increased to about 900 workers as the 
project expanded. In 1997, in addition to the 791 workers employed by Candelaria, an 
additional 435 workers had permanent jobs at the company's subcontractors. Currently, there 
are 869 direct employees, of which approximately 82 percent hail from Region III. 
Meanwhile, there are 450 indirect workers, of which 95 percent come from Region III. These 
numbers represent approximately 4 percent of the work force in Region III. 
In order to analyze the indirect effects on the local economy of the salaries received by the 
workers and management at Candelaria, we used the multiplier for the mining sector 
estimated by the Faculty of Economics and Administration of the Catholic University of the 
North. (See Table 5.) According to this study, for each worker employed by a mining firm in 
Chile, approximately 1.76 indirect jobs are generated on the assumption that all of the income 
is spent in the region. We will use this indicator to get an order of magnitude of the indirect 
employment and income effects of the mine, keeping in mind that it is a general multiplier 
and not specific to Candelaria. 
Table 5. Direct and indirect impacts generated by the income received by the workers 
and management of Candelaria (US $) 1999. 
  Workers Management Total
Income 58 951 768 31 030 046 89 981 814
Direct impact 47 703 770 24 405 131 72 108 901
Indirect impact 83 958 636 42 953 031 126 911 667
Direct plus indirect impact 131 662 406 67 358 162 199 020 568
Employment multiplier 1.76 1.76 1.76
Income multiplier 2.23 2.17 2.21
As in the case of Escondida —see Table 3 —the direct impact is the expenditure of the mine 
workers, while the indirect impact is the expenditure of those receiving employment 
indirectly due to the mine. The income multiplier is total income generated in the region 
divided by the income earned by the mine workers and management. 
Others 
Including investments in the port facilities at Padrones Point, total infrastructure investment 
was approximately US $62.5 million. In addition, the company has constructed 21.5 
kilometers of new roads, 17 of which are in or around the town of Tierra Amarilla and 4.5 of 
which are in Caldera. 
Between 1993 and 1996, Phelps Dodge paid approximately US $30 million in taxes, 
including taxes on income, patents, concessions and others. 
Candelaria has developed a housing assistance plan that aims to help workers find housing 
solutions in the communities of Copiapó, Tierra Amarilla or Caldera, depending on their 
work location. This has meant accumulated costs, through May 1997, of US $3.3 million. In 
addition, Candelaria is constructing a modern sports facility in the town of Copiapó. 
Environmental variables 
Company policy 
The issue of the environment has been fundamental in the development of the Candelaria 
mine. Environmental protection is a constant concern and priority in each of the company's 
institutions, a concern born in the directives and objectives of the Phelps Dodge Corporation. 
The company's mission statement declares that its central objective is to create value for its 
associates and workers within a context of responsibility, ethics, and safety. 
The company aspires to be a good neighbor who protects the environment. In addition, the 
company expressly declares its commitment to and involvement with the local community 
where the company is located. The company pledges to use the cleanest and most advanced 
technology throughout the exploitation process. The company's primary objectives are to 
protect the natural environment, serve as an example of the best environmental practices in 
the industry and to be recognized as a responsible entity by the community, other companies 
and government authorities. 
Candelaria was the first company in Region III to voluntarily conduct environmental impact 
studies before beginning operations. These studies allowed the company to obtain 
environmental authorizations starting in 1992. The company conducted a detailed study of 
solid waste management, which lead to the control and minimization of the operation's 
adverse environmental impacts. In addition, the company continuously monitors air, soil, and 
water quality. It also has signed agreements with schools and universities to realize 
investigations and joint seminars. 
Safety and quality standards 
Environmental protection measures at the mine and processing plant in Tierra Amarilla and 
the port facility in Caldera Bay include: an emissions control program in the area of the mine, 
environmental training programs, a fully enclosed concentrate transport system, and a system 
of water recovery and reuse that has made the company the lowest water consumer per tonne 
of processed mineral in the region. Between 82 percent and 85 percent of the water used at 
the mine is recycled, according to information provided by the company. 
Nevertheless, some agricultural producers express doubts with respect to the water recycling 
figures reported by the company and feel the mine is taking water away from producers in the 
area. However, the company periodically sends regional and local environmental authorities 
all monitoring data and maintains it has not received a single complaint from any neighbor 
with respect to water use. 
It would appear the company is doing everything in its power to comply with Chilean and 
international norms. Nevertheless, the population does not feel entirely sure about the 
solutions or studies presented by it. This could be due to a lack information or to the 
industry's historical legacy that has lead community residents to believe that mining is a 
polluting activity with little concern for the environment. 
Starting in 1997, Candelaria began to design an environmental management system (EMS) 
based on strict international guidelines under the voluntary ISO 14001 standard. In December 
1999, the company's EMS was certified under this system for all mine and port facilities, 
making it one of the first copper mining operations in the world to achieve full certification 
under the ISO standards. 
Social and human capital 
Health 
Company's internal health 
Candelaria's total health program provides for drug and alcohol testing. The Risk Prevention 
Department is in charge of testing under the Phelps Dodge philosophy known as "zero and 
lower," which refers to the company's goal of a workplace, home, school and community that 
is free of material damage, injuries and accidents. 
The work shift is not a health problem for the workers at Candelaria. Since workers return 
home daily, there are no problems associated with prolonged stays at worker camps. 
 
 
Benefits to community health 
Candelaria has contributed significantly to the remodeling of emergency services at the 
Regional Pediatric Hospital in Copiapó and to the construction of the general clinic in 
Rosario. 
Education and training 
As the owner of Candelaria, Phelps Dodge's education strategy is oriented to strengthening 
relationship between the formation of new mining technicians and the company's needs in the 
context of a cleaner, more technologically advanced mining industry. Toward this end, the 
company collaborates with the Benjamín Teplinzky Center, which provides technical training 
for the mining industry. 
A second area of focus is the implementation of student and teacher training programs at the 
region's technical and professional schools. The programs consist of internships at the mine, 
which provide participants with a realistic vision of the mining industry. In this way, the 
company seeks to overcome the problem of a lack of articulation between technical training 
and company needs. 
A third area of focus is an orientation program for the company's own workers and suppliers. 
The program's main objective is to introduce every worker, employee or supplier to 
Candelaria's corporate model, which has clear procedural guidelines regarding such 
considerations as technological management, worker safety, and environmental protection. 
Between 1993 and 1996, the company invested US $630 000 in employee training, the 
equivalent of 143 person-hours of training. According to the National Employment and 
Training Services (SENCE), the total of US $1.9 million was invested in training programs 
for Region II in 1995. Phelps Dodge's training investment that year was US $288 000, or 15 
percent of the regional total. In addition, Phelps Dodge created the San Lorenzo School in 
conjunction with the Placer Dome Company. The two companies have set up a scholarship 
program for workers and their families. Candelaria's contribution to this program was US 
$194 000 in the first semester of 1997. 
Community-company relations 
Community's perception 
The region has numerous recognized comparative advantages for its development, including 
significant natural resources available for exploitation. This does not mean that region's 
advantages and possibilities are free of risks or threats. The community has a clear sense of 
the risks inherent in large mining projects. Residents make constant references to large 
projects of the past that extracted minerals and left behind nothing more than a hole in the 
ground. In this sense, Atacama is a region with mining experience. The community also has a 
clear vision of what contributions a mining project should make to regional development. In 
this case, references point to important projects that in the past left their mark on the region 
by constructing lasting public works. 
The presence of companies such as Candelaria attracts banking institutions and large stores to 
the region. This is seen both as an opportunity for general employment and as a threat, since 
local businesses are displaced. Thus the arrival of a new mining project is viewed with a 
mixture of mistrust and enthusiasm. The negative experiences of the past are not enough to 
contain the enthusiasm generated by arrival of new projects, and people create expectations 
that they pass on to family members in other parts of the country, causing migration to the 
region in search of jobs. Expectations center on jobs and increased business for local 
commerce and service providers, since mine employees receive higher salaries than the local 
average and thus have greater purchasing power. 
Nevertheless, our interviews with members of the commercial sector revealed a different 
perception of mining in general. The perception is that mine employees tend to spend their 
wages on recreation and diversion in other parts of the region, since many of them live in 
other cities. Miners do not spend their income at local businesses, but rather spend it in other 
cities. This is attributed to the fact that there are important mining companies in the area that 
import workers from other regions who generally do not reside in Copiapó, or if they do, it is 
only temporary. 
Local suppliers 
With regard to input purchases, large companies generally purchase items needed 
immediately in Copiapó or locally, while big ticket items or larger orders are purchased in 
Santiago. Candelaria has made efforts to give priority to regional companies during bidding 
for goods and service provision. Nevertheless, there are various areas in which local 
businesses are not qualified to provide to the company. Some 56 percent of Candelaria's costs 
from the acquisition of goods and services are spent on companies outside of Region III. 
The company's policy states that, all things being equal, it prefers to use local suppliers for 
the provision of goods and services. Above all, the company gives priority to local residents 
in the area of employment, in an attempt to capture all qualified human resources from people 
in the area. For example, the transport of mineral concentrate from the mine to the port is 
done by a local company, with which Candelaria has very close relations. 
Since operations began, many companies from Santiago have opened branch offices in the 
area. There has also been significant growth in purchases from local businesses and the 
appearance of several small local subcontractors in areas such as shipping, welding, vehicle 
repair and facilities engineering. Instead of maintaining a long list of potential suppliers, 
which was the company's initial policy, Candelaria has chosen to concentrate on a few key 
suppliers. Suppliers can thus maintain their competitiveness and count on a certain volume of 
business, allowing them to maintain a stable work force and keep experienced workers. In 
addition, this allows the company to inculcate suppliers with its corporate values, such as 
safety and environmental protection. The company has been extremely rigorous on this point 
and subcontractors have assimilated key corporate values. 
Commerce 
In the local commerce sector, there is the perception that benefits have not been as significant 
as those in nearby towns such as Antofagasta or Iquique, where large-scale mining has 
produced visible and explosive development. According to our interviews, public authorities 
have an important role to play in pressuring large companies to make significant and lasting 
investments, such as housing complexes, that ensure workers will live in the area and, in 
consequence, require local services. Our interviewees indicated that local commerce tends to 
benefit more from small-and medium-sized mining companies. 
Infrastructure 
In the community's view, the most important contribution that a mega-project can make is the 
construction of large public works. Candelaria has not built any large public works for the 
community, such as a highway or housing complex. While it is true that Candelaria built 
houses for its executives, the community does not view this as a contribution to the city. The 
area where Candelaria managers and upper executives live is perceived as an exclusive 
enclave that has not been incorporated into the city and does not contribute to the company's 
integration into the community. 
The lack of a large housing complex for Candelaria employees and workers has been strongly 
criticized.40 The company adopted a policy of letting all supervisors and worker choose their 
own housing in the region by way of its housing plan. Under this plan, 60 percent of workers 
have their own homes. This was an attempt to integrate workers into the community. 
Employment 
Our interviewees agree that Candelaria's impact on job creation has been significant. While 
the community's expectation is that it will be able to meet all of the company's labour needs, 
there is the perception that even though this is not the case, the project nevertheless represents 
an important boost to the regional economy. Interviewees refer to prior project phases, such 
as construction, during which there were 2 000 new jobs in the region. 
However, not all jobs went to regional workers. According to the labour secretariat, the local 
work force covered approximately 20 percent of the demand, which from the local 
perspective is positive, since it meant 400 direct new jobs for the region. The remaining 80 
percent went to outside workers who arrive in search of work. According to one informant, 
they are viewed as a contribution to the region, since they constitute a qualified work force 
that will be integrated into the community as a factor for change. As a result of this migratory 
flow, Copiapó's population has grown nearly 7 percent since 1990. 
A negative aspect of this new source of employment stems from the distortions in the local 
job market caused by the relatively high salaries. Services tend to become more expensive, 
especially for the sector of the population that is not linked to the mining project. 
Work shift 
Candelaria does not use worker camps at the mine; instead, workers return home at the end of 
every shift. This situation directly benefits the community since it is able to capture a larger 
share of the work force's expenditures. The situation is very different for the employees of 
subcontractors. According to the region's labour authority, this is one of the greatest concerns 
generated by Candelaria. There are significant differences between Candelaria employees and 
subcontractor employees, in areas such as salary levels, the length of contracts, work 
conditions and internal relations. The Candelaria worker, for example, has access to a sports 
facility and many other advantages for building a family life that the subcontractor employee 
does not have. 
Union 
The appearance of a union at Candelaria has not been exempt from the general problems of 
unionism at the international level. Our interviewees indicate that the appearance of 
Candelaria's union was hidden and gradual. Issues such as medical leave and housing 
programs sparked workers' interest. 
The union's objective is to be fully organized in time for the next collective bargaining round 
in 2001. Its strategy has been to establish alliances with similar entities and to participate in 
worker confederations, especially the metal mining confederation. Union leaders have 
initiated conversations with unions at the parent company's projects in the USA and Canada  
40 There are mechanisms for workers to buy housing through Serviu, where workers are 
obligated to stay at the company for 12 years. 
who are interested in supporting their Chilean counterparts. It is worth noting that the union 
does not participate in the CUT (Unified Workers Central), which is seen as politicized entity 
that does not represent workers' interests. 
Union leaders are concerned with the unequal working conditions between Candelaria and 
subcontractor employees. They are not indifferent to the situation and they consider it unjust. 
While the issue is not part of their demands, it is something that concerns them and is cause 
for solidarity. 
Contributions to the community 
The union is critical of the company's contributions to the community, which it considers 
insufficient and opportunistic. Union leaders note that many company donations appear to be 
part of a communications strategy to attract press coverage rather than a real contribution to 
the community. According to union leaders, the company should have a budget item 
specifically for contributions to the community. This situation prompted the union to generate 
its own funds to help the community, since they feel they are in a privileged situation. 
From the company's perspective, Phelps Dodge's policy seeks to establish a strong 
commitment to the communities where its operations are located. The company has 
contributed US $1.6 million to the regional community since it arrived in the area. Starting in 
1994, when Candelaria began production, the company has concentrated on maximizing its 
contributions to the regional community, principally the towns of Tierra Amarilla, Copiapó 
and Caldera. Between 1995 and 1997, the company contributed US $830 000 for various 
health, education and sports initiatives. 
 
